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Abstract
Ryan McCall. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August/2014. Fundamental
Motivation and Perception for a Systems-Level Cognitive Architecture. Major Professor:
Stanley P. Franklin.
A comprehensive systems-level cognitive architecture attempts to provide a blueprint for
generally capable intelligent software agents or cognitive robots. While such
architectures can be conceived and studied at a high level of abstraction, this work
focuses primarily on some of the low-level algorithms underlying the architecture. For
instance, one might study logical reasoning, decision-making, etc., ignoring or making
simplifying assumptions about the perceptual processes producing the representations
involved in the higher-level processes. In contrast, critical aspects of cognitive
architectures lie in the low-level details of the traditionally identified, abstract modules
and processes.
Natural selection has imbued biological agents with motivations driving them to
act for survival and reproduction. Likewise, artificial agents also require motivations to
act in a goal-directed manner. In this context, I present a motivational extension to the
LIDA cognitive architecture integrated within LIDA’s cognitive cycle at a fundamental
level. This motivational extension provides a repertoire of motivational capacities
including alarms, feelings, affective valence, incentive salience, emotion, appraisal,
reinforcement learning, and model-free and model-based learning. A LIDA-based agent
implementing the proposed motivational extension replicates a reinforcer devaluation
experiment testing its ability to learn, and later revise, the reward predicting attributes of
stimuli that drive its behavior.
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Intelligent software agents must also autonomously navigate complex, dynamic,
uncertain environments with bounded resources. In my view, this requires that they
continually update a hierarchical, dynamic, uncertain internal model of their current
situation, via approximate Bayesian inference, incorporating both the sensory data and a
generative model of its causes. To explicate my approach, I identify perceptual principles
for cognitive architectures influencing perceptual representation, perceptual inference,
and the associated learning processes. Guided by these, I propose a predictive coding
extension to the HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms, termed PC-CLA, as a potential
foundational building block for the systems-level LIDA cognitive architecture. PC-CLA
fleshes out LIDA’s internal representations, memory, learning and attentional processes;
and takes an initial step towards the comprehensive use of distributed and probabilistic
(uncertain) representation throughout the architecture. I conclude with reports on a
battery of new tests of the original CLA as well as proof-of-concept tests of PC-CLA.
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Introduction

Cognitive architectures are control structures for autonomous agents. An autonomous
agent is a system situated within, and a part of, an environment, that senses that
environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda, so as to affect what it
senses in the future (Franklin & Graesser, 1997). Given this, how can the agenda of an
autonomous agent be implemented in a cognitive architecture? How does such agenda
arise from basic cognitive processes? I address these foundational questions in the third
chapter on artificial motivations.
Motivation is a broad term influencing everything from simple reflexive actions
to decade-long career commitments. In this work, I discuss a number of motivational
processes covering a range of temporal scales, and having varying complexity. My
approach bases motivation on feelings. Motivation based on feelings for autonomous
agents is not a new idea. Several researchers have addressed this topic to date (Bach,
2009; Canamero, 2003; Franklin & Ramamurthy, 2006; Gmytrasiewicz & Lisetti, 2002;
Lang & Davis, 2006; Sloman & Croucher, 1981). Moreover, the topic of human emotion
has seen a vast amount of study (e.g., Davidson, Maxwell, & Shackma, 2004; Davis &
Lewis, 2004; Izard, 1993; Pessoa, 2008; Shariff & Tracy, 2011; Yiend, 2010; Zhu &
Thagard, 2002).
It is not my aim to start a priori with human-level emotional categories, and
attempt to explain their function, or how they arise. Rather, I present a motivational
extension to the broad systems-level LIDA cognitive architecture (McCall, Franklin,
Snaider, & Faghihi, in preparation), based on feelings, and integrated within the system at
a fundamental level — an approach to motivation involved in the entirety of cognition.
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However, I hold that only by building upwards from solid conceptual primitives can we
provide precise systems-level explanations of such complicated phenomenon. The
motivational extension is biologically inspired, but does not aim to model human or
animal motivation at the level of neuroscience.
Chapters 4 and 5 explore modern perception (recognition) algorithms with
properties hopefully suitable for future integration with the broad systems-level LIDA
cognitive architecture. In these chapters, I propose a 2D extension to the HTM Cortical
Learning Algorithms (CLA), termed 2D-CLA as well as a predictive coding extension,
which I call PC-CLA (McCall & Franklin, 2013). The work is presented in the context of
the LIDA model; however, it does not depend on the commitments of the LIDA model
(Franklin, Strain, McCall, & Baars, 2013), and as a consequence, should be widely
applicable. I review several inspirational models for this work including Hierarchical
Temporal Memory, predictive coding, and others. Some of these, as models of cortical
computation, have biological inspiration to their credit. Others feature equally compelling
information-theoretic justifications, e.g., the free-energy principle (Friston, 2010), as well
as mathematical justifications, e.g., implementing approximate hierarchical Bayesian1
inference (Lee & Mumford, 2003). Crucially, I strive to identify key principles across
these various approaches that will guide research and development of networks, like PCCLA, capable of robust recognition of patterns not only having hierarchical structure, but
temporal dynamics as well. Also, in the context of systems-level cognitive architectures,
it should be possible to reconcile such a network with the commitments of the
architecture. To this end, I discuss several theoretical considerations for integrating PC1
Bayesian probability is one of the different interpretations of the concept of probability that can be seen as
an extension of logic enabling reasoning with propositions whose truth or falsity is uncertain.
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CLA, which has its own requirements, into the broad-based LIDA model. While such
connectionist approaches may also have more narrow applications to pattern recognition
problems, I focus here on PC-CLA as a potential building block for the implementation
of the current representations, memory and learning, and attentional processes of LIDA
as a systems-level cognitive architecture.
Problem Domain and Philosophy
Not long after its birth, artificial intelligence abandoned its original aim of reproducing
human-level intelligence in favor of developing highly practical systems that behave
intelligently in narrow, but nonetheless important, domains (Franklin et al., 2013). After a
half century, a movement in AI research toward that original quest has emerged under the
heading of artificial general intelligence (Goertzel & Pennachin, 2007; Wang, Goertzel,
& Franklin, 2008). After an initial invitational workshop in 2006, five successful AGI
conferences have been held in several locations including Europe, China, and the United
States (e.g., de Garis & Goertzel, 2009). The last two conference proceedings were
published in Springer’s Lecture Notes in AI book series (Bach, Goertzel, & Iklé, 2012;
Schmidhuber, Thorisson, & Looks, 2011). Additionally, The Journal of Artificial
General Intelligence has published several volumes.
A parallel movement flies under the rubric of BICA (Biologically Inspired
Cognitive Architectures). First appearing as several AAAI symposia carrying that name
(Samsonovich, 2008), the movement has produced successful conferences of its own
(Samsonovich & Johannsdottir, 2011; Samsonovich, Jóhannsdóttir, Chella, & Goertzel,
2010), and has started a journal, Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures, published
by Elsevier. The aims and scope declaration of the journal begins with the sentence, “The
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focus of the journal is on the integration of many research efforts in addressing the
challenge of creating a real-life computational equivalent of the human mind.” Note that
the “BICA challenge,” as it has come to be called, is quite equivalent to the goal of AGI.
Another such parallel movement was ushered in by the First Annual Conference
on Advances in Cognitive Systems, held in Palo Alto, California in December 2012. Its
call for papers asserts “The purpose is to provide a venue for research on the initial goals
of artificial intelligence and cognitive science, which aimed to explain the mind in
computational terms and to reproduce the entire range of human cognitive abilities in
computational artifacts.” A new online journal, also entitled Advances in Cognitive
Systems, has published its second volume.
Yet another movement in this same direction is arising in the form of an AAAI
Spring symposium entitled “Designing Intelligent Robots: Reintegrating AI.” The
Overview of its second incarnation (Spring 2013) includes the following lines:
AI is a fragmented field: well-developed and largely independent research
communities exist for learning, planning, reasoning, language, perception
and control. Since the challenges posted by each of these subfields are
immense, most researchers have found it necessary to devote their careers
to specializing in a single subfield. While immense progress has been
made in each of these subfields in the last few decades, it remains unclear
how they can be integrated to produce an intelligent robot. Unifying these
disparate technologies will open up new avenues of research and create
new application opportunities. Therefore, we believe that integration
should be considered a valid research endeavor in its own right.
(Designing Intelligent Robots, 2012)
It would seem that the quest for a generally applicable, integrated AI system capable of
human-level intelligence is an idea whose time has come. The question is how to go
about it. Necessary components include human-level perception, action selection, and
everything in between. This calls for controlling our generally applicable, integrated AI
agent with a systems-level cognitive architecture capable of human-level intelligence.
4

Many cognitive architectures exist, though none, as of yet, at human-level intelligence
(Samsonovich, 2010). Some of these architectures, for instance SOAR, ACT-R,
CLARION, are decades old, while others are relatively new (Franklin, Strain, et al.,
2013).
The need for using systems-level cognitive architectures has been championed in
the past by several researchers. As social psychologist Kurt Lewin so succinctly pointed
out, “There is nothing so practical as a good theory” (Lewin, 1951, p. 169). Artificial
intelligence pioneer Allen Newell (1973) strongly supported the need for systems-level
theories over isolated ones asserting, “You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win.”
Echoing Newell in decrying the reliance on modeling individual laboratory tasks,
memory researcher Douglas Hintzman (2011, p. 253) wrote, “Theories that
parsimoniously explain data from single tasks will never generalize to memory as a
whole…” Hintzman’s arguments, which rest upon the need for systems-level cognitive
architectures in memory research, carry over into the realm of intelligent agents, again
calling for systems-level architectures. In their review article, Langley, Laird, and Rogers
(2009, p. 2) argue that “Instead of carrying out micro-studies that address only one issue
at a time, we should attempt to unify many findings into a single theoretical framework,
then proceed to test and refine that theory.” They are calling for a broad-based, systemslevel architecture, such as the LIDA architecture. Any such systems-level cognitive
model must necessarily be quite complex, and so, time-consuming to design and
implement. Thus, at present, Samsonovich (2010) catalogs only about two-dozen such
models, including the LIDA model.
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Contributions of this Work
Motivation in intelligent agents is a complex subject at the intersection of many
disciplines and theories. Some study human emotions and feelings as motivators, others
have focused on the neurobiological aspects of emotion and motivation. Computer
science is included with the disciplines of reinforcement learning and temporal difference
learning.
In the Artificial Motivations Chapter (Chapter 3) I discuss how to extend the
broad systems-level LIDA cognitive architecture to incorporate these various
motivational concepts and mechanisms (McCall et al., in preparation). The aspects
implemented include feelings as motivators, valence, incentive salience, reinforcement
learning, temporal difference learning, model-free control, and model-based control.
These additions include changes to aspects of the LIDA model’s memory, current
representations, and notion of salience. To complement these additions to the LIDA
conceptual model, this work additionally extends the software framework implementation
of the LIDA model to include support for motivation. Specifically, this work 1) adds an
implementation of feelings nodes having affective valence, 2) extends regular nodes by
allowing for current and base-level incentive salience, 3) extends links to pass incentive
salience, and 4) adds learning algorithms related to incentive salience, including temporal
difference learning to LIDA’s PAM. To begin validating the proposed motivational
extension, a computational LIDA agent replicates a psychological experiment testing
motivational phenomena in biological agents.
Perception and pattern recognition are oft-ignored subjects in cognitive models,
which are typically high-level. On the other hand, connectionist approaches are not

6

always concerned with algorithms suitable for systems-level cognitive architectures,
which require online learning and unsupervised learning, and cannot have a human in the
loop. In Chapters 4 and 5 I explore an algorithm capable of processing high dimensional
inputs, which has relevance to cognitive architectures. In Chapter 4 I present a
modification to the HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA), termed 2D-CLA. 2DCLA adds limited 2D receptive fields to CLA to more closely model the way biological
intelligence deals with high-dimensional “natural” data, e.g., audio and visual. I then
describe several tests of the algorithm with relevance to both 2D-CLA and CLA. While
the HTM theory has enjoyed some interest, to date there have been relatively few
published works on the CLA. In Chapter 5 I present a predictive coding extension to the
CLA algorithm, PC-CLA, which extends the algorithm by allowing it to be repeated
recursively in a hierarchy (McCall & Franklin, 2013). I then present additional tests of
the CLA, and initial tests of hierarchy with PC-CLA, which has not seen previous study.
In summary, while my research has several goals, it has produced several
particular contributions to Computer Science and Cognitive Science:
•

Development of the generic parts of the LIDA software framework allowing for
rapid and highly-customizable implementations of LIDA software agents (Ch. 2)

•

Conceptual modeling of motivation in much of cognition using the LIDA model.
Motivation is a fundamental, often-overlooked aspect of cognitive architectures.
(Ch. 3)

•

Extends the computational LIDA software framework to support the conceptual
motivation model (Ch. 6)

•

Part of the proposed work will validate the motivational extension of LIDA via
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the replication of an existing experimental result (Ch. 3)
•

Conceptual modeling of high-dimensional perception in cognition necessary for
intelligent agents with rich senses to succeed in complex environments (Ch. 4–5)

•

Suggests a theoretical view (the free-energy principle) and accompanying
algorithm (PC-CLA) that sees the processes of a systems-level cognitive
architecture as performing general data assimilation based on patterns in time.
This principled approach may help unify existing approaches by providing a core
conceptual framework for mental processes (Ch. 4–5)

•

Fleshes out a method for biologically plausible, limited, overlapping, 2D
receptive fields for the Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA) making the algorithm
more suitable for processing visual stimuli (Ch. 4)

•

Tests and evaluates some of the basic aspects of the CLA, previously undescribed
by published work, including its sparse distributed representations, noise
robustness, parameters and their effects, “boosting” mechanism, and memory
quality (Ch. 4–5)

•

Extends the Cortical Learning Algorithms, by adding predictive coding, to
support hierarchical versions of the algorithm. This allows for hierarchical
decomposition, which is crucial in managing complexity in data analysis and
pattern recognition (Ch. 5)

•

Extends the LIDA software framework to support high-dimensional pattern
recognition, which was previously unsupported. This allows LIDA agents to cope
with sensory data streams of much greater complexity (Ch. 6)

8

Dissertation Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is the Background Chapter
that introduces the LIDA model of cognition, and surveys models relevant to motivations
and perception. The Artificial Motivations Chapter (3) presents a motivation model for
LIDA, its computational implementation, and an experimental replication. Chapter 4
discusses 2D-CLA, its theoretical underpinnings, its applications for perception and
learning in LIDA, and experiments exploring the basic properties of the algorithm.
Chapter 5 covers PC-CLA, presenting a predictive coding extension to CLA termed PCCLA and tests thereof. Chapter 6 proposes additional experimental work to be completed.
In closing, Chapter 7 outlines directions for future research, and discusses the conclusions
and contributions.
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2

Background and Context

The LIDA Architecture and its Cognitive Cycle
The LIDA model is a comprehensive, systems-level, conceptual and computational model
covering a large portion of human cognition1. Based primarily on Global Workspace
theory (Baars, 1988), the model implements and fleshes out a number of psychological
and neuropsychological theories. The LIDA model and its ensuing architecture are
grounded in the LIDA cognitive cycle. The cycle is based on the fact that every
autonomous agent (Franklin & Graesser, 1997), be it human, animal, or artificial, must
frequently sample (sense) its environment and select an appropriate response (action).
The agent’s “life” can be viewed as consisting of a continual sequence of these cognitive
cycles. Each cycle can be divided in three phases: understanding, attending, and acting.
Neuroscientists call this tripartite process the action-perception cycle (Dijkstra, Schöner,
& Gielen, 1994; Freeman, 2002; Fuster, 2004; Neisser, 1976). A cognitive cycle can be
thought of as a moment of cognition, a “cognitive moment” (Snaider, McCall, &
Franklin, 2012). Sophisticated agents, such as humans, process (make sense of) the input
from such sampling in order to facilitate their decision-making and learning. Higher-level
cognitive processes are composed of many of these cognitive cycles, each a cognitive
“atom.”
The LIDA model hypothesizes that the cognitive cycle has a rich inner structure,
which I briefly review next. More detailed descriptions are available elsewhere (Baars &
Franklin, 2003; Franklin, Baars, Ramamurthy, & Ventura, 2005; Franklin, Madl,
D’Mello, & Snaider, 2013). During each cognitive cycle, a LIDA agent first makes sense
1

“Cognition” is used here in an unusually broad sense, so as to include perception, feelings and emotions.
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of its current situation as best as it can by updating its representation of both external and
internal features of its world and itself. By a competitive process, as specified by Global
Workspace Theory, it then decides what portion of the represented situation is the most
salient, the most in need of attention. Broadcasting this portion, the current contents of
consciousness, enables the agent to chose an appropriate action, and execute it,
completing the cycle. Though GWT speaks to phenomenal consciousness, and thus to the
“hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996), the LIDA model follows Shanahan
(2010) in taking the “post-reflective inner view” and doing “… without the habit of
metaphysical thinking.” More specifically, consciousness in the LIDA model refers to
functional consciousness in which no assumption is made of the conscious broadcast
being phenomenally conscious (Franklin, 2003).
Figure 1 shows the process in more detail. The cycle begins with the
understanding phase, where incoming sensory stimuli from external and internal sources
in the agent’s environment activate low-level feature detectors in Sensory Memory. This
begins the process of making sense of the incoming stimuli. These low-level features are
passed on to Perceptual Associative Memory (also called recognition memory) where
higher-level features, such as objects, feelings, actions, events, categories, relations, etc.
are recognized. These features, which have been recognized preconsciously, make up the
percept that passes asynchronously to the Workspace, where a model of the agent’s
current situation is updated. This percept serves as a cue to spatial memory, transient
episodic memory, and declarative memory. Responses to the cue, termed local
associations, consist of remembered contents from these memory systems that were
associated with the various elements of the cue. In addition to the current percept, the
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Workspace contains recent percepts and portions of the structures assembled from them,
which have not yet decayed away. A new model of the agent’s current situation is
assembled from such percepts, their local associations, and the undecayed parts of the
previous model. This assembling process will typically require structure building
codelets. These are small, special purpose processors, each of which has some particular
type of structure it is designed to build. To fulfill their task these codelets may draw upon
Perceptual Associative Memory and even Sensory Memory, to enable the recognition of
relations and situations. They may also draw on the Conscious Contents Queue, which
stores the conscious contents of the past few tens of cognitive cycles (a few seconds of
actual time). The newly assembled model forms the agent’s understanding of its current
situation within its world. It has made sense of the incoming stimuli.
For an agent operating within a complex, dynamically changing environment, this
Current Situational Model (CSM) may well be much too much for the agent to consider
all at once in deciding what to do next. It needs to selectively attend to a portion of the
model, the most salient portion. Portions of the CSM compete for attention. These
competing portions take the form of coalitions of structures from the CSM. Such
coalitions are formed by attention codelets, whose function is to try to bring certain kinds
of structures to consciousness. When one of the coalitions wins the competition, the agent
has effectively decided on what to attend.
One purpose of this processing is to help the agent decide what to do next. To this
end, a representation of the contents of the winning coalition is broadcast globally (hence
the name Global Workspace Theory). Though the contents of this conscious broadcast
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Figure 1. The LIDA cognitive cycle diagram.

are available globally, a primary recipient is Procedural Memory, which stores templates
of possible actions including their contexts and expected results (Drescher, 1991). It also
stores an activation value that attempts to measure, for each such template, the likelihood
that an action taken within its context produces the expected result. Templates whose
contexts intersect sufficiently with the contents of the conscious broadcast instantiate
copies of themselves with their variables specified to the current situation. Instantiated
templates remaining from previous cycles may also continue to be available. These
instantiations are passed to the action selection mechanism (Maes, 1989), which chooses
a single action from one of them. The chosen behavior then goes to Sensory-Motor
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Memory, where an appropriate algorithm, called a motor plan, executes it. The action
taken affects the environment, and the cycle is complete.
Another function of LIDA’s cognitive cycle is to facilitate learning. LIDA’s
multiple modes of learning all occur continually, simultaneously, and online using each
global broadcast of the contents of consciousness (Franklin et al., 2005; Franklin &
Patterson, 2006). Perceptual learning is learning to recognize objects, actions, feelings,
categorizations, relationships, events, etc., and the relationships among them. As new
objects, categories, and the relationships among them and between them, and other
elements of the agent’s ontology are learned, nodes (objects and categories) and links
(relationships) are added to Perceptual Associative Memory (Figure 1). Spatial learning
refers to the building and updating of cognitive maps, which serve to locate objects in the
environment (Derdikman & Moser, 2010; Madl, Franklin, Chen, & Trappl, 2013).
Episodic learning is the encoding of information into episodic memory, the associative,
content-addressable, memory for events — the what, the where, and the when (Baddeley,
Conway, & Aggleton, 2001; Franklin et al., 2005). Relatively little studied by memory
theorists, attentional learning refers to the learning of what to pay attention to (Kruschke,
2011). In the LIDA architecture, attentional learning is the learning of new attention
codelets, and the updating and reinforcing of the existing ones (Faghihi, McCall, &
Franklin, 2012). Procedural learning is the encoding of procedures, i.e., “what” to do
“when,” into Procedural Memory (Figure 1). It is the learning of new actions and action
sequences with which to accomplish new tasks (Franklin, Madl, et al., 2013), and the
reinforcement of old ones. Here we must distinguish between action selection and action
execution. LIDA’s Procedural Memory is composed of schemes concerned with the
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selection of actions. Algorithms (motor plans) for the execution of actions are found in
Sensory-Motor Memory where sensory-motor learning takes place.
The LIDA model hypothesizes that all human cognitive processing is via a
continuing iteration of such cognitive cycles. These cycles occur asynchronously, with
each cognitive cycle taking roughly 300–500ms (Madl, Baars, & Franklin, 2011). These
cycles cascade, that is, several cycles may overlap having their currently active processes
at different stages of the cycle running simultaneously in parallel. This cascading must,
however respect the serial nature of conscious processing necessary to maintain the stable,
coherent image of the world it provides (Franklin, 2005; Merker, 2005). This cascading,
together with the asynchrony, allows a rate of cycling in humans of five to ten cycles per
second.
The Nonlinear Dynamics Bridge to Neuroscience. The LIDA model has invoked
nonlinear dynamics to bridge its nodes and links, perceptual symbols a lá Barsalou
(1999), to neuroscience. This is realized by considering that such perceptual symbols
represent “not neurons or cell assemblies, but, rather, wings of chaotic attractors in an
attractor landscape” (Franklin, Strain, Snaider, McCall, & Faghihi, 2012). The notion of
nodes as wings of chaotic attractors in an attractor landscape is due, in part, to Freeman
and colleagues (Freeman, 1999; Skarda & Freeman, 1987). For instance, when perturbed
by a previously learned exogenous stimulus such as one that may result from an
inhalation, the spiking trajectory of a cell assembly, such as an olfactory bulb, falls into a
wing of an attractor, and so recognizes an odor. LIDA postulates nonlinear dynamics as
an intermediate theory useful in grounding comprehensive cognitive models such as
LIDA in the underlying neuroscience (Franklin et al., 2012).
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Friston and Kiebel (2009) share a similar view that the brain uses attractors to
represent and predict causes in the sensorium. They suggest the brain models sensory
data using a hierarchical dynamical (having temporal dynamics) network. In such a
network, the states of a high-level attractor enter the equations of motion of (providing
control parameters) of a low-level attractor, changing its trajectory, in a nonlinear way.
This form of generative model2 has a number of sensible and appealing
characteristics: 1) any level can generate (and therefore encodes) structured sequences of
state variable patterns, as a level’s state evolves along a trajectory. 2) The network can
generate and therefore predict or represent different categories of sequences (Friston &
Kiebel, 2011). This is because any low-level attractor embodies a family of trajectories
with each member corresponding to a particular instance of a structured sequence. The
current activity encoding the particular state at a particular time determines where the
current dynamics are within the sequence, while the particular basin of attraction
determines which sequence is currently being expressed. In short, the attractor manifold
encodes what is being represented while the current neuronal activity encodes where the
current representation is located on the manifold or within the sequence. 3) If the state of
a higher attractor changes the manifold of a subordinate attractor (e.g., via a top-down
prediction), then the states of the higher attractor come to encode the category of the
sequence of dynamics represented by the lower attractor. This means it is possible to
generate and represent sequences of sequences, and by induction, sequences of sequences
of sequences, and so on. 4) Lastly, this suggests that the dynamics of high-level
representations unfold more slowly than the dynamics of lower level representations,
2

In probability and statistics, a generative model is a model for probabilistically generating observable data
from some distribution, typically given some hidden parameters.
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since the state of a higher attractor prescribes a manifold that can guide the flow of lower
states (Friston & Kiebel, 2009).
The LIDA Software Framework
A software framework (framework) is a reusable implementation of all or part of a
software system. In many cases, a framework constitutes the skeleton of the application,
capturing its generic functionality. The framework specifies a well-defined application
programming interface (API) that is implemented generically using abstract classes,
interfaces, and generic, customizable module design. This hides the complexity of its
code from the user. Most frameworks are based on object-oriented languages because the
major properties of object orientation, data abstraction, inheritance, information hiding
and polymorphism, complement the goals of frameworks. The core idea of a framework
is to have a generic design as well as a base implementation of a complex software
system. The user of the framework then only needs to “fill in the blanks” with problem or
domain-specific elements. This is, perhaps, the major advantage of using frameworks:
users can concentrate their efforts on the specifics of the problems, and reuse the generic
mechanisms implemented in the framework. This also speeds up the development of the
new application, and makes it less error-prone because part of the system has already
been produced and tested.
The LIDA software framework (Snaider et al., 2011) is a generic and
customizable computational implementation of the LIDA model. It is implemented in
Java, a strong and proven object-oriented language. The main goal of this framework is to
provide a generic implementation of the LIDA model, easily customizable for specific
problems or domains. As mentioned before, this has several advantages: it speeds up the
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implementation of new agents based on the LIDA model, and shortens the learning curve
to produce such implementations. While the framework assists in the development of
LIDA agents, it is generic enough to support in developing complex software systems
with several modular pieces.
The framework permits a declarative description of the specific implementation.
The full architecture of the software agent is specified using an XML formatted file; this
is similar to other frameworks where the use of declarative description files are common
(e.g., Walls & Breidenbach, 2005). In this way, the developer does not need to define the
entire agent in Java; he or she can simply define it using the XML specification file.
Another important goal of the framework is its ready customization. The
customization can be performed at different levels of detail. At the most basic level,
developers can use the LIDA configuration file to customize their applications. Several
small pieces in the framework can also be customized implementing particular versions
of them. For example, new algorithms for decaying or for codelets can be implemented
following a specified structure. Finally, more advanced users can also customize and
change internal implementation of whole modules. In each case, the framework provides
default implementations that greatly simplify the customization process.
The conceptual LIDA model suggests that minds operate in parallel. To
complement this, the LIDA framework was developed with multithreading support.
Framework tasks, encapsulations of short processes, along with a dedicated task
manager, implement multithreading support that allows for a high level of parallelization.
Lastly, the LIDA framework implementation adheres to the most important design
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principles (Gamma, Helm, Johnson, & Vlissides, 1995), e.g., factory pattern and strategy
pattern, and best programming practices (Snaider et al., 2011).
The LIDA framework defines several data structures and procedures (algorithms),
and is composed of several pieces. Its main components include Framework Modules
(modules), which are interconnected elements representing modules in the LIDA model.
Another main component is the Framework Task Manager that controls the execution of
all processes in the framework. Most of these processes are implemented as Framework
Tasks, which allows for multithreaded execution by the Framework Task Manager in a
user-transparent manner. The Node Structure is a main data structure in the framework. It
maintains a set of Nodes, a set of Links, and their connections to each other. Nodes, Links
and other LIDA elements such as coalitions, codelets, and behaviors, have scalar
activation attributes. In the LIDA framework, activations are updated (excited or
decayed) using strategies. Strategies are implementations of the strategy design pattern,
which allows for customizable behavior; in this case they specify the manner in which an
activation value is updated. Lastly, the framework implements several supporting tools
such as a customizable GUI, logging, and an architecture loader that parses an XML file
with the definition and parameterization of the application, its data, and processes
(Snaider et al., 2011).
The first version of the LIDA framework features several useful tools. The first is
a customizable GUI consisting of a main GUI application and a series of GUI panels
which display such things as the content of modules, running tasks, parameter values, etc.
A properties file allows users to add their own GUI panels as well as configure which
panels are used and where they appear in the GUI window. The Java logging API is used
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throughout the framework, recording important activities as they occur. Every log entry is
made with one of several levels of severity. A dedicated GUI panel for Logging is part of
the standard framework GUI. It allows the user to view logs of particular levels for
specific modules or all modules. An architecture loader allows agents to be specified via
an XML file. The loader reads this file, and constructs an agent with modules,
parameters, and initial tasks based on the file’s specification. This utility obviates the
need to specify agents by hand, and allows for quick interchange of modules, connections
between modules, change of parameters, etc. The element factory, an implementation of
the factory design pattern (Gamma, Helm, Johnson, & Vlissides, 1995), provides a
centralized, configurable way to obtain new objects common in a LIDA agent
implementation, e.g., Nodes, Links, and Codelets. The objects that the factory produces
can be configured by XML, and, in addition, which strategies such objects use (Snaider et
al., 2011).
The LIDA software framework allows the creation of new intelligent software
agents, and the replication of experiments using software agents based on the LIDA
model. Its design and implementation aim to simplify this process, and to permit to the
user to concentrate on the specifics of the application, hiding the complexities of the
generic parts of the model. It also enforces good software practices that simplify the
creation of complex architectures. It achieves a high level of abstraction permitting
several ways and levels of customization with a low level of coupling among modules.
The framework also provides supplemental tools such as a customizable GUI and logging
support. The result is a powerful and customizable tool with which to develop LIDA
based applications and, perhaps, many others as well (Snaider et al., 2011). To date,
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several LIDA agents using the framework have been successfully developed in support of
published work (e.g., Faghihi et al., 2012; Madl et al., 2011; Madl & Franklin, 2012).
Models of Motivation and Emotion
James (1884) and Lange pioneered early emotions research (Cannon, 1927). In recent
times several theories of motivation for agents and cognitive architectures have been
developed. Here I briefly review a few of the more influential approaches, comparing
them to LIDA’s perspective where applicable.
Picard’s seminal work on “affective computing” (1997, 2003) motivates current
research concerned with artificial emotions in computer systems. Here, the goal is to
develop systems to recognize, express, model, communicate and respond to human
emotions in human-computer interactions. In affective computing, the various attributes
of emotions can be studied separately, unlike in humans. For instance, a researcher might
develop a computer agent that smiles without having the agent actually experience
“happiness.”
Fellous (2004) suggests focusing on the functions of emotions rather than what they
are. He argues that one of the main functions of emotions is to achieve multi-level
communication of simplified but high impact information. Fellous defines feelings as a
subclass of emotions that involves some form of consciousness. He presents a framework,
termed “neuromodulation,” for understanding how emotions arise, are maintained, and
interact with other aspects of behavior and cognitive processing. He argues that it may be
crucial to understand emotions as dynamical patterns of neuromodulations, rather than
patterns of neural activity. He maintains that emotion and “cognition” are integrated
systems implemented by the same brain structures. “Emotion” is related to the state of
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neuromodulation of these structure while “cognition” is related to the state of information
processing. Given that LIDA’s perceptual nodes, including those for “emotions” (see
below) are hypothesized to correspond to particular basins of attraction in the dynamics
of neuron populations (Franklin, Strain, Snaider, McCall, & Faghihi, 2012), the proposed
feeling nodes (see below) can be viewed as being close to Fellous’ vision.
One of the first intelligent agents that used “emotions” as a motivation mechanism
was due to Cañamero (1997), who produced an autonomous agent with basic drives and
an action selection mechanism modulated by its “emotions.” Almost all cognitive
architectures have motivation mechanism(s). For instance, SOAR (Laird, Newell, &
Rosenbloom, 1987) has explicit goals, and an impasse mechanism that creates sub-goals
for complex tasks. More recently emotions have been integrated into SOAR (Marinier,
Laird, & Lewis, 2009), and used to drive reinforcement learning (Marinier & Laird,
2008), but not as motivators. The role of emotions of cognition has also been studied in
ACT-R including its affect on rationality (Fum & Stocco, 2004), decision-making
(Belavkin, 2001), and the “inverted U” effect (Cochran, Lee, & Chown, 2006).
Some cognitive architectures have sophisticated motivational mechanisms. For
example, CLARION uses a bipartite motivational representation where “explicit goals”,
e.g., finding food, are generated based on past and current “internal drive states”, e.g.,
being hungry. This explicit representation of goals derives from, and hinges upon,
implicit drive states. Explicit goals may be generated on the fly during an agent’s
interaction with various situations. CLARION adopts (Sun, 2003) a “balance-of-interests”
approach to goal setting where each drive “votes”, with some strength (e.g.,0 to 9), for
multiple goals. The goal receiving the highest total score is the winner. CLARION posits
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a set of primary drives including food, water, sleep, avoiding physical dangers,
reproduction, avoiding unpleasant stimuli, etc. (Sun, 2009). They are presumed to be
evolutionarily hard-wired. Neural networks implement a “mapping” between world state
and the strengths of drives. Such networks are trained offline, not unlike the process of
evolution, which developed biological motivation. Reinforcement learning is used for
online tuning of drive strengths. Sun also addresses high-level drives, e.g.,affiliation and
belongingness, and personality within CLARION (2009). With such theoretical
underpinnings, the CLARION architecture has modeled human performance degradation
under pressure, which depends heavily on competing drives (Wilson, Sun, & Mathews,
2009).
Another architecture with a rich motivational mechanism is Psi (Dörner & Hille,
1995) and its progeny Micro-Psi (Bach, 2009). Psi distinguishes between demands, urges,
motives, cognitive modulators, affect, and directed emotions. Demands are built-in drives
that give rise to goals while urges are the signals that make demands apparent. The theory
suggests: “an abrupt increase of an urge corresponds to… a ‘displeasure or distress
signal’… while a decrease of an urge — its satisfaction — yields … ‘pleasure signals’”
(Bach, 2012). A motive is defined as the combination of an urge and an event associated
with the satisfaction of the urge. Goals depend on the nature of a given situation, and the
existing demands. Higher-level emotions such as jealousy and anger are said to arise in
Psi from the combination of motives and the agent’s perception of a situation. Psi
maintains that emotions should be distinguished from motivational phenomena, for
example, while hunger is cognitively represented (as an urge) and implies a valence and
an effect on the allocation of mental and physical resources of an organism, it is not an
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emotion, but a motivator. The Psi model provides inspiration for some of the concepts in
the motivation model I propose for LIDA. Later, in the Discussion section, I further
explore the relationships between the two models.
Causal knowledge and its use in prediction are mentioned in our discussion of
motivations. I assume that LIDA has the capacity to form and access temporal memory
between events (defined below); however, this chapter is not meant to constitute a theory
of causal learning (Danks, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2003; Faghihi, Fournier-Viger, &
Nkambou, 2011), and I will not discuss how causal memory might be formed in LIDA.
Previous work on LIDA has approached high-level time production and representation
(Snaider et al., 2012) and temporal memory writ broad (McCall & Franklin, 2013). Hume
argued that causality is not based on actual reasoning: only correlation can actually be
perceived (Morris, 2011). I adopt this stance for the LIDA model suggesting that causal
knowledge is built from frequent, invariant temporal patterns among conscious events
(Faghihi & Franklin, in preparation; Snaider et al., 2012).
Models of Perceptual Analysis and Learning
Here I review several inspirational perceptual analysis theories to provide background
and motivation for the proposed Predictive Coding Cortical Learning Algorithms (PCCLA) (McCall & Franklin, 2013). I feature theories with biological plausibility, more
specifically, those imitating the cerebral cortex. Some aspects of some of these models
are not of interest, e.g., the use of supervised learning is not of interest because it violates
requirements of autonomy and agency.
HMAX (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999) is a biologically inspired model of the
visual ventral stream in primates, which includes the initial feedforward processing that,
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occurs in the initial 100–150ms of visual object recognition (Serre, Kreiman, et al., 2007).
HMAX has shown state-of-art performance on object recognition and action recognition
(Serre, Wolf, Bileschi, Riesenhuber, & Poggio, 2007). HMAX employs two simple
operations, performed in alternating fashion over successive hierarchical levels: 1) a
“max” operation, which selects the strongest input from a given set of inputs, which
builds representational invariance, and 2) a template matching operation, which compares
inputs with stored patterns or templates, building selectivity.
Leabra (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000) stands for “Local, Error-driven and
Associative, Biologically Realistic Algorithm,” and is a model of learning that employs
both Hebbian and error-driven learning. It is used to mathematically predict outcomes
based on inputs and previous learning influences. Hebbian learning is performed using a
form of the Principal Components Analysis algorithm. Error-driven learning is performed
using an approximate recurrent backpropagation algorithm. Layer or unit-group level
inhibition is computed directly using a k-winners-take-all function to produce sparse
representations.
Deep learning networks employ a hierarchical architecture that is comprised of
common circuits with similar (and often cortically influenced) functionality. The goal of
such systems is to represent sensory observations in a manner that will later facilitate
robust pattern classification, mimicking a key attribute of the mammalian brain. Arel,
Rose, and Coop (2009) describe the Deep Spatio-Temporal Inference Network (DeSTIN)
as a scalable deep learning architecture that relies on a combination of unsupervised
learning and Bayesian inference. Dynamic pattern learning forms an inherent way of
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capturing complex spatiotemporal dependencies. The network is proposed for highdimensional signal classification.
Hierarchical Temporal Memory (George & Hawkins, 2009; J Hawkins &
Blakeslee, 2004) is a theory of the primate neocortex, which postulates that the neocortex
builds a model of the world using a spatio-temporal hierarchy. The most recent
implementation of the theory is called cortical learning algorithms (CLA) (Hawkins,
Ahmad, & Dubinsky, 2011). According to the theory, a tree-structured hierarchy built
from a basic computational unit, called a cortical region, can approximate the operation
of the neocortex. Each cortical region in such a hierarchy uses the same learning and
inference algorithm, which entails storing co-occurrence patterns and then sequences of
those co-occurrence patterns. The hierarchy is organized so that higher levels have 1)
successively larger receptive fields in the original input space and 2) tend to produce
representations exhibiting greater invariance over time. It is speculated that this kind of
organization leads to efficient learning and generalization because it mirrors the spatiotemporal organization of the causes in the world (George & Hawkins, 2009). More recent
accounts of HTM (Hawkins et al., 2011) stress the importance of sparse distributed
representations, prediction, and inference for the recognition of patterns in noisy, timevarying data. However, to date, there has been no hierarchical implementation of CLA.
Rao and Ballard (1999) described a “predictive coding” view of the visual cortex,
modeling it as a hierarchical network with units at each hierarchical level continually
predicting the responses of the units in the next lower level via top-down, feedback
connections. The lower level units then send back the discrepancies between the topdown predictions and the actual activity through feedforward connections. These
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discrepancies, or error signals, are then used to correct the higher-level representation of
the cause of the input signal, ideally improving the next top-down prediction. Lower
levels have smaller receptive fields (in the input space and possibly in time), whereas
higher levels have larger receptive fields, predicting and estimating signal properties at a
larger scale by combining the responses of several lower level units (Huang & Rao,
2011).
Predictive coding provides an explanation for oriented receptive fields and
contextual effects (Rao & Ballard, 1999), as well as the hierarchical reciprocally
connected organization of the cortex. Predictive coding has also been found to be
consistent with a variety of neurophysiological and psychophysical data obtained from
different areas of the brain (Huang & Rao, 2011).
Generalized Filtering (GF) (Friston, Stephan, Li, & Daunizeau, 2010) is a
recursive Bayesian estimation3 scheme for nonlinear state-space models in continuous
time. It provides a method for estimating the posterior or conditional probability density
functions on the hidden states (current representations) and unknown parameters (e.g.,
connections implementing memory) generating the observed data, e.g., audio signals or
human kinematics. Unlike classical filtering, e.g., Kalman-Bucy (1961) or Particle
Filtering (van der Merwe, Doucet, de Freitas, & Wan, 2000), Generalized Filtering does
not make Markovian assumptions about the time evolution of its models’ random
fluctuations (probabilistic components). Furthermore, the scheme operates online,
assimilating data to optimize these conditional densities on states and parameters without
the need for a backward pass. Another defining feature of GF is the formulation of this
3
A general probabilistic approach for estimating an unknown probability density function recursively over
time using incoming measurements and a mathematical process model.
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optimization dynamically, in generalized coordinates4 of motion. In this choice of
generalized coordinate system, a point represents the trajectory, at a particular instant, of
some variable (or variables) in the sense that it prescribes the variable’s value, velocity,
acceleration, and higher-order temporal derivatives. GF optimizes the conditional density
with respect to a (approximating) variational free energy5 bound on the model’s logevidence6 using the generalized motion of hidden states and parameters. GF assumes that
the motion of the parameters is small, which avoids assuming conditional independence
between partitions of the model’s parameters as is required by variational Bayes
methods7. GF has been shown to outperform existing approaches, such as particle
filtering, extended Kalman filtering (Puskorius & Feldkamp, 1991), and a similar
approach using variational Bayes termed Dynamic Expectation Maximization (DEM)
(Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, & Daunizeau, 2008).
Based Dynamic Expectation Maximization, Bitzer and Kiebel (2012) developed a
model called recognizing recurrent neural network (rRNN), which fuses the recurrent
neural network (RNN) approach with Bayesian inference techniques for nonlinear
dynamical systems. In this model, units compute and exchange prediction and prediction
error messages, implementing a predictive coding scheme for dynamic inputs. They
demonstrate that the rRNN model has several desirable features over conventional RNNs
including fast decoding of dynamic stimuli, and robustness to initial conditions and noise.

4

A set of coordinates used to describe the state of a system relative to some reference configuration.

5

An information theory measure that provides an upper bound for the Shannon surprise or self-information
on sampling some data, given a probabilistic generative model.
6
The natural logarithm of a marginal likelihood function, i.e., one where some variables have been
marginalized (removed).
7

A family of techniques for approximating intractable integrals arising in Bayesian inference.
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They suggest that Bayesian model inversion (the process of inferring model parameters
from observations) of recurrent neural networks may be useful both as a model of brain
function and as a machine learning tool.
To summarize, I have briefly reviewed several models, many computational, that,
taken together, in my opinion, call for the use of hierarchy, nonlinear dynamics,
approximate Bayesian inference, and biological inspiration from the primate neocortex to
confront the central problem of data analysis or data modeling. I take a closer look at
these ideas and others in Chapters 4 and 5 where I present them as guiding principles for
the Predictive Coding-Cortical Learning Algorithms (McCall & Franklin, 2013).
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3

Artificial Motivations for Cognitive Software Agents

Introduction
Cognitive architectures are control structures for autonomous agents. An autonomous
agent is a system situated within and a part of an environment that senses that
environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda, and so as to affect
what it senses in the future (Franklin & Graesser, 1997). Given this, how can the agenda
of an autonomous agent be implemented in a cognitive architecture? How does such
agenda arise from basic cognitive processes? These are the foundational questions I
address in this work on artificial motivations in the LIDA model (McCall, Franklin,
Snaider, & Faghihi, in preparation). Figure 2 outlines the parts of the LIDA model to
which this work contributes.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: I first make some preliminary
considerations concerning the representation of events and schemes in LIDA. Next, I
review a series of motivation-related concepts, including feelings, affective valence,
incentive salience, emotion, appraisal, reinforcement learning, and model-free and
model-based learning. For each concept, I explain their relation to the LIDA model, and
LIDA’s implementation of the concept. In doing so, I invoke some existing aspects of
LIDA, but also propose new faculties that extend the LIDA model. With this grounding, I
then discuss the role of motivations in a single LIDA cognitive cycle, as well as over
multiple cycles. To begin validating this motivational extension, I present a
computational implementation of a LIDA-based agent with some of these capabilities,
which replicates the results of an existing “reinforcer devaluation” experiment.
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Figure 2. Contributions of Artificial Motivations Chapter to the LIDA model. The work
in this chapter contributes additional constructs to the areas of the LIDA architecture
outlined in green. This includes Perceptual Associative Memory, perceptual learning, the
Workspace, coalitions, the Global Workspace, and scheme recruitment.
Event Representation in LIDA. A recent development in the LIDA model involves the
representation of events (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007; Zacks &
Tversky, 2001). Previously, events were represented by an action node, a perceptual
symbol, with thematic-role links connected to role-filling nodes (McCall, Franklin, &
Friedlander, 2010). Here I suggest maintaining the use of action nodes with thematic
roles; however, an additional more abstract event node should be added encompassing the
action node and its roles, and representing the entirety of the event. In this view, the
action node is a central, but not complete, part of an event. For example, suppose the
event “Charles takes the pen” is recognized in PAM, and becomes part of the current
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percept. Then it should appear as shown in Figure 3 in the Current Situational Model of
the Workspace.

Figure 3. The representation of the event “Charles takes a pen.” Double-headed arrows
indicate bidirectional information passing. The labels are for illustrative purposes and
play no role in LIDA’s dynamics.

With this representation it is clear how events can be recreated by passing
activation “top-down” from the event node. Furthermore, since the single event node
effectively encapsulates the entire event, the event can become a part of a higher-level
structure in a straightforward manner. For example, a link between two event nodes can
express a temporal relationship between the two events. For the purposes of this chapter I
will assume that learned or newly recognized events, while involving several nodes
providing grounding, are effectively encapsulated, and can be referenced by their event
node.
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Network Models of Representation and LIDA. Network models are predicated on the
basic tenet that cognitive representations consist of widely distributed networks of
cortical neurons. Cognitive functions, namely perception, attention, memory, language,
and intelligence, consist of neural transactions within and between these networks. Fuster
(2006) presents a network model of cortical representations called the “cognit.” The
cognit model purports that all cognitive representations (all items of memory and
knowledge) consist of networks of cortical neurons that have been associated by
experience, whether that is the experience of the species or the experience of the
individual organism. Cognits are of an immense variety, in terms of size — that is,
number and cortical distribution of the neurons that form them — and in terms of content.
The content of a cognit derives strictly from its component neurons and, above all, the
relationships (connections) between them. Thus, the memory code is essentially a
relational code. The content of an individual memory is determined by the combination
of neurons that make it. The seemingly infinite variety of individual memories derives
from the practically infinite combinatorial power of some 10 billion neurons (Fuster,
2006).
Perceptual cognits are cognitive networks made of neurons associated by
information acquired through the senses, while executive cognits are made of neurons
associated by information related to action. In both cases cognits are hierarchically
organized. At the bottom of the hierarchy, cognits are small and relatively simple,
representing simple percepts or motor acts. At the top cognits are wider, and represent
complex and abstract information of perceptual or executive (motor) character, or both.
Perceptual and motor networks are associated with each other in cortico-cortical

33

connections. These connections support the dynamics of the perception-action cycle in
sequential behavior, speech, and reasoning (Fuster, 2006).
Inspired by the cognit model for cortical representation LIDA is moving towards
(McCall & Franklin, 2013) a network view of mental representation. That is to say, we
can (and should) view LIDA’s perceptual and motor representations as vast, distributed
network-based representations. One implication is that all but the most trivial of LIDA’s
representations, will be stored as distributed patterns across a hierarchy generated by an
individual memory with each pattern at a different level of abstraction, from features to
objects to events and beyond (see Chapters 4 and 5). Another implication is that there is
clearly no room for copies (in the computational sense) of long-term representations. By
this I mean that complex memories (e.g., events), which involve simpler memories,
should “point back” to their constituent parts. These stances are in accordance with
situated and embodied cognition to which LIDA has long adhered (Franklin et al., 2012).
Scheme Representation in LIDA. LIDA’s Procedural Memory is a critical bridge from
the motivational primitives introduced in this chapter to action selection. Procedural
Memory provides long-term storage of ideas of what to do in various circumstances.
Each such datum is called a scheme, inspired by Drescher’s schema mechanism (1991).
A scheme in LIDA consists of a “context” and a “result,” both perceptual symbols, along
with an “action,” which connects to “an appropriate network in sensory-motor memory”
(D’Mello, Ramamurthy, Negatu, & Franklin, 2006). Under this account, a scheme also
maintains a base-level activation, and, when instantiated as a behavior, a current
activation as well. The current activation measures “the relevance of the scheme to the
current situation (environmental conditions, goals, etc.),” while its base-level activation is
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an estimate of “the likelihood of the result of the scheme occurring as a result of taking
the action within its context” (D’Mello et al., 2006).
One point of clarification needed regarding this earlier description of schemes
concerns the “action.” This entity should not connect directly to Sensory-Motor Memory.
Instead, the “action” should refer to the perceptual symbol that is based on the internal
and external sensory stimuli that accompany the execution of the action (e.g., for the
“grabbing” action, the internal stimulus of one’s hand grabbing an object, and the
external stimulus of seeing one’s hand grabbing). Figure 4 depicts a scheme that includes
an action event. To be clear, there can still be associations between a scheme and motor
plans, however, these are considered to be a part of Sensory-Motor Memory, not a part of
the scheme.
I agree with the earlier stance that the current activation of an instantiated scheme
should derive from “environmental conditions.” Specifically, each of the scheme’s
context, action, and result contributes to the instantiated scheme’s activation based on
their total activation. Later in this chapter I propose how “goals” can impact a scheme’s
current relevance. However, this impact will come in the form of incentive salience
(defined below), a separate quantity from current activation.
The final attribute of schemes to discuss is base-level activation. How might
scheme base-level activation be implemented? One possible answer comes by noting that
the context, action, and result events of a scheme will likely also be the events of an event
sequence in PAM, that is, a recognition memory of a temporal pattern of events
connected by temporal links. If the temporal links of such a sequence encode the
likelihood, for a given context, that the link’s source event leads to its sink event, then the
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scheme’s base-level activation could be based directly on the base-level activation of
these temporal links. The final advantage of this view of schemes as action sequences in
PAM is parsimony. The same event sequence is useful for recognition (i.e., it’s in PAM),
and, if the sequence involves a context, action, and result, it also comprises procedural
memory, without the need to store the memory twice in two different memory systems.

Figure 4. A depiction of a single scheme as proposed in this chapter. Each of the purple
nodes can be thought of as perceptual symbols in LIDA’s PAM.

Motivational Concepts
This section gives several definitions of motivational concepts from other researchers. I
explain how each concept is realized within the LIDA model, and in doing so, hope to
bridge LIDA to existing concepts facilitating comparison and comprehension. I do not
intend to offer LIDA as a comprehensive model of all motivational and emotional
phenomena, but rather as a useful tool for thinking about motivation and emotion, and as
a possible architecture for implementing them in software agents.
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Homeostatic Receptor. Biological agents use homeostatic control mechanisms to
regulate their internal environment, keeping internal variables within stable ranges
(Cannon, 1929). More recently they have been used to implement drives in robots
(Breazeal (Ferrell), 1998). Each homeostatic control mechanism has at least three
interdependent components for the variable being regulated. The receptor is the sensing
component that monitors and responds to changes in the internal environment. When the
receptor senses a stimulus, it sends information to a “control center,” the component
attempting to keep the variable within a stable range. The control center then sends
signals to effectors, which can be muscles, organs, or other structures, that receive signals
from the control center (Marieb & Hoehn, 2007). Homeostatic receptors then are sensors,
which detect the value of critical attributes in an agent’s bodily state. Examples of these
in humans include sensors for low levels of oxygen or glucose in the blood. The detection
of low oxygen and/or high carbon dioxide in the body sends a signal to the brain (control
center). From this point, the brain must interpret the signal. Such interpretation gives rise
to a feeling of, for example, the need to breathe more rapidly. A sensor may be
implemented in many ways, for instance, with distributed inputs from all over the body or
by taking inputs a localized bodily region.
In LIDA, homeostatic sensors are implemented as sensors, and are considered to
be a part of Sensory Memory (see Fig. 1). A particular feature detector begins the control
process detecting an incoming internal (or external) stimulus, and activating an
associated feeling node in Perceptual Associative Memory. The control center concept is
effectively described throughout the rest of this chapter including the aforementioned
mechanisms of LIDA’s cognitive cycle.
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Feeling. Damasio (1999) views feelings as somatic markers, the perception of a certain
state of the body along with the perception of a certain mode of thinking, and thoughts
with certain themes (Damasio, 2003). Franklin and Ramamurthy (2006) also adopted this
view writing:
Feelings in humans include hunger, thirst, various sorts of pain, hot or
cold, the urge to urinate, tiredness, depression, etc… One feels feelings in
the body. Implemented biologically as somatic markers, feelings typically
attach to response options and, so, bias the agent’s choice of action…
Feelings, including emotions, are nature’s means of implementing
motivations for actions in humans and other animals. They have evolved
so as to adapt us to regularities in our environments. These general
preferences derived evolutionarily from regularities can be viewed as
values. Thus feelings become implementations of values in biological
agents, providing a common currency for quick and flexible action
selection.
I adopt this notion of feelings for this work. Feelings are implemented as PAM
nodes in LIDA. They always have exactly one valence sign, either positive or negative
(see below). Given that feelings are implemented as PAM nodes, it is also critical to
distinguish two types of feeling nodes, which will prove useful later on:
1) Drive feeling node, a feeling node representing a drive of the agent.
2) Interpretive feeling nodes, a feeling node representing a perceptual
interpretation of a stimulus.
The former is a representation of the current internal state of the agent’s body,
independent of the current external environment, while the latter is the agent’s evaluation
of a stimulus regardless of whether it is external or internal to the agent. For example, a
“hungry” feeling node represents a drive, and has negative valence sign, while a
“satiated” feeling node also represents a drive but with positive valence sign. A “sweet”
feeling node represents a perceptual interpretation of some stimulus with positive valence
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sign, while a “bitter” feeling node is similar, but with negative valence sign. Intuitively,
one may be hungry or satiated in a variety of external situations, and one may interpret a
variety of different stimuli as sweet or bitter. Again, the importance of this distinction
becomes evident later in the chapter.
Affective Valence. Affective valence is the basic hedonic niceness or nastiness, “liking”
or “disliking,” of reward or aversion that is essential to emotions (Berridge &
Kringelbach, 2008).
For LIDA, I propose that each feeling node has a valence sign, having either a
positive or negative value. With a positive value, the sign stands as the agent’s basic
representation of niceness or liking, while a negative value represents basic nastiness or
disliking. For example, the feeling node “thirst” would have a negative valence, while
the feeling node “relief from thirst” would have a positive valence. A feeling node’s
valence sign plus its current activation specifies its affective valence, with the activation
representing the magnitude of “liking” or “disliking.” Thus, a strongly activated feeling
node having a positive sign represents strong “liking,” while a weakly activated one
represents weak “liking.”
Like all PAM nodes, feeling nodes must be activated from the sensory stimulus to
be instantiated in the Workspace. Said in another way, feature detectors in the feeling
node’s receptive field must detect features of the sensory stimulus. Either by direct
recognition, due to earlier perceptual learning, or by close temporal association, feeling
nodes may become part of preconscious event representation(s) in the Workspace. Such
events will be referred to as feeling events, a designation likely true of most all events.
The feeling node can be aptly thought of as a feature of the event. This suggests that
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recalled or imagined feeling events may also involve some degree of affective valence. By
having different feeling nodes carrying positive or negative affective valence, it is also
possible to both “like” and “dislike” the same event structure. All that would be required
is for two feeling nodes with positive and negative affective valence respectively to be a
part of the same active event structure.
Liking vs. Wanting and Disliking vs. Dreading. Kringelbach and Berridge (2009)
distinguish “wanting” from pleasure — “liking.” By analogy, “dreading” should be
distinguished from displeasure — “disliking.” “Wanting” is an objective hedonic reaction,
measured behaviorally or neurally, whether or not accompanied by conscious pleasure.
Core “liking” reactions result from activity in identifiable brain systems that paint
hedonic value on a sensation such as sweetness (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008). There is
evidence of separate neural representations for wanting and liking (Smith, Berridge, &
Aldridge, 2011). Dread appears to be the opposite of wanting or desire, as
neurotransmitters in the nucleus accumbens have been shown to modulate whether the
area generates desire (wanting) or dread (Richard & Berridge, 2011).
For LIDA, as previously mentioned, a node’s affective valence is the product of its
valence sign and current activation, and is either positive (representing liking) or
negative (representing disliking). This is clearly distinguished from a node’s incentive
salience attribute (see below), a scalar ranging from negative (dreading) to positive
(wanting). Both the affective valence and incentive salience must be further distinguished
from current activation, which measures the current salience of a node, and base-level
activation, which measures the learned usefulness of a node in general. Note that having
positive incentive salience refers to a potential or proposed goal, not necessarily the
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agent’s current goal. The relationship between wanting and goals is discussed in the
section below on options.
Incentive Salience. Incentive salience is a motivational “wanting” attribute given by the
brain to stimuli transforming the representation of a stimulus into an object of attraction.
This “wanting” is unlike “liking” in that liking is produced by a pleasure immediately
gained from consumption or other contact with stimuli, while the “wanting” of incentive
salience is the motivational magnet quality of a stimulus that makes it a desirable and
attractive goal, transforming it from a mere sensory experience into something that
commands attention, induces approach, and increases the likelihood of its being sought
out (Berridge & Robinson, 1998).
Roughly, stimuli have incentive salience, i.e., are “wanted,” only if they have
been previously “liked.” However, it has also been demonstrated in biological agents that
physiological signals, e.g., hunger, are integrated with a stimulus’ incentive salience
(Tindell, Smith, Berridge, & Aldridge, 2009). Thus, overall incentive salience is
adaptable as its learned component is modulated by current physiological signals, a view
originally articulated by Bindra (1978) and Toates (1986), and later referenced in the
incentive salience model (Berridge & Robinson, 1998). Such a combined measure
contributes to an event’s decision utility (Berridge & Aldridge, 2008), the valuation of an
outcome that determines choice (Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997). Zhang et al.
developed a “neurocomputational” model of incentive salience, which combines “learned
reward components” with “current physiological state” to model salt appetite and
addiction (Zhang, Berridge, Tindell, Smith, & Aldridge, 2009). In the LIDA model,
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activation and incentive salience implement this so-called decision utility as they alone
determine which actions will be selected.
Inspired by all of this, I implement incentive salience as a distinct attribute of
event nodes having both a base level1 and a current component. This attribute is similar
to, but separate from, node activation. Activation represents a node’s salience, which
may involve relevance, importance, urgency, insistence, novelty, unexpectedness,
loudness, brightness, motion, etc. While activation represents an event’s situational
salience, incentive salience represents the value the agent places on an event actually
occurring. Incentive salience may take on a range of values from positive (e.g., 1) where
it represents the degree that an event is “wanted,” to negative (e.g., -1) representing the
degree of aversion to the event. Just as a node’s total activation is a function of its baselevel activation (learned usefulness) and current activation, a node’s total incentive
salience combines its base-level incentive salience and current incentive salience. Baselevel incentive salience is modified in perceptual learning (see Base-Level Incentive
Salience Learning below); events gain incentive salience by being associated with
feelings with positive affective valence. Likewise, their incentive salience decreases when
it is associated with feelings having negative affective valence. Current incentive salience
comes from activated drive feeling nodes (representing physiological drives), connected
by an incentive salience link (see Incentive Salience Link Learning below) to an event.
The details of such a link including how it is learned are discussed later in the Perceptual
Associative Memory Learning section. Both the total activation and the total incentive

1

PAM is recognition memory, and a PAM node having some base-level incentive salience is not sufficient
for recognition. However, base-level incentive salience is a fundamental attribute of nodes, and, as such, is considered a
part of PAM.
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salience of an event contribute to its salience, which makes the event more likely to come
to consciousness.
Option. An option for action (option) (Keller & Ho, 1988; Klein, Wolf, Militello, &
Zsambok, 1995; Raab, de Oliveira, & Heinen, 2009; Ward, Suss, Eccles, Williams, &
Harris, 2011) is an action representation an agent can select for execution. It is a
candidate for action or a “choice alternative” (Kalis, Kaiser, & Mojzisch, 2013).
So far, I have discussed feeling events; those events with one or more associated
feeling nodes. Feeling events have an overall affective valence, which is based on the
aggregate affective valence(s) of the feeling node(s) associated with (linked to) the event.
In the last subsection, I proposed that events also have incentive salience. In fact, I
hypothesize that most every event will involve some feelings and some nonzero amount of
incentive salience. Event memories in PAM can have base-level incentive salience;
however, they do not have current incentive salience.
Given this, I define a virtual event as an event instantiated despite the absence of
the event’s corresponding sensory signature with respect to the agent’s sensors. For
example, recalled episodic memories, plans, imaginations, options, and hallucinations
are all virtual events that may occur in absentia. Based on this, I define an option as an
instantiated virtual event in the Workspace with some nonzero total incentive salience.
Thus, options are unique in that their salience is based on an event’s total incentive
salience, and, possibly, the event’s activation (e.g., from stimuli) as well. Options can be
thought of as possible “choices” that have not yet been made. When an option helps
instantiate a scheme likely to bring it about, that is, a behavior with the option as its
result, and if such a behavior is selected, then the option becomes an immediate goal. A
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behavior stream is a stream of behaviors that can be thought of as a partial plan of
action. Given this, I define a pending goal as an option that is 1) a part of a behavior
stream selected by a volitional decision-making process (ideomotor theory) and 2)
cannot be immediately achieved.
Emotion. The usage of the term “emotion” has been imprecise and, for many researchers,
the concept is not easily definable (Alvarado, Adams, & Burbeck, 2002; Thompson &
Madigan, 2007). Various definitions of emotion have been given, and very important
functions have been attributed to emotion; however, there is currently no consensus for
one definition. Some well-known work on emotions includes the six basic emotions:
surprise, fear, disgust, anger, happiness, and sadness (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969).
They are particular to individuals (Picard, 2003), and influence cognition directly (Phelps,
2006; Squire & Kandel, 2000). More recently some researchers deny that there is
anything “basic” about these six (Camras, 2011). Westen (1999) describes emotions as a
mix of several biochemical, sociocultural, and neurological factors. Purves et al. (2008)
divides emotions into three processes: 1) a behavioral action (e.g., escape), 2) a conscious
experience of an event or situation (e.g., regret or shame), 3) a physiological expression
(e.g., paleness, blushing, palpitations, uneasiness). It is not specified how these three
processes are related. Diener (1999) suggested that a theory of emotions should account
for several components: 1) subjective experience (how it feels to be in an emotional state),
2) physiological processes (neural, neurochemical and physiological mechanisms that
facilitate emotion), and 3) expressive behavior (facial and bodily expression, movement
patterns, the modulation of voice and breath etc.), and 4) cognitive evaluations.
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The LIDA model does not address subjective experience; rather its consciousness is
only postulated to be functional2 (Franklin, 2003). While “cognitive evaluations” are
addressed in the next section, the physiological and expressive aspects of emotions are
beyond the scope of this current work, though they could, in principle, be added.
In LIDA, emotions exist only within the context of a being, or an agent. It is a
feeling towards something or someone that is an emotion. For example, the emotion of
feeling sad because one has suffered a loss, or the emotion of feeling angry at someone
because they interfered with something you want to do. I adopt such a definition of
emotion for the LIDA model. This stance was previously described by Franklin and
Ramamurthy (2006) who wrote: “Emotions, such as fear, anger, joy, sadness, shame,
embarrassment, resentment, regret, guilt, etc., are taken to be feelings with cognitive
content (Johnston, 1999). One cannot simply feel shame, but shame at having done
something. The something done constitutes the cognitive content.” A feeling node in PAM
would represent shame. A currently active association of an event node, the cognitive
content, with the shame node within the Workspace would constitute an instance of the
emotion shame. Once again, such an emotion may, or may not, come to consciousness.
Shame, of course, may come in multiple varieties, each represented by its own node. Note
that every emotion is a feeling, but there are feelings, e.g., thirst, that need not be
emotions. Thus emotions constitute a subset of feelings.
Appraisal. Appraisal theory is described as providing a cognitive interpretation of what
we sense or perceive (Lazarus, 1991). Moreover, this theory explains our evaluation of
2
Global Workspace Theory, which LIDA implements and fleshes out, is a high-level theory of the role of
consciousness in cognition. It assumes that phenomenal consciousness occurs in conjunction with each conscious
broadcast. Wishing to apply our LIDA model to both biological and artificial agents, the model remains agnostic on the
question of phenomenal consciousness.
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specific external (environmental) or internal (within ourselves) stimuli that give rise to
emotions. Roseman and Smith (2001) explained how human motives and goals play an
important role for the evaluation of a specific situation. Lazarus (1991) identified two
appraisal methods: 1) primary appraisal, for the organism to determine the importance or
meaning of an event, and 2) secondary appraisal, for the organism to determine whether
or not it can manage or handle the event and its consequences. Lazarus also discusses two
types of appraisal models: the structural appraisal model and the process model.
The structural model has three components: 1) a relational aspect, involving the
person-environment interactions, 2) a motivational aspect, involving the assessment of a
current situation’s relevance in relation to one’s current goals, and 3) a cognitive aspect
involving one’s appraisal of the situation (Lazarus, 1991). Accordingly, one’s evaluation
of the situation leads to specific emotions.
The process model suggests that person-environment interactions might go
through an appraisal-coping-reappraisal cycle (Lazarus, 1991). For example, imagine a
father becomes angry (appraisal) after hearing of his daughter’s disobedience. He then
has a heated argument with her (coping). Later on, he may feel guilty about his behavior
during the argument (reappraisal), which, in turn, may lead to an apology (coping). This,
finally, leads to a feeling of satisfaction at having apologized (reappraisal). However, the
process model of appraisal fails to account for automatic emotional response, a fast and
direct pathway for action in critical situations. I will discuss how this occurs in the LIDA
model in detail in the section below on alarms.
In LIDA model terms, appraisal is an initially unconscious process occurring
automatically with perception, and may also involve episodic and semantic recall,
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imagination, and consciousness. I consider the appraisal process as one that evaluates a
situation (event) along dimensions such as novelty, goal-alignment, agency, coping
potential, and availability of a plan, thereby determining the activation level of relevant
feeling nodes. In this sense the appraisal process culminates in the attachment of an
activated feeling node to the cognitive content, typically an event, producing the
corresponding emotion. This is typically accomplished in LIDA’s Workspace by the
preconscious association of an event and the emotion(s) activated during the event’s
appraisal. Such association is performed by structure building codelets concerned with
particular appraisal dimensions. The attachment of the feeling node modulates the
current activation of the event. If this newly appraised structure, including the feeling
node, wins the competition for consciousness, this emotion, this feeling event, is learned
into PAM (long-term recognition memory). Once learned, emotions, like other feelings
can be recognized in PAM without additional appraisal. Often times the appraisal of
emotion is a multi-cyclic affair requiring at least several cognitive cycles. However, I
hypothesize that the initial appraisal of emotion can also occur during a single LIDA
cognitive cycle.
Reinforcement Learning. Reinforcement learning typically refers to learning what to
choose to do — how to map situations to actions so as to maximize a numerical reward
signal (Sutton & Barto, 1998). The learner is not told which actions to take, as in many
forms of machine learning, but instead must discover which actions yield the most reward
by trying them. In the most interesting and challenging cases, actions may affect not only
the immediate reward but also the next situation and, through that, all subsequent rewards.
These two characteristics — trial-and-error search and delayed reward — are the most
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important distinguishing features of reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998).
In LIDA terms, the learning involved in reinforcement learning is most closely
related to procedural learning. A potential qualm LIDA might have with the standard
form of reinforcement learning is the numerical reward signal aspect. For LIDA, and for
autonomous agents in general, what reinforcement learning calls reward must come from
the agent’s perception of its current state, including its bodily state. If such perception is
appraised with positive affective valence, i.e., if it is liked, it can then be viewed as a
“reward.” Note that such assignment of reward, being preconscious, necessarily
precedes conscious learning in the LIDA model. In fact, if the reward lacks salience, it
may not reach consciousness, and thus will not be learned. Another possible point of
departure is LIDA’s procedural learning, which adds new schemes to its Procedural
Memory based on the consequence of actions in various contexts. Such temporal
knowledge can later be used for reasoning and planning (see Deliberation and ModelBased Control below).
As denoted by the orange arrows in Figure 1, the LIDA model supports multiple,
simultaneous learning modes, including perceptual, spatial, episodic, attentional,
procedural, and sensory-motor. Each of the various modes of learning in the model
follows the principle of profligacy. This principle suggests that new representations are
added to the various memories profligately, at the slightest justification, that is, whenever
they come to consciousness, and left to survive or not. The principle of profligacy is often
referred to as “generate and test” because multiple representations are generated but
very few survive. Repeated conscious learning of a given representation over time can
increase the base-level activation of the representation allowing it to survive. However,
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all memories and active representations decay incrementally during each cognitive cycle
and, are removed from memory if their base-level activation drops to zero.
Model-Free Learning. Lucantonio, Stalnaker, Shaham, Niv, & Schoenbaum (2012)
succinctly describe model-free learning (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005) as a set of
reinforcement learning methods that use prediction errors to estimate and store scalar cue
or action values from experience. In reinforcement learning, these stored values represent
the “predicted total future reward if an action or cue is pursued.” Agents may use such
stored values to guide action selection. The name “model-free” is based on the fact that
choices are made only based on this stored value, and not on a model incorporating the
details of the current situation or possible future consequences. Such a decision strategy
is “simple but inflexible” because the values are merely scalar numbers, “separated from
the identity of the expected future outcomes themselves or the specific events that will
ensue en route to obtaining the outcomes.” In particular, such cached values do not
immediately change if the outcomes are revalued, e.g., a cue, typically followed by a
reward, suddenly begins to lead to a punishment. Instead, such a change to stored values
requires repeated experience and learning of new cached values by means of prediction
errors. As a result of this inflexibility, it has been postulated that decision-making using
cached values underlies habitual behavior (Lucantonio et al., 2012). Model-free
approaches have been invoked to account for the activity of dopamine neurons and their
(notably dorsolateral) striatal projections (Houk, Adams, & Barto, 1995; Schultz, Dayan,
& Montague, 1997).
In the motivation extension proposed for LIDA, the cached values updated in
model-free learning directly correspond to the base-level incentive salience of event
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nodes, which is modified (learned) during conscious learning. Model-free control (action
selection) occurs when a LIDA agent selects an option for execution only based on its
total activation and base-level incentive salience, ignoring the consequences. This type of
decision-making in LIDA is referred to as consciously mediated action selected since
conscious access is required for content to affect action selection. For example, an agent
might have the event node, “open-the-refrigerator-door,” with a strong base-level
incentive salience due to its relation with food. This leads to agent to habitually open the
refrigerator door, even when the power is out and the agent desires to keep the
refrigerator closed to preserve its temperature.
Model-Based Learning. Lucantonio et al. (2012, p. 360) also describe model-based
learning (Daw et al., 2005) briefly as:
A set of reinforcement learning methods in which an internal model of the
environment is learned and used to evaluate available actions or cues on
the basis of their potential outcomes. In these methods, values are not
learned incrementally through prediction errors and stored for future use,
but rather are computed ‘on the fly’ when needed, by mental simulation of
sequences of events and outcomes using the internal world model. All that
is required is a world model that includes predictions about the immediate
consequences of each action or state in a sequence. This approach to
action selection is computationally expensive owing to the need to
mentally simulate and ‘test’ alternative courses of action, but it allows one
to flexibly adapt behavior in a changing environment, and specifically, to
adapt immediately to changes in the current value of the outcome.
Model-based methods are identified neurally with a prefrontal cortex system (Daw et al.,
2005).
In LIDA’s Workspace, the Current Situational Model (CSM) contains the agent’s
current model of the environment including possible future events. I propose that such
anticipated events may be part of the content of a coalition brought to the Global
Workspace by attention codelets and, that, as a part of a coalition, their total activation
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and total incentive salience determine the activation of the coalition and thus its
likelihood of winning the competition for consciousness. Over multiple cognitive cycles,
LIDA may deliberate over various coalitions of possible actions and their expected
outcomes based on the coalitions’ activation. This type of decision-making is referred to
as volitional (deliberative) action selection in LIDA. How LIDA implements model-based
control is the subject of further discussion in the sections “Learning Event Sequences”
and “Deliberation and Model-Based Control” below.
Summary. Table 1 summarizes the major concepts introduced in this Motivational
Concepts section and describes their suggested implementation in the LIDA model.

Table 1. Motivational concepts introduced in this section and their implementation in the
proposed motivation extension to the LIDA Model.
Concept
Homeostatic
receptor
Affective
valence
Feeling

Virtual Event
Option
Immediate Goal

Brief Description
A sensing component that
monitors and responds to
particular changes in the internal
environment.
An attribute representing the
basic hedonic niceness or
nastiness of stimuli.
A representation of a stimulus
(internal or external) having a
valence, which serves to
implement one or more of the
agent’s values.
An active event representation in
absence of its external
counterpart.
A candidate for action or a
choice alternative.
The current actionable goal of
the agent.
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LIDA’s implementation
An agent-dependent sensor
within Sensory Memory.
A scalar attribute of all feeling
nodes determined by the product
of the feeling node’s valence
sign and current activation.
A particular type of node in
PAM, called a feeling node, each
with a valence sign, either
positive or negative.
An instantiated event node in the
absence of its corresponding
sensory signature.
An instantiated virtual event in
the Workspace with nonzero
total incentive salience.
An option that is the expected
result of a selected behavior.

Table 1. (Continued).
Concept
Incentive Salience

Liking vs. Wanting

Emotion
Appraisal process

Reinforcement learning

Model-free learning

Model-based learning

Brief Description
The motivational magnet
quality of a perceptual
representation making it a
desirable and attractive goal,
transforming it into something
that commands attention,
induces approach, and causes
it to be sought out.
The distinction between
“wanting,” an objective
hedonic reaction and “liking,”
the hedonic value of a
sensation
A feeling with cognitive
content.
The process that evaluates a
situation (event) along
particular dimensions thereby
determining the activation
levels of relevant emotions.
Learning how to map
situations to actions so as to
maximize a numerical reward
signal.

A set of reinforcement
learning methods using
prediction errors in “value” to
update, from experience, a
stored scalar quantity
measuring the value (expected
future reward) of pursuing an
option.
A set of reinforcement
learning methods in which an
internal model of the
environment is learned and
used to evaluate available
actions or cues on the basis of
their potential outcomes.
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LIDA’s implementation
An attribute of event nodes,
distinct from activation, that
contributes to a node’s overall
salience. PAM nodes have a
base-level incentive salience
while their instantiations
additionally have a current
incentive salience.
The use of two distinct node
attributes: affective valence
and incentive salience.
A feeling node associated with
an event node.
The dynamic association, in
LIDA’s Workspace, of an
event with the emotion(s)
activated by the event and the
agent’s current mental state.
Conscious learning, in several
modes, based on not only the
conscious contents, but also
their overall affective valence,
and incentive salience, which
modifies both base-level
activation and base-level
incentive salience.
The update of the base-level
incentive salience attribute of
event nodes during conscious
learning.

The internal model is learned
via LIDA’s conscious
learning. Over multiple
cognitive cycles, an active
option in the Current
Situational Model of the
Workspace can instantiate
relevant parts of the learned
model incorporating the
various expected results of
pursuing the option.

Single-Cycle Motivational Processes in LIDA
The LIDA model implements several motivation mechanisms, which are discussed in this
section. Most mechanisms make a trade off between speed and the amount of memory
brought to bear on the situation. This makes each best suited for particular situations;
however, if implemented together in an integrated architecture they might provide a
flexible set of faculties well suited for a range of situations.
To help frame this section, I first review two distinctions previously used in LIDA.
The first is a distinction between levels of conscious access. LIDA identifies three levels
of conscious access of mental processes or representations: 1) never conscious, unable to
ever become conscious, 2) preconscious, potentially, but not currently, conscious, and 3)
conscious, part of the content of a conscious broadcast (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache,
Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Franklin & Baars, 2010). LIDA also distinguishes between four
types of action selection: volitional, consciously mediated, automatized, and alarm. In
volitional (deliberative) action selection (decision-making) much of the selection process
itself is conscious, that is, a part of successive contents of consciousness (Franklin, 2000).
Consciously mediated action selection may occur in each of LIDA’s cognitive cycles,
when a never-conscious selection process consults the current contents of conscious
during its choosing of the next action (Franklin et al., 2012; Franklin & Baars, 2010).
Automatized action selection occurs when one action calls the next via a never-conscious
process, and without use of the current contents of consciousness (Franklin et al., 2012;
Negatu, 2006). Lastly, action selection during an alarm is the topic of the next section.
Alarms. In dangerous situations, agents must react as quickly as possible. The notion of
“alarms” was previously articulated, in the context of agent architectures, by Sloman
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(1998) and enjoys neuroscientific support (e.g., LeDoux, 2006; Liddell et al., 2005). In
terms of the LIDA model, an alarm situation (alarm) is one where an agent instantiates a
scheme, selects its action, and executes an associated motor plan in rapid succession in
response to a dangerous situation prior to, or simultaneous with, consciousness of the
situation. This would correspond to an action selection and execution before (or while)
the situation is brought to consciousness by attention codelets. For example, an alarm
occurs with the unconscious turning of a car’s steering wheel in response to suddenly
being cut off by another vehicle. During an alarm, some part(s) of the Current Situational
Model in the Workspace directly instantiates a scheme from Procedural Memory. The
ensuing behavior is sufficiently activated for the immediate selection of its action and, in
close succession, the execution of an associated motor plan. All of this occurs before, or
simultaneously with, consciousness. Note that alarms require the existence of some
learned or built-in scheme. They also require that a scheme be strongly “activated.” Here,
I suggest the activation and the incentive salience both play a role in the rapid
recruitment of scheme(s) during alarms. Note that every alarm directly instantiates a
scheme before it can come to consciousness. However, later, an agent can become
conscious of the situation causing the alarm, and of the action it took in direct response to
the alarm. After an action is taken during an alarm situation, the result will likely come to
consciousness and become involved in the procedural learning for the scheme selected
and executed during the alarm.
Feeling Nodes. The presence of activated feeling nodes, be they drive feelings or
interpretive feelings, in a LIDA agent’s Workspace has several motivational effects.
Feelings and emotions are part of the cue to Transient Episodic and Declarative Memory
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(Franklin & Ramamurthy, 2006) as well as to LIDA’s nascent spatial memory (Madl et
al., 2013). The resultant local associations can contain records of the agent’s past feelings
and emotions in associated situations. Present and past feelings and emotions influence
the competition for consciousness in each cognitive cycle, by affecting the activation of
structures in the Current Situational Model, as well as the activation of coalitions
containing such structures strengthening a coalition’s chances of winning the competition
for consciousness. This implies conscious content can include affective portions, and play
a role in conscious learning (see Perceptual Associative Memory Learning below). If
modeling human performance, then affect should modulate learning following an
inverted U curve according to the Yerkes-Dodson law (1908): increasing affect causes
increased learning up to a point, after which more affect results in less learning.
Incentive Salience of Nodes. I have proposed that event nodes in PAM have a base-level
incentive salience while their current instantiations additionally have a current incentive
salience. The total incentive salience of events contributes to the salience of events, and
as a result, can play several roles within a single cognitive cycle. A coalition involving
events with high incentive salience is more likely to win the competition for
consciousness, and become the object of conscious learning. If broadcasted, events
having a large magnitude of incentive salience better recruit schemes from Procedural
Memory, and can instantiate more salient behaviors, increasing their likelihood of
selection. This influence of incentive salience on action selection is akin to the influence
of “goals” on behaviors in Maes’ (1989) behavior network model of action selection.
Action Selection and Consciousness. The LIDA model distinguishes action selection
from motor plan selection. The former is the selection of a behavior (an instantiated
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scheme) from Procedural Memory, while the latter is the selection of an instantiated
motor plan template from Sensory-Motor Memory in the service of action execution. As
mentioned in the previous section, Procedural Memory is built using structures
originating in Perceptual Associative Memory, i.e., it is a grounded representation. This
implies that it may be primed preconsciously, allowing for preconscious priming of
actions. Does this suggest that action selection occurs without consciousness? The answer
is that there can be several possibilities: The unconscious selection of alarms can occur
with a sudden, strong instantiation of a learned scheme that leads to a motor plan
execution before consciousness of the event can occur. However, in the vast majority of
situations, action selection follows the conscious broadcast (consciously mediated action
selection). Consciously mediated action selection can be viewed as a “fast” decisionmaking using cached base-level activation and base-level (as well as current) incentive
salience values to select options. Such a mechanism has also been referred to as modelfree control (Daw et al., 2005) as well as “System 1” (Kahneman, 2003, 2011). Finally,
the action selection process can itself be conscious, as is the case in volitional decisionmaking (see “Volitional Decision-making in LIDA” below). Volitional decision-making
has also been referred to as model-based control (Daw et al., 2005) and Kahneman’s
“System 2” (2011).
Conscious Learning in LIDA
LIDA’s conscious learning involves several memories. In Perceptual Associative
Memory (or recognition memory), new concepts, and associations between them, are
learned while existing ones are reinforced. In Spatial Memory, new cognitive maps are
stored and existing ones updated. In Transient Episodic Memory broadcasted events
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containing what, where, and when are encoded. Schemes, procedural memories of what to
do when, are learned into Procedural Memory. It is also possible for attention codelets to
be learned or reinforced.
Since affective valence plays a role in determining saliency, its presence among
the content of a broadcast affects conscious learning, in addition to influencing scheme
recruitment and action selection. Following Tindell et al. (2009), affective valence is
hypothesized to strongly influence learning based on feelings. I present the details of this
below and then discuss how such learning may lead to appetitive or aversive behavior.
Perceptual Associative Memory Learning. Whenever an event is part of a conscious
broadcast the nodes and links of the event are learned into PAM. If the node or link is not
currently present in PAM, then it is added to PAM, and given an initial base-level
activation according to some function of the node’s activation. If the node or link is
already present in PAM, then its base-level activation is updated according to the same
function.
Base-Level Incentive Salience Learning. Previous work on feelings as motivators
(Franklin & Ramamurthy, 2006), stipulated that instantiated feeling nodes play an
important role in LIDA’s conscious learning. They add to their coalition’s activation,
which, in turn, modulates the learned base-level activation of coalition nodes. Earlier I
proposed that feeling nodes should have a valence sign, positive or negative. I next
specify how affective valence additionally affects perceptual learning. I propose that for
feeling events having affective valence, an additional kind of perceptual learning occurs.
The base-level incentive salience of broadcasted event nodes is positively updated as a
function of the overall affective valence of the event, that is, the sum of the affective
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valences of all feeling nodes currently associated with the event. For example, if an event
were associated with a positive feeling having a total activation of 0.6 and a negative
feeling with total activation 0.5, then the overall affective valence of the event would be
+0.1. If the event has an overall positive affective valence, then base-level incentive
salience is increased, while if it has an overall negative affective valence its base-level
incentive salience is decreased. The magnitude of the overall affective valence
determines the strength of this base-level incentive salience learning.
In summary, perceptual learning updates the base-level incentive salience of event
nodes. After such learning, events can be directly recognized as “desirable” or not. In the
later section “Incentive Salience Link Learning,” I discuss a learning sub-type affecting
how event nodes obtain current incentive salience.
Temporal Difference Learning. Temporal difference (TD) learning (Sutton, 1988) is an
approach to learning how to predict a quantity, which depends on future values of a given
signal (Barto, 2007). TD is a reinforcement learning technique, which considers not just
reward, but expected reward as well. The name TD derives from its use of changes, or
differences, in predictions over successive time steps to drive the learning process. In
general, the process mandates that the prediction of a quantity (e.g., base-level incentive
salience as a prediction of affective valence) at any given time step be updated to bring it
closer to the next time step’s prediction of the same quantity (See Equation 3). TD
algorithms are often used in reinforcement learning to predict a measure of the total
amount of reward expected over the future, which, in the context of this chapter,
corresponds to base-level incentive salience (Barto, 2007). A number of neuroscientific
findings (e.g., Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996;
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O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 2003) support the hypothesis that the
brain performs TD learning. The mechanisms underlying the changes in valuation appear
to occur during learning itself, and “bias decisions without effortful retrieval at the time
of decision” (without deliberation in LIDA) (Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012).
Let us denote the tth conscious event (or state) in LIDA by, st, and the event’s
accompanying overall affective valence by rt. Also, let the discount rate, γ, be a real
number from the closed interval, [0,1]. This rate defines the degree to which the rewards
(overall affective valence) of future events are discounted or de-emphasized, with a value
of 1.0 corresponding to no discounting and 0.0 corresponding to complete discounting.
Given these definitions, the complete return3, Rt, for conscious event st is defined as:

Rt = rt + γrt+1 + γ 2 rt+2 +... = rt + γ(rt+1 + γrt+2 +...)

[1]

= rt + γ Rt+1

It is then assumed that the long-term value of a state (here, conscious event), V(s), is
directly equivalent to the expected return under an unspecified action policy, π:
V (s) = Eπ (Rt | st = s)

[2]

In the context of this work, I denote the base-level incentive salience of the event
memory underlying the ith conscious event, si at the time t, V (si , t) . Given a learning rate,
α, the temporal difference update for the base-level incentive salience of event st at the
time t+1 is given by:
V (st , t + 1) = V (st , t) + α [rt + γ V (st+1, t)−V (st , t)]

3

[3]

Since LIDA considers the overall affective valence (reward) as coming with (not preceding) a given
conscious event (state), the complete return is defined starting at t, the time of the event, instead of t+1 as is done in the
reinforcement learning literature.

59

This equation says that the update for the base-level incentive salience of event st is a
function of the difference between the event’s previous base-level incentive salience,
Vt (st ) , and a new estimate of the complete return of st ; namely, rt + γ V (st+1, t) . Notice that

the rt term corresponds to the affective valence-based learning described in the previous
subsection. Thus, temporal difference learning additionally suggests using the discounted
base-level incentive salience of the next encountered event when learning base-level
incentive salience of an event.
Event Sequence Learning. Sequences are a large and critical part of Perceptual
Associative Memory that associate patterns having temporal regularity. Consider the
multitude of melodies, word phrases, and action sequences that one may recognize
immediately; these are all event sequences in PAM. As mentioned in the earlier section
Scheme Representation in LIDA, event sequences are integral to schemes (Figure 5).
Such temporal connections may be initially “hypothesized” by structure building codelets
as temporary temporal links in LIDA’s preconscious Workspace. If two events and their
temporal link win the competition for consciousness then such a link between them
would be learned in PAM. The role of event sequences in volitional decision-making will
be explored in further detail later on in the section “Multi-Cyclic Motivational Processes
in LIDA.”
Incentive Salience Link Learning. Drive feeling events and their affective valence play
another role in perceptual learning. This learning is critical in determining which event
nodes (whether instantiated or not) receive current incentive salience from active drive
feelings. In the proposed model, current incentive salience is transmitted from drive
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feelings by incentive salience links, that is, PAM links that transmit only incentive
salience, not activation.

Figure 5. Two event sequences, s1 and s2, underlying two different schemes. The green
links transmit activation and bidirectional links suggest that activation may be passed in
both directions. The context of one scheme may serve double-duty as the result of
another.
Let’s first consider an example of learning an incentive salience link. Suppose an
agent becomes conscious of an active “thirst” drive feeling node having a negative
affective valence. Despite this awareness, the agent takes a long walk, and returns home
with the “thirst” feeling node, now strongly activated, carrying a large negative affective
valence. Due to a preconscious temporal association by a structure building codelet in the
Workspace, the agent becomes conscious of the fact that the walk led to the increase in
the thirst node’s activation. Consequently, the agent learns an incentive salience link with
a negative weight from the “thirsty” node to the “walking” event. (Note that this
incentive salience link learning would occur in addition to the learning of other links,
such as a temporal link running from the walking event node to the strong feeling of thirst
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event.) Having learned this incentive salience link, whenever the “thirsty” node becomes
activated, “walking” (and any other similarly implicated events) receive a negative
amount of current incentive salience. In contrast, suppose that the agent had instead
drunk water in response to being conscious of the feeling “thirst,” and consequently
reduced the drive feeling’s activation. If it becomes conscious of this temporal
relationship, an incentive salience link with a positive weight would be learned, which
would promote drinking when thirsty.
How can a LIDA agent learn from experiences involving a change in a drive
feeling? In general, these situations involve a temporal link in the Workspace from one
event to another event involving change in activation, across the two events, of a drive
feeling node. (Note that such preconscious association could occur between instantiated
representations from various places in LIDA’s memory.) In such situations, a structure
building codelet can introduce an incentive salience link that has the feeling node as its
source and the event implicated in the feeling node’s change as its sink. Supposing that
the entire structure, consisting of both events connected by the temporal link, wins the
competition for consciousness, then the proposed incentive salience link would be
learned into PAM. Links learned in this manner are assigned a weight proportional to the
change in the drive feeling’s activation, a, multiplied by the feeling’s valence sign, vs.
Equation 4 expresses how this link weight, w, is proposed to be calculated:
w = vs ⋅ f (Δ a)

[4]

After such links are learned they transmit some amount of current incentive salience to
their sink events proportional to 1) the activation of the source (the drive feeling node)
and 2) the link’s weight. This, by itself, may lead to the instantiation of the sink.
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Intuitively, the idea is to send positive incentive salience to events leading to positive
changes to homeostasis, be they a decrease in a negative affective valence or increases in
positive affective valence. Similarly, negative incentive salience is sent to events leading
to negative changes to homeostasis under this approach. Figure 6 illustrates the example

Figure 6. A learned incentive salience link in PAM. The orange-colored link depicts an
incentive salience link having a positive weight in (long-term) PAM. The link’s source is
the thirst drive feeling having a negative valence sign. The link’s sink is the event
implicated in the decreased thirst event, here, the drink node. The thirst-change detector
can recognize decreased thirst by monitoring changes in activation of the thirst feeling
node. The learning process updates the weight of the incentive salience link according to
Equation 4. In this example, a feeling, having a negative valence sign, decreased in
activation, necessitating a positive link.
of drinking to reduce thirst. After an incentive salience link with positive weight is
learned, the link transmits positive current incentive salience, based on the activation of
the “thirst” node, to the “drinking water” event.
Interim Summary
Let’s review the motivation extension for LIDA presented thus far. Central to this model
are feeling nodes, which serve as a common motivational currency. All feeling nodes
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have a valence sign attribute, either positive or negative. The valence sign combined with
the node’s current activation gives its affective valence. Homeostatic sensors in Sensory
Memory detect fluctuations in the state of the agent’s body exciting drive feeling nodes in
Perceptual Associative Memory representing a deviation from homeostasis. Alternatively,
interpretive feelings nodes represent an evaluation or interpretation of some stimulus, e.g.,
the sugar in any number of desserts may activate a “sweet” feeling node having positive
valence. This interpretive feeling node may be associated, e.g., in the Workspace, with
the event “eating ice cream,” thereby adding positive affective valence to the event. Such
preconscious feeling events in the Workspace have one or more associated feeling
node(s) providing the event with valence. The appraisal process in LIDA operates
similarly, where events are evaluated along dimensions such as novelty, goal-alignment,
agency, coping potential, and availability of a plan, thereby determining the activation
level of relevant feeling nodes. The result of the appraisal process is the attachment of an
activated feeling node to the cognitive content, typically an event, producing the
corresponding emotion. Such dynamic preconscious association of a preconscious event
with those feeling node(s) activated by that event also occurs within LIDA’s Workspace.
Whenever such a feeling event is part of a coalition that wins the competition for
consciousness two main things happen: 1) the broadcast, including the event and feeling
node(s), helps recruit schemes for possible action selection; 2) learning based on the
broadcast’s content occurs. Affective valence plays a special role in this learning. In
perceptual learning, broadcast events that have an overall positive affective valence have
their base-level incentive salience increased, while broadcast events having an overall
negative affective valence have their base-level incentive salience decreased. In
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accordance with temporal difference learning, the discounted base-level incentive of the
next following conscious event also affects base-level incentive salience learning of an
event. Broadcasts containing temporal links between two events are also critical for
perceptual and procedural learning. If two events and a temporal link connecting them
win the competition for consciousness, e.g., the event “push-button” linked to the event
“receive candy,” then a temporal link is learned. Such links are critical for sequence
learning, prediction, and causal learning (not explored in this chapter). Note that temporal
links connecting two events may form the context-action part or the action-result part of a
scheme in Procedural Memory. For instance, in Figure 5, the link from Event a to Event
action b forms the context-action part, while the link from Event action b to Event c
forms the action-result part.
In the case where a broadcast contains a temporal link whose sink event
represents a change in activation of a drive feeling node, an incentive salience link is be
learned from the feeling node to the event implicated in the change of the feeling. The
weight of the learned incentive salience link is proportional to the product of the drive
feeling’s affective valence and the change in its activation (see Figure 5).
Thus the motivational aspect of perceptual learning modifies base-level incentive
salience and adds or reinforces incentive salience links, which transmit current incentive
salience from activated drive feelings. Critically, incentive salience, in addition to
activation, affects the saliency of coalitions, and the recruitment of schemes. The
influence of the incentive salience on schemes constitutes one way the LIDA model can
exhibit appetitive or aversive behavior.
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Multi-Cyclic Motivational Processes in LIDA
So far I have discussed the role of motivational processes within a single cognitive cycle.
However, many important aspects of cognition are implemented by, and occur over,
multiple cognitive cycles. Recall the previous distinction between 1) an option, an
instantiated virtual event having nonzero total incentive salience, 2) an immediate goal,
an option that is the expected result of a selected behavior, and 3) a pending goal, a goal
that is part of a behavior stream, selected by a volitional decision-making process, that
cannot be immediately achieved. Now, suppose that an option comes to mind, that is, is a
part of the content of a conscious broadcast. As a direct result, several schemes in
Procedural Memory will typically be instantiated as behaviors with the option bound to
their results. In some situations, an agent may immediately select an action to achieve this
option in which case the option becomes the agent’s immediate goal. In other situations,
the agent enters into a volitional decision-making process. More generally, we can speak
of deliberation (Sloman, 1999), a kind of cognitive process that builds upon reactive
processes.
Volitional Decision-Making in LIDA. What conditions lead to volitional decisionmaking? I hypothesize that it may be initiated by a behavior with considerable activation,
but not enough that it can be currently selected. There are a few main reasons why a
behavior would fit this billing: 1) competition with other behaviors, 2) having an
unsatisfied context, or 3) a result with low incentive salience. Recall that LIDA’s action
selection is an extension of Maes’ behavior network (1989). In the behavior network, a
competition situation arises between two behaviors when one undoes a precondition of
the other. Alternatively, competition may arise when there is insufficient difference in
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behavior activation to prefer one to the other. For instance, evidence from the basal
ganglia suggests that action selection performance improves when competing alternatives
inhibit each other requiring an action to have a “statistically significant” greater
activation than competitors in order to be selected (Bogacz & Gurney, 2007; Bogacz,
2007). Alternatively, a behavior may have strong activation due to its underlying result
and/or action event having positive incentive salience; however, its context might not be
satisfied. Similarly, the context may be satisfied, but the result may have a high negative
incentive salience. In each of these cases, a deliberative process may be initiated. What
initiates such a process? In LIDA, with every instantiated behavior that was produced by
an option or a drive a competing behavior with an internal action enters into Action
Selection. If this special behavior is selected, its internal action starts an ideomotor theory
volitional process (see next section).
Ideomotor Theory in LIDA. William James first introduced the ideomotor theory of
volition (James, 1890; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). James postulated proposers,
objectors, and supporters as actors in the drama of acting volitionally. He might have
suggested the following scenario in the context of dealing with a feeling of thirst: The
idea of drinking orange juice “pops into mind,” that is, propelled to consciousness by a
proposer motivated by the drive feeling, “thirst,” and a “liking” for the sweetness of
orange juice, it becomes the contents of consciousness. “No, it’s too sweet,” asserts an
objector. “How about a beer?” says a different proposer. “Too early in the day,” says
another objector. “Orange juice is more nutritious,” says a supporter. With no further
objections, drinking orange juice is volitionally selected.
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Baars incorporated ideomotor theory directly into his Global Workspace Theory
(1988, Chapter 7). The LIDA model fleshes out volitional decision-making via ideomotor
theory within Global Workspace Theory (Franklin, 2000) as follows. An idea “popping
into mind” in the LIDA model is accomplished by the idea being part of the conscious
broadcast of a cognitive cycle. Thus, the conscious broadcast implements the characters
in James’ scenario, with some broadcasts acting as proposers, others as objectors, and
others as supporters, the content of each “popping into mind” if it wins the competition,
and is broadcast.
But, how does the thought “Let’s drink orange juice” come to consciousness? It
must arise from a virtual “drink-orange-juice” event node with positive total incentive
salience in the Workspace. According to the motivational extension to LIDA, an option
may arise from an event having nonzero base-level incentive salience, e.g., seeing a glass
of one’s favorite orange juice. Alternatively, or additionally, an activate drive feeling, e.g.,
thirst, may provide sufficient current incentive to the drink-orange-juice event node in
PAM to instantiate it in the Workspace as an option. Like every higher-order cognitive
process in the LIDA model, volitional decision-making occurs over multiple cycles. In
this example, “drinking orange juice” may come to consciousness for the reasons just
described. If this proposal fails to immediately lead to an external action selection,
another proposal, or an objection, could come to consciousness.
Specific implementations of internal actions may use a “timekeeper” (Franklin,
2000) or an “impatience” feeling node, which increases the likelihood of an action
selection the longer the volitional process takes. Volitional decision-making can end
when time runs out on some proposal (option), and an action is thus selected.
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The LIDA model hypothesizes that neural correlates of volitional decisionmaking include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the striatum, the basal ganglia and the
ventral anterior cingulate cortex (MacDonald, 2008; Pasquereau et al., 2007; Rowe,
Hughes, Eckstein, & Owen, 2008) .
Proposers and Objectors from Mental Simulations. How might LIDA produce James’
proposers and objectors? During volitional decision-making, instantiated events in the
Workspace, including options and drives, repeatedly cue LIDA’s Perceptual and Episodic
Memories. This cueing retrieves relevant local associations, and, drawing upon
knowledge stored by the temporal links of event sequences, includes potential future
events. Such cueing and recall can be thought of as “internal” or virtual actions
(Nakayama, Yamagata, Tanji, & Hoshi, 2008). Potential future events are grounded
virtual representations of potential consequences of pursuing the options. Over multiple
cognitive cycles, such virtual actions can produce an instantiated, “chain” of events. Such
chains can become coalitions that may compete for consciousness. Critically, each event
in the coalition contributes its total activation and total incentive salience. Recall that
total incentive salience includes a base level component (updated by TD learning) and a
current component (modulated by current drive feelings). Thus, the incentive salience of
future events, proposers and objectors in ideomotor theory, would contribute to a
coalition’s overall strength or salience. The net effect is to bias those behaviors or
behavior streams believed to lead to a “desirable” future set of events. For instance,
considering going outside in the rain unprepared may lead you to imagine getting wet,
which leads you to grab an umbrella, or imagining being robbed on a walk in the city
may compel you to take pepper spray along. Thus, appetitive or aversive behavior may
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also result from an anticipation, imagination, or recollection of an event with incentive
salience.
Deliberation and Model-Based Control. I take the stance that deliberation in general
should involve the kind of mental simulations described in the previous section. For each
alternative, a mental simulation must occur, which accesses the total incentive salience of
expected events. Huys et al. (2012) found that humans adopt a Pavlovian strategy for
pruning decision trees. During mental evaluation of a sequence of choices, they curtailed
any further evaluation of a sequence as soon as they encountered a large loss. In terms of
the LIDA model high negative incentive salience may cut off one “branch” in a tree of
possibilities. For example while planning a route to the airport you realize the plan will
involve taking the interstate, which you view as dangerous. This leads you to abandon
that specific plan, and come up with another route taking safer roads. Conversely,
sufficient positive incentive salience may prompt the selection of a behavior stream,
leading to the end of the deliberation altogether.
Recall that model-based learning refers to a set of reinforcement learning methods
in which an internal model of the environment is learned and used to evaluate available
actions or cues on the basis of their potential outcomes. I propose that volitional decisionmaking, modulated by the total incentive salience of anticipated or potential events in the
Current Situational Model of the Workspace, underlies LIDA’s implementation of
model-based control. Such processes in LIDA typically require multiple cognitive cycles,
in accordance with the slower, model-based control or “System 2” (Kahneman, 2011).
Experiment Replication
To validate the motivation extension to LIDA, I replicated a psychological experiment of
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the reinforcer devaluation paradigm. In particular, I created a computer simulation of an
experiment testing the effects of orbitofrontal lesions on the representation of incentive
value in associative learning (Gallagher, McMahan, & Schoenbaum, 1999). The
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is thought to contain representations of the motivational
significance of cues (conditioned stimuli) and the incentive value of expected outcomes.
The significance of the reinforcer devaluation task is that normal performance depends on
the ability of a conditioned stimulus (CS) to gain access to the motivational properties of
an upcoming unconditioned stimulus (US). Moreover, it illustrates the difference between
the fast acting, slow-adapting model-free control (consciously mediated action selection
in LIDA) and the slow-acting, fast-adapting model-based control (volitional decisionmaking in LIDA).
In the original study, the experimenters first divided rats into two groups: those in
the first had their orbitofrontal cortex lesioned, while those in the second maintained an
intact OFC. Rats were then trained in a conditioning phase in accordance with standard
Pavlovian conditioning: Over a series of 40 trials, rats were presented with a 10-second
light CS, which was paired with (immediately followed by) a food delivery, itself
followed by a ten-minute period in which the rat was allowed to eat freely. After a series
of conditioning trials, a conditioned response (food cup behavior) to the CS was
established. The measure during these trials was the rat’s appetitive behavior towards the
food cup during the last 5 seconds of the 10-second cue.
After the conditioning phase, each rat underwent three trials in a different US
devaluation phase. In each trial of this phase, there was no light cue, instead food was
delivered first and the rat was given 10 minutes to eat. After this period, the rat
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experienced an aversive event; namely, the injection of LiCl, producing temporary
sickness. The US devaluation phase introduces two more experimental conditions: In the
paired injection condition the experimenters injected the rats immediately after the eating
period. In the unpaired injection condition the rats were injected six hours after eating.
Combining these conditions with the earlier OFC lesion manipulation, there were a total
of four experimental groups: lesioned-paired, lesioned-unpaired, intact-paired, and intactunpaired. The measure during the US devaluation phase was the amount of food
consumed during the eating period of each trial.
After the US devaluation phase, the experimenters performed a devaluation test
phase that revisited the rats’ conditioned responses (CRs) to the light CS. In this phase,
each rat was presented with the light CS only, i.e., without any further experimental
manipulations. As in the first phase, the measure for these trials was the rat’s appetitive
behavior towards the food cup during the last 5 seconds of the 10-second cue.
Although the light CS was absent during the devaluation phase, its previous
association with the food US provides a basis for anticipating the US. The experimenters
found that lesions of the OFC did not affect either 1) the initial acquisition of a
conditioned response to the light CS in the initial conditioning phase, or 2) the learning of
food aversion in the US devaluation phase. However, in the devaluation test phase, OFC
lesioned rats exhibited no change in their conditioned responding to the light CS, i.e.,
they continued to exhibit appetitive food cup behavior. This outcome contrasts with the
behavior of control rats: after the devaluation of the US, a significant decrease in the food
cup approaches occurred in the devaluation test phase. The experimenters hypothesized
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that, after OFC damage, the cue was unable to access the representational information
about the incentive value of the associated US (Gallagher et al., 1999).
LIDA Account of Experimental Behavior. Recall that, in the first phase of the
experiment, a light cue is paired with food delivery, that is, food is delivered immediately
after the light signal terminates. The agent’s appetitive behavior towards the food cup is
recorded during the last 5 seconds of the 10-second cue. The measure of learning in
Phase 1 was food cup behavior recorded as a percentage of total behavior recorded during
the last 5-second observation interval of the 10-second CS presentation (the light). This
was achieved by recording a single behavior for each 1.25-second interval, and then
computing the percentage of behavior that was food cup behavior, i.e., the frequency of
food cup behavior in an observation interval was divided by the total number of
observations made in that interval. The results of Phase 1 of the original experiment are
shown in the first graph in Figure 7, which shows no significant difference between the
experimental groups in the acquisition of a conditioned response. Next, I describe how a
LIDA agent models the events of this phase, and how it learns a conditioned response.
Let us first assume that a LIDA agent replicating this experiment would have a
memory for the light cue in the form of a “light-cue” node in its Perceptual Associative
Memory (PAM). Then, during this phase, the light-cue node would be instantiated while
the light is on, and this node would come to consciousness. Later on, a “food” node is
similarly recognized with, due to the short time passage, the light node still being active
in the Conscious Contents Queue of the Workspace. A temporal structure building
codelet then builds a new structure in the Current Situational Model of the Workspace,
based on the food node and its temporal predecessor, the light node. If this structure of
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light, link, and food is formed into a coalition by an attention codelet, and wins the
competition for consciousness, then a new temporal link from light-cue to food would be
learned into PAM.
The conscious broadcasting of this structure would also serve to recruit resources
to deal with the situation. In this case, it is assumed that the broadcast instantiates one or
more previously learned schemes from Procedural Memory having a context of “food,”
and an appetitive food cup action, “approach food.” If such a scheme is instantiated and
its resulting behavior is selected for execution, then we can expect the agent to
additionally perform the “eat food” action. Note that when the “eat food” action event
occurs, it will be is recognized and it will be likely accompanied by a built-in “food
pleasure” feeling node having positive affective valence. If the “eat food” event comes to
consciousness, two kinds of learning are performed: 1) a temporal link from “approach
food” to “eat food,” representing an affordance, is positively reinforced in PAM, and 2)
due to the positive affective valence from the “food pleasure” feeling node, a positive
update is made to the “eat food” node’s base-level incentive salience.
Several repetitions of this first phase would lead to repeated conscious broadcasts
of the “light cue, food delivery, approach food, eat food” event sequence. Temporal
difference (TD) learning would occur each time a structure with a temporal link is present
in the broadcast, and would update the base-level incentive salience of the link’s source
event. Working backwards in order of occurrence, TD learning would first update the
base-level incentive salience of the “approach food” event based on the difference
between the approach event’s current base-level incentive salience and that of the
following event, “eat food.” Later, the two antecedent events of food delivery and light
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cue would, incrementally over multiple cognitive cycles, gain base-level incentive
salience. At first, this would only affect the approach node (immediate predecessor to eat
food), but later the other nodes would receive some “credit” in predicting the food
“reward.” The upshot of this learning is that the node for the light cue gains a high baselevel incentive salience, which later helps it to strongly activate the “food” node via
learned temporal links. Once “food” is strongly activated, the selection of an appetitive
food cup behavior is likely to occur, even in the absence of actual food.
For the second phase of the experiment, there were two conditions: 1) In the
paired injection condition, rats were given food immediately followed by (paired with) an
illness inducing LiCl injection, and 2) the unpaired injection condition also first provided
food, but its LiCl injection occurred six hours later. The results from the original
experiment are shown in the second graph in Figure 7. The experimental groups that
received food paired with the injection are shown in white. These groups learned to
greatly reduce their food consumption. The unpaired groups are shown in black. These
groups attenuated their food consumption by significantly less. There was no significant
decrease in food consumption across sessions for these unpaired groups. One explanation
for the apparent decrease for the rats in the unpaired groups is that they might have
performed some deliberative temporal association, followed by conscious learning, to
actually form a memory of an association between the food and the injection.
For the paired experimental group, the mental events occurring in a LIDA-based
agent are similar to those of the first experimental phase. The agent would, via conscious
learning, add a temporal link from the food node to the injection event. Additionally,
after the injection, the agent would recognize a “sickness” event and, via conscious.
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Figure 7. The results of the original reinforcer devaluation experiment. The Phase 1
graph shows that all groups acquired conditioned responses to the light cue, as evidenced
by their increased food cup behavior as a percentage of total behavior during the latter
half of the light cue presentation. The Phase 2 graph shows that the rats receiving paired
LiCl injections significantly reduced their food consumption as compared to those rats
receiving unpaired injections. There was neither a significant difference in food
consumption (due to lesion) among the paired groups nor among the unpaired groups.
Lastly, the Phase 3 graph shows that only intact rats receiving paired injections
significantly reduced their food cup behavior during the devaluation test.
learning, add another temporal link from the injection event to the sickness event. The
sickness event would come with an accompanying “sickness feeling” feeling node with
negative affective valence. Conscious learning would then lead to the assignment of a
low (possibly negative) base-level incentive salience to the sickness event because of this
negative affective valence. Repeated conscious exposures of this “food delivery,
approach food, eat food, injection, sickness” sequence would then, via temporal
difference learning, “devalue” or decrease the base-level incentive salience, first of the
injection event, then of the earlier events as well.
For an agent in the unpaired group, the processing and learning would be the
same as for the paired group, except that, since the injection occurs six hours after the
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food presentation, the “food” node would have long since decayed away from the
Workspace during the aversive events. Thus, for such a simple agent, no temporal links
are ever learned between the eating event and the injection or sickness. (In this second
unpaired group, the injection and sickness events would still be learned with a temporal
link between them, and both would be given low base-level incentive salience.) For the
unpaired groups, the apparent decrease in food consumption across sessions may have
been a result of deliberative association between the injection event and an earlier event
(e.g., food consumption) recalled from Episodic Memory.
In the final phase of the experiment the agent receives several presentations of the
light cue that are not followed by any additional experimental manipulations. As in Phase
1, the agent’s appetitive food cup behavior is recorded during the last 5 seconds of the
10-second cue. The experimental findings for Phase 3 of the experiment are shown in the
final graph in Figure 7. The white bars represent groups receiving paired injections, and
the black bars represent unpaired groups. Only the paired control (having intact OFC)
group (left white bar) significantly decreased its rate of conditioned responses from the
other groups, whose CR rate were statistically equivalent.
To set up a LIDA-based explanation of Phase 3, I first note the LIDA agent can
form new long-term memories based on temporal links. Such links afford the agent the
ability to instantiate expected future event(s) into the Current Situational Model of the
Workspace based on currently active nodes in the CSM. This process may repeat with
subsequent future events each further ahead in time than the last. It is also hypothesized
that expected events, their temporal links, and the original event can all form into a single
coalition. This coalition competes based on the total activation and total incentive
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salience of each of these events including the expected one(s). Keeping this in mind, if a
LIDA agent replicating the results of the experiment is to be constructed, I must
hypothesize a functional role for the OFC, and relate this role to a capacity of a typical
LIDA agent that must be removed to simulate an OFC lesion. The OFC has been
suggested as critical for “associative learning,” and the representation of “associative
information, particularly information about the value of expected outcomes”
(Schoenbaum, Takahashi, Liu, & McDannald, 2011). The neural activity in the OFC
“increases to cues and after responses that predict rewards.” Finally, the authors suggest
viewing OFC function as “constructing or implementing a model-based representation”
(Schoenbaum et al., 2011).
Based on these ideas, I define a lesioned OFC LIDA agent as one that cannot use
the total incentive salience of expected event(s) in determining the total incentive salience
of a coalition involving those event(s). An intact OFC LIDA agent is one that can access
the total incentive salience of expected event(s) and use it in computing the total
incentive salience of any coalition containing the event(s). Note that for both agent types,
the base-level incentive salience of event nodes is assumed to be intact. Likewise, the
lesion does not affect existing memory in PAM or Procedural Memory. Lastly, both
agent types, lesioned or intact, can perform temporal difference learning.
The results for the unpaired injection groups in Phase 3 can be explained simply:
Since the injections were unpaired, the aversive injection event would not be active in
LIDA’s Workspace contemporaneously with the food event, and thus it cannot be
associated by a structure building codelet in the Workspace. (This fact is independent of
whether the agent is lesioned or not.) As a result, a potential temporal link never comes to
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consciousness and no TD learning can occur that might devalue the base-level incentive
salience of the temporally earlier events — the food delivery and the light cue. As a result,
the light-cue event retains its high base-level incentive salience, originally learned from
Phase 1, motivating the agent to approach the food cup when the light cue is later shown
in Phase 3.
Now, let’s consider the two paired injection groups. For the paired-lesioned OFC
group, the lesioned OFC LIDA agent is only able to evaluate a stimulus’ (light cue) value
based on its base-level incentive salience. This would prevent the agent from integrating
any expectation of future aversive events into a coalition with an instantiated light cue
event node. Since the light cue occurred in the initial conditioning phase of the
experiment, its base-level incentive salience was positively updated by TD learning.
However, since the light cue did not occur in Phase 2, it could not have been altered by
TD learning. Consequently, a coalition involving the light cue has an overall positive
incentive salience, and, via a conscious broadcast, would prompt appetitive food cup
behavior. The expected result is that an OFC-lesioned, paired-injection LIDA agent
would exhibit a similar percentage of food cup behavior as both unpaired groups.
Why might an intact, paired-injection agent reduce its food cup behavior? This
type of agent, given the instantiation of the light cue node, is able to instantiate the
subsequent events it has learned to expect. It does this by repeatedly cueing its PAM
based on instantiated events in the CSM of the Workspace. The initial light-cue event
cues PAM instantiating the food-delivery event into the Workspace. Next, the eating
event is instantiated, then injection, etc. An attention codelet then forms a coalition from
this integrated sequence of events, and bring it to the Global Workspace. While the
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earlier events in this sequence may have a fairly high base-level incentive salience, the
later ones would surely have a low base-level incentive salience due to the devaluation
trials. Such a coalition would then have less overall incentive salience and, consequently,
less of a chance to win the competition for consciousness. Even if it does, it would have
less of a chance to induce an appetitive action selection.
Agent Implementation. I reproduced the reinforcer devaluation experiment
computationally to provide an environment for the motivationally extended LIDA agent.
Using the LIDA framework, the simulated environment was implemented as a separate
framework module from the agent. Only the sensing and acting processes coupled the
two. A process of the environment module performed the manipulations of the
experiment. In a sense, the experimenter was built into the simulated environment.
The experiment was simulated using a series of stages, with each stage
representing a main event in the original experiment. The possible stages are light-cue,
food-delivery, LiCl-shot, nothing. Only one stage may occur at a time, and each stage
lasts for a fixed amount of simulated time, which was measured in ticks. For this work,
one tick represents one millisecond of real time. The minimum length of a stage was
1,000 ticks (simulating 1 second) with longer stages lasting for some integer multiple of
1,000 ticks. I define a stage sequence as a specific sequence of stages. Each of the three
main phases of the experiment was implemented as a stage sequence. Phase 1 was
implemented with the stage sequence light-cue, food-delivery, nothing, nothing repeated
4 times. Phase 2 was implemented with the stage sequence food-delivery, LiCl-shot,
nothing, nothing repeated 2 times. Phase 3 was implemented with the stage sequence
light-cue, nothing, nothing repeated 2 times.
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The replicated experimental environment maintains several variables representing
the state of the experimental objects, the agent’s internal state, and several other
parameters. All quantities mentioned below (see Table 2) are scalars with possible values
in the closed interval [0, 1]. The food-amount variable represents the current amount of
food available to the agent in the food cup. The food-delivery amount parameter
determines the amount of food delivered to the food cup. The consumption-amount
parameter governs how much food is consumed when the agent eats. The eating-action
variable implements the proprioceptive stimulus of performing the eating action, while
the eating-sensation amount parameter specifies the value that eating-action takes
immediately after the agent performs the eat action. The eating-pleasure variable
implements the proprioceptive stimulus of “enjoying” the consumption of food, and the
eating-pleasure amount parameter specifies the value eating-pleasure takes immediately
after the agent eats. The sickness level variable represents the proprioceptive stimulus of
sickness, and the shot sickness amount parameter specifies the value sickness-level is set
to when the agent receives the LiCl injection. Each of these proprioceptive variables has
an associated decay parameter (Table 2). The food-delivery amount and consumption
amount values were chosen such that the agent could eat twice for each food delivery.
The eating sensation parameter values were chosen such that it would take around 500
ticks for the eating node to decay way. If the eating sensation decays too quickly, it is not
possible to temporally associate eating with future events. The eating pleasure parameter
values were chosen such that eating “pleasure” would occur long enough to be a part of a
conscious broadcast. Likewise, the shot sickness parameters were chosen so that the
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sickness feeling decays away in about 200 ticks — long enough to be consciously
recognized.

Table 2. The parameters of the simulated experimental environment and their values.
Parameter name
Food-delivery amount
Consumption amount
Eating-sensation amount
Eating-sensation decay
Eating-pleasure amount
Eating-pleasure decay
Shot-sickness amount
Sickness-level decay

Value
0.5
0.25
0.5
0.001
0.3
0.005
1.0
0.005

The agent is able to sense each of the proprioceptive stimuli, and can also sense
two “visual” stimuli: one representing the current stage (e.g., light-cue stage), and another
signifying whether food was present in the food cup. At any one instant (tick), it is
possible for the agent to sense any or all of these stimuli.
The LIDA agent has a single motor plan, eat-food, which it can execute to affect
the environment. When the agent executes the eat-food motor plan, several things occur
in the simulated experimental environment: 1) The eating-action variable is set to eatingsensation amount, 2) The food-amount variable is decreased by consumption-amount or
is set to 0.0, 3) The eating-pleasure variable has its value increased in proportion to the
decrease in food-amount, and 4) If the current stage is the light-cue stage, a count of
appetitive food cup behaviors is incremented. Independent of the agent’s actions, the
food-amount variable is set to food-delivery amount by the simulation whenever the fooddelivery stage occurs. Similarly, the sickness variable is set to shot-sickness amount
whenever the LiCl-shot stage occurs.
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The LIDA agent’s Sensory Memory acts as a simple buffer of sensor activity,
which was refreshed every tick. The implementation of its Perceptual Associative
Memory (PAM) is more complicated. The PAM has five built-in nodes of regular type:
light-cue, food-delivery, eating-action, injection, and sickness, and two interpretive
feeling nodes: eating-pleasure, and sickness-feeling. There are feature detectors processes
for each node, which check for the presence of sensory activity corresponding to a PAM
node. All PAM nodes begin each simulation with zero base-level activation.
New to this implementation of PAM is the addition of temporal difference
learning, and base-level incentive salience learning to the existing algorithm for
conscious learning. Two parameters modulate this learning: learning rate, α , and
discount rate, γ . The former is a multiplicative factor modulating the magnitude of all
updates to base-level activation and base-level incentive salience in PAM. The latter
modulates the degree to which the incentive salience of a predecessor event is “credited”
to its immediate successor in temporal difference learning. (For example, see Equation 3
in Temporal Difference Learning). In addition to propagating activation, PAM also gains
the ability to propagate current incentive salience along incentive salience links.
Activation passing in PAM is multiplicatively modulated by a third parameter, upscale.
The effects of different values of these three parameters will be described later in the
testing section.
A general addition to the LIDA framework with the motivational extension is the
addition of a current incentive salience attribute to all nodes and, additionally, a baselevel incentive salience attribute for long-term PAM nodes. Base-level, current, and total
incentive salience may take on values in the closed interval [–1.0, 1.0] where negative
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values represent negative incentive, and positive values represent positive incentive. All
of these changes to the implementation are designed for inclusion in a future version of
the LIDA software framework (see Chapter 6).
The agent’s Workspace contains both the Current Situational Model (CSM)
submodule and the Conscious Contents Queue (CCQ) submodule. The Workspace has a
temporal structure building codelet; one that tries to builds a structure in the CSM
consisting of the previous conscious event from the CCQ and an event that is a part of the
incoming percept to the CSM. In particular, the codelet proposes (adds) a new temporal
link from the previous CCQ event to the current incoming percept event. This codelet
was not implemented as a periodically running task; rather, the algorithm ran each time a
new node was added to the CSM from PAM. This is a more parsimonious approach as a
link need only be built when a new event arrives from the percept. In practice, this
approach also avoided the creation of cycles in the CSM graph structure. The pseudocode
details of this codelet’s algorithm can be found in Appendix B. Secondly, the Workspace
also has a feeling structure building codelet, running as a separate task, which proposes
links associating instantiated feeling nodes with the currently most active event in the
CSM.
There is a single default attention codelet, which periodically forms coalitions
from the most active node in the CSM and those active node(s) and link(s) connected
with the most active node. A conscious broadcast is triggered every 100 ticks for any
currently active coalition with nonzero activation.
The agent’s Procedural Memory has one built-in scheme with the food node as the
context, the eat node as the action, and an unspecified result. The Action Selection
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module checks if an action should be selected every 75 ticks with a 200 tick refractory
period after each action selection. Sensory-Motor Memory had a single motor plan
template, which associated the selected action eat with a motor plan. Selected motor
plans are run in a separate task after process action task ticks have passed to simulate the
time to execute the action. The decay rate parameter involves multiple modules as it
affects the decay of nodes, coalitions, schemes, behaviors, and incentive salience
throughout several LIDA modules. Finally, in calculating the total activation of nodes, a
weight on the base-level activation’s contribution was used. Table 3 summarizes these
main parameters for this motivational agent implementation.

Table 3. Main parameters of the replication agent, their associated modules, and their
default parameter values.
Parameter Name
Sensing frequency
Feature detector frequency
Learning rate
Discount rate
Upscale factor
Feeling structure building
codelet frequency
Attention codelet frequency
No broadcast occurring period
for broadcast trigger
Individual coalition threshold
for broadcast trigger
Action selection frequency
Action selection refractory
period
Process action task
Decay rate
Base-level activation weight

Module
Sensory Memory
PAM
PAM
PAM
PAM
Workspace

Default Value
1 tick
5 ticks per run
0.1
0.5
0.1
6 ticks per run

Attention Codelet Module
Global Workspace

5 ticks per run
100 ticks

Global Workspace

0.0 activation

Action Selection
Action Selection

75 ticks
200 ticks

Sensory-Motor Memory
Various
Various

150 ticks
0.005
0.2
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The OFC lesion manipulation was implemented in the Procedural Memory
module. In the intact (non-lesioned) case, event nodes (options) from the current
conscious broadcast are evaluated based on the average of their total incentive salience
and the total incentive salience of all associated expected events. For the lesioned case,
broadcasted event nodes (options) are evaluated only on their total incentive salience. In
either case, if the average is positive, then the node is permitted to recruit and instantiate
schemes, otherwise it is not.
Simulation Results
Fixed Parameters. I first evaluated the motivational agent by having it participate in
multiple trials of the simulated reinforcer devaluation experiment. First, using a fixed set
of parameters summarized in Table 3, I performed 30 lesioned trials of the experiment
and also 30 non-lesioned trials. In each trial a LIDA agent was generated with only the
aforementioned PAM nodes built in. The agent was then exposed to the 3 stages
sequences corresponding to the 3 phases of the experiment in which it had to learn from
experience. The measurement in the original experiment for Phases 1 and 3 was the ratio
of the number of appetitive food cup behaviors to total behaviors recorded during the
latter half of the light cue presentation. For the simulation I simply recorded such
behaviors during the entire light cue presentation. Figure 8 summarizes the synthetic
results for the lesioned and non-lesioned cases in the first and third experimental phase.
The results are consistent with the original experiment. There was no significant
difference between conditions in terms of food cup behavior in Phase 1, but there was a
significant difference between these conditions in Phase 3. In Phase 3 the non-lesioned
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condition almost always avoided approaching the food cup, while the lesioned condition
failed to halt its food cup behavior.
In the following sections, I study the effects of changing three parameter values
that were fixed in the original test. By exploring a range of parameters, I can give a better
sense of the stability of the original fixed parameter set.

Figure 8. The results of the reinforcer devaluation experiment replication for a fixed
parameter set. The error bars represent the standard deviation.
Varying Learning Rate Parameter. The first parameter for which I tested a range of
values was the learning rate, a multiplicative factor modulating the magnitude of all
updates to base-level activation and base-level incentive salience in PAM. In the fixed
parameter test the learning rate was 0.1. Here I explored values of the learning rate from
0.0 to 0.5 for both lesion conditions. The results for Phase 1 of the experiment are given
in Figure 9 and show a general increase in appetitive behavior as learning rate increases
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until stability at and above 0.3. There was no significant difference between lesion
conditions.

Figure 9. Phase 1 food cup behavior versus learning rate.

Figure 10. Phase 3 food cup behavior versus learning rate
For Phase 3, we should expect lesioned agents to maintain substantial food cup
behavior and non-lesioned agents to avoid food cup behavior. Across learning rates there

88

was a significant difference between the lesioned and non-lesioned cases with nonlesioned agents largely abstaining from food cup behavior (Figure 10). Lesioned agents’
behavior was more complex for various learning rates. Around from 0.0 to 0.1 increases
in learning rate serves to bolster food cup behavior; however, beyond 0.1, increases in
learning rate decrease this behavior, likely due to the increase in the rate of temporal
difference learning. That is to say a high learning rate allows the lesioned agent to
overcome its mental deficit via more rapid TD learning, which allows it to more quickly
revise the base-level incentive salience of food.
Varying Discount Rate Parameter. The second parameter for which I explored a range
of values is the discount rate, which modulates the degree to which the incentive salience
of an event is “credited” to its immediate temporal predecessor in temporal difference
learning. In the fixed parameter test the discount rate was 0.5. In Phase 1, there was no
significant difference in food cup behavior across values of the discount rate from 0 to 1.
Moreover, there was no significant difference due to the lesioning manipulation either
(Figure 11).
In Phase 3, the discount rate’s value had a significant effect on food cup behavior
for the lesioned condition. In particular, starting at around 0.5, higher values of the
parameter served to attenuate, but not completely extinguish, food cup behavior (Figure
12). Again this suggests that improving Temporal Difference learning helps the agent
overcome its deficit to a degree for this particular task.
Varying Upscale Parameter. The final parameter for which I tested a range of values
was the upscale, which multiplicatively modulates activation passing in PAM. In the
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Figure 11. Phase 1 food cup behavior versus discount rate.

Figure 12. Phase 3 food cup behavior versus discount rate.
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fixed parameter test the learning rate was 0.1. Here I explored values of the upscale from
0.0 to 1.0 for both lesion conditions. The results for Phase 1 of the experiment are given
in Figure 13 and show a general increase in appetitive behavior as learning rate increases
until stability at and above 0.3. There was no significant difference between lesion
conditions. Increased upscale allows an agent to better anticipate future events. In Phase
1 this encourages the agent to eat the food since it would be more likely for the light cue
to significantly activate the food node.
In Phase 3, upscale value had little effect on food cup behavior for either
condition. There appears to be a small uptick in food cup behavior for the non-lesioned
condition as upscale increases. It may be that increased upscale chiefly serves to bolster
the relevance of the food node, but not the later event nodes with negative consequences.
Similarly for the lesioned condition there may be a small decrease in food cup behavior
with increased upscale (Figure 14).
In this section I have presented the results of the replication of a reinforcer
devaluation experiment using a motivationally extended LIDA software agent. The agent
successfully replicated the main result of the experiment. I also explored the effects of
varying three critical internal parameters on the agent’s behavior in the experiment.
Discussion
The Psi model (Bach, 2009) provides inspiration for some of the concepts in the
motivation extension to LIDA. I discuss this relationship next, and outline it in Table 4.
Psi distinguishes between demands, urges, motives, cognitive modulators, affect, and
directed emotions. Demands are built-in drives that give rise to goals while urges are the
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Figure 13. Phase 1 food cup behavior versus upscale.

Figure 14. Phase 3 food cup behavior versus upscale.
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Table 4. Approximate overlap of motivation concepts in the Psi and LIDA models.
Concept
Built-in homeostatic
mechanism
Cognitive
representation
of a drive
Valence (Psychology)
Arousal

Psi Term
Demand (demand sensor)

LIDA Term
Homeostatic sensor

Urge

Drive feeling node

Valence (kind of modulator)
Arousal (kind of modulator)

Desired (or aversive)
event
Emotion

Motive

Affective valence
Sum activation of feeling
nodes
Event with nonzero
incentive salience
Feelings with cognitive
content

Motives combined with
perceptual representation

signals that make demands apparent. In LIDA, homeostatic sensors and the sensors’
associated drive feeling nodes implement drives. Psi theory suggests: “an abrupt increase
of an urge corresponds to… a ‘displeasure or distress signal’… while a decrease of an
urge — its satisfaction — yields … ‘pleasure signals’” (Bach, 2012). In Psi, a motive is
defined as the combination of an urge and an event associated with the satisfaction of the
urge. LIDA refers to motives as events with nonzero incentive salience. Psi theory asserts
that goals depend on the nature of a given situation and the existing demands. Higherlevel emotions such as jealousy and anger are said to arise in Psi from the combination of
motives and the agent’s perception of a situation. Fellous’ work (2004) has been
interpreted as providing a biological underpinning for the use of emotions in Psi (LeeJohnson & Carnegie, 2009). Psi maintains that emotions should be distinguished from
motivational phenomena: while hunger is cognitively represented (as an urge) and
implies a valence and an effect on the allocation of mental and physical resources of an
organism, it is not an emotion, but a motivator. Finally, Bach (2012) adopts the general
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notion that motivation determines what has to be done, while emotion determines how it
has to be done. In my view such an assertion is more problematic than elucidating.
One difference between the model introduced above and the Psi model is the way
drive feeling nodes (urges in Psi) affect perception, action selection and action execution.
In Psi urges interact with perception via modulators (Bach, 2003, Fig. 1; Bach, 2012, Fig.
6). In LIDA feelings can immediately modulate perception and action selection, given
that conscious learning has previously occurred. Some feeling nodes are likely part of
most coalitions, and affect learning if they win the competition for consciousness.
Emotional valence is considered a representation of desirability (Bach, 2012), while in
this model the two are distinguished, and play different functional roles (see sections
“Affective Valence” and “Incentive Salience” above). Furthermore, it appears that in Psi,
valence is a “reinforcement signal that emanates from changes in the perceived demands”
(Bach, 2012). However, in this model, valence can also arise from intrinsically positive
or negative stimuli, e.g., a sweet feeling node with positive valence. Lastly, the Psi model
does not integrate cognitive neuroscience evidence for the “short route of emotion”
(Cannon, 1927; Faghihi, Nkambou, Poirier, & Fournier-Viger, 2009; LeDoux, 2000),
which have been referred to as alarms.
Future Work. In the section on the temporal difference learning of base-level incentive
salience it was assumed that that the discount factor, γ, was fixed. However, changes in
physiological state (e.g., stress) may serve to dynamically modulate this factor. Future
work could, in general, explore the situations where emotions modulate the agent in a
physiological way.
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Another avenue of future research may involve the so-called, eligibility traces,
which “trace” the credit assignment of temporal difference learning back further in time
than the immediately previous event. Eligibility traces can be viewed as providing a
short-term memory of multiple previous events so that several of these previous events
may all be updated as each new observation arrives. Eligibility traces are usually
implemented by an exponentially decaying memory trace, with decay parameter λ (Barto,
2007).
Conclusions
Here, I have explored how to implement the agenda of an autonomous agent in the
systems-level LIDA cognitive architecture. To this end, I presented a motivation
extension to LIDA covering a range of motivation-related concepts, including
feelings, affective valence, incentive salience, emotion, appraisal, reinforcement
learning, and model-free and model-based learning (McCall et al., in preparation).
This extension adds new faculties to the LIDA model including drive feelings,
affective valence, incentive salience, and temporal difference learning. I discussed the
role of motivations in a single LIDA cognitive cycle, as well as over multiple cycles.
To begin validating this motivational extension, I presented a computational
implementation of a LIDA-based agent with some of these capabilities, which
replicates the results of an existing “reinforcer devaluation” experiment, which tested
the agent’s ability to learn, and later update, the reward-predicting attributes of
stimuli that drive its behavior. To better understand the working parameter set, I also
explored the effects of varying the values of three key agent parameters on agent
behavior.
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4

Cortical Learning Algorithms with 2D Receptive Fields for a Systems-Level

Cognitive Architecture
Introduction
In this chapter I consider how modern treatments of perception might be integrated into a
broad systems-level cognitive architecture, LIDA. Having reviewed several inspirational
models for this work including HMAX, Hierarchical Temporal Memory, predictive
coding, Generalized Filtering, etc., I now strive to identify key principles across these
various approaches to guide the research and development of an algorithm capable of
generically assimilating a model of the data it samples. I argue that such an algorithm has
applications to systems-level cognitive architectures. The organization of this chapter is
as follows: I identify and justify guiding principles for perceptual representation, its
related processes, and learning. Next, I perform a case study of Generalized Filtering, a
biologically plausible application of the free-energy principle, to complex hierarchical
dynamic statistical models. Generalized Filtering provides the mathematical and
theoretical guide for this work that adapts the Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA). I then
describe the Cortical Learning Algorithms and my own 2D-CLA an extension adding 2D
receptive fields to CLA (McCall & Franklin, 2013). The chapter finishes with reports of
several tests of the CLA, which has seen relatively little in the way of published work.
Figure 15 depicts where this work contributes to the LIDA architecture.
Perceptual Principles for Cognitive Architectures
Motivated by strong ideas within the models of perceptual analysis and learning reviewed
in Chapter 2, this section identifies several key principles for perceptual representation,
processing, and learning in cognitive architectures. To start, what evidence is there that
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Figure 15. Contributions of 2D-CLA and PC-CLA Chapters to the LIDA model. The
work in this chapter on 2D-CLA and that of the subsequent chapter on PC-CLA chiefly
contribute to the LIDA model as implementations of the low-level Sensory Memory,
Perceptual Associative Memory, and their associated current representations in a part of
the Current Situational Model of LIDA’s Workspace.
common perceptual principles might exist? Mountcastle (1978) proposed that there is a
common function performed throughout the entire neocortex. The main idea is that a
common cortical algorithm learns patterns of coincidence, and then sequences of
coincidence patterns in sensory data (Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2004). Being grounded in
time, such an algorithm appears to be generally useful across the various sensory
modalities. Some early experimental work in support of this idea came from Métin and
Frost (1989). They studied hamsters whose retinal ganglion cells were surgically adjusted
at a young age to project to somatosensory areas. As adults, the hamsters’ somatosensory
neurons responded to visual stimulation in resemblance to normal visual cortical neurons.
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For both experimental animals and controls, the same functional categories of neurons
occurred in similar proportions, and the neurons’ selectivity for orientation or movement
direction were comparable. This suggests that the visual and somatosensory pathways
perform similar transformations on their inputs. Other experiments using ferrets similarly
rerouted visual inputs to the cortical areas typically involved in auditory processing. For
instance, Roe, Pallas, Kwon, and Sur (1992) concluded that the sensory neocortex is not
uniquely programmed to process inputs of a particular modality. Rather the audio cortex
can process visual input, and the visual transformations performed by auditory cortex
appear very similar to those of a normal visual cortex. Von Melcher, Pallas, and Sur
(2000) also performed a similar rerouting experiment, reporting that their ferrets had
visually responsive cells in the auditory thalamus and auditory cortex forming a
retinotopic1 map. Cells in the auditory cortex had receptive field properties typical of
cells in visual cortex. The ferrets additionally exhibited behavior in response to a visual
light stimulus.
In a similar vein, neuroscience research suggests that the neo-cortex may be
implementing a large number of similar, hierarchically arranged “cortical circuits”
(Douglas & Martin, 2004; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Phillips & Singer, 1997;
Rockel, Hiorns, & Powell, 1980). While there is debate over the uniformity of such
circuits (e.g., Meyer et al., 2013), variations might be understood as parametric
refinements of common structure. Recently, Bedny, Pascual-Leone, Dodell-Feder,
Fedorenko, and Saxe (2011) found that congenitally blind humans perform language
processing in their visual cortices during some verbal tasks. More specifically, they found
1
Retinotopy is the mapping of visual input from the retina to neurons, particularly those neurons within the
visual stream.
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that the left visual cortex behaved similarly to the classic language regions of the left
frontal and temporal cortex. The authors concluded that brain regions thought to have
evolved for vision could take on language processing as a result of early experience.
In a paper with similarities to this “Perceptual Principles” section, O’Reilly
(1998) identified principles for “biologically based computational models of cortical
cognition.” He suggested the following advantages: “…integrating these principles
allows one to demonstrate the consistency of different models, capitalize on synergies
between different principles, organize and consolidate existing findings, and generate
novel insights into the nature of cognition.” His principles were: biological realism,
distributed representations, inhibitory competition, bidirectional activation propagation,
error-driven task learning, and Hebbian model learning. I directly discuss the first two of
his principles, and mention the third under the heading “Sparse Distributed
Representation.” “Bidirectional activation propagation” comes up under the heading of
the more specific hierarchical predictive coding, a consequence (under certain
assumptions) of the free-energy principle, which I identify in this section. Similarly
Hebbian-style, prediction-error-driven learning also stems from the free-energy principle
(see the later section “Parameter Optimization via Associative Plasticity”).
Converging Evidence Approach. While machine learning approaches emphasize
efficient, high-performance algorithms, cognitive architectures require perception
algorithms to integrate within the architecture. Biologically inspired cognitive models
add the further constraint of biological plausibility. O’Reilly (1998) succinctly qualified
biological plausibility arguing that: “Although the issue of biological realism is easy to
state, it can be difficult to apply, because the known biology often does not provide

99

sufficient constraints. Thus, biological realism often reduces to plausibility arguments,
which depend on things like how simple and local the mechanism in question is, and that
it is not inconsistent with known biology.” He goes on to suggest a converging evidence
approach where multiple constraints from biology, computation, and cognition converge
to support a given principle. In this spirit, I present my own set of principles below,
justified by converging evidence from disciplines including biology, information theory,
and mathematics.
Autonomy and Agency. Biologically plausible, autonomous, learning agents demand
that learning occur online without stoppages. This still allows for the possibility of a
developmental period, not unlike human development, during which an agent learns
rapidly in a natural setting. Secondly, agents must be able to learn autonomously without
the aid of labeled data, i.e., to perform unsupervised learning. Another critical aspect of
agency is motivations, which are beyond the scope of this chapter; nonetheless there are
ideas on how to implement motivation in hierarchical Bayesian networks (e.g., Friston et
al., 2009).
Hierarchical decomposition. Hierarchical decomposition is an idea that “pervades
almost all attempts to manage complexity” (Russell & Norvig, 2009). Decomposition
using hierarchical structure allows, at the non-root levels of a hierarchy, a computational
task “to be reduced to a small number of activities at the next lower level so the
computational cost of finding the correct way to arrange those activities [...] is small”
(Russell & Norvig, 2009). In the context of internal representations for agents, many
patterns (at non-root levels) can be constructed from patterns in the level immediately
below, achieving substantial pattern reuse. For example, consider a hierarchically
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decomposed memory of sentences where the 1st level stores letter patterns, the 2nd level,
word patterns, and the 3rd, sentence patterns. Given several stored words patterns at the
2nd level, it is more efficient to construct and store sentence patterns (at the 3rd level)
using patterns from the 2nd level (words) than out of 1st level patterns (letters). Note that
patterns can be hierarchically decomposed using co-occurring features in the input space.
For example, the representation of a face can be based on a set of co-occurring features
including the eye, nose, mouth, etc. Likewise, patterns can be decomposed temporally,
using sequences of features. Returning to the previous example with sentences, we can
have the 3rd level storing and representing a single pattern representing an entire sentence
based on temporal sequences of word patterns in the 2nd level.
There is considerable evidence that brains use hierarchical decomposition dating
back to Mumford (1992). Fuster’s “cognits” model of cortical representation (Fuster,
2006, 2007) also includes hierarchy. According to Fuster, perceptual cognits are
cognitive networks initially made of neurons associated by information acquired through
the senses, while executive cognits are made of neurons associated by information related
to action. In both cases, cognits are hierarchically organized. At the bottom of the
hierarchy, cognits are small and relatively simple, representing simple percepts or motor
acts. At the top, cognits are wider and represent complex and abstract information of
perceptual and/or executive (motor) character. Perceptual and motor networks are
associated with each other in cortico-cortical connections. These connections support the
dynamics of the action-perception cycle (Dijkstra et al., 1994; Freeman, 2002; Neisser,
1976) in sequential behavior, speech, and reasoning (Fuster, 2006).
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Sparse Distributed Representation. Snaider (2012, pp. 53–57) reviewed distributed
representations in connectionist systems. In localist representation, each unit represents a
single object, concept, or element of the system, and the represented elements have a oneto-one correspondence to the system’s units (Franklin, 1995, p. 132). The main advantage
of a localist approach is the explicit representation of data. Currently, the Perceptual
Associative Memory module in the LIDA architecture (Ramamurthy & Franklin, 2011)
follows this paradigm. In localist representation, passing activation among units can
explicitly implement constraint rules, e.g., is-a, if A then B, and if A not B. Also, the
excitation of a unit based on the activation of other connected units can model similarity
and composition of elements. Despite these advantages, this type of representation is
inefficient since the one-to-one correspondence between items and units in the system
requires n units to represent n items (Snaider, 2012).
With distributed representations several units represent each pattern, and each unit
can participate in the representation of many patterns (Franklin, 1995, p. 132; Hinton,
McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Each unit in a distributed representation can be thought
of as representing a single microfeature (Hinton et al., 1986), with the information being
encoded by particular combinations of such features and not by a single bit or feature.
With distributed representation, explicitness in representation is lost; however, there are
several advantages. Firstly, it is more efficient than localist representation, e.g., for binary
vectors, only units are required to represent n patterns, whereas localist representation
would require n units. Furthermore, similar patterns have similar representations, because
they may share several features. This can lead to automatic generalization, since similar
items will activate a similar pattern of units (Franklin, 1995, pp. 132–133). Distributed
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representations can implement what Plate (2003, p. 13) calls explicit similarity; i.e.,
similar patterns have similar representations. Electrophysiological recordings
demonstrate that distributed representations are widely used in the cortex (e.g., Rao,
Rainer, & Miller, 1997).
The idea of sparse representation can be traced to the infomax principle (Linsker,
1990), which suggests the brain maximizes the mutual Shannon information between
sensations and representations. Infomax also suggests that internal representation should
efficiently and parsimoniously encode sensory data, and provides an informationtheoretic view of the sparse coding hypothesis of Olshausen and Field (1996), which
suggests that sensory patterns are represented by the strong activation of a relatively
small set of neurons. How can a code be made sparse? One biologically plausible answer
is inhibitory competition, which arises when mutual inhibition among a set of units (e.g.,
via inhibitory interneurons), prevents all but a sparse subset of them from becoming
active at a give moment (O’Reilly, 1998). Inhibitory competition allows only the most
strongly activated representations to win. Approximately 20% of the neurons in the
cortex are believed to be inhibitory interneurons (Gabbot & Somogyi, 1986). More
recently, Rinkus (2010), proposed that cortical macrocolumns are functional detectors of,
and repositories for, sparse distributed representations of inputs, and that the “generic
function of the minicolumn is to enforce macrocolumnar code sparseness.”
What is the value of sparse coding? One answer is that sparse representations are
highly unique and thus robust. Kanerva (1988) considered high-dimensional binary
spaces where each point, x, in the space has exactly one opposite x'. He showed for a
space N, having dimensionality n, that for an arbitrary point, x, the average Hamming
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distance2 to any of the other points in space is roughly half the distance between x and x'.
More specifically, the distribution of the other points as a function of Hamming distance
is approximately Gaussian with a mean distance to x of n / 2 and standard deviation of
n / 2 (Snaider, 2012). Thus, for sufficiently large n, say 1000 and greater, the

distribution becomes quite concentrated around n / 2 . Suppose a pattern y has been stored
in a memory, then this property implies that there are few other patterns close to y, and, if
a similar pattern y* is encountered, it is reasonable to consider y* as a version of y.
Use of Prediction. William James (1890) once noted: “Enough has now been said to
prove the general law of perception, which is this, that whilst part of what we perceive
comes through our senses from the object before us, another part (and it may be the large
part) always comes out of our own head.” James’ law is consistent with modern views of
perception that see the brain as a constructive or predictive organ actively generating
predictions of its sensory inputs using an internal or generative model3 (Friston, 2012).
Such a view can actually be traced back to Helmholtz’s original writings on unconscious
inference, e.g., “Objects are always imagined as being present in the field of vision as
would have to be there in order to produce the same impression on the nervous
mechanism” (von Helmholtz, 2005).
More recently, Bar (2009) suggested a framework portraying a proactive human
brain that continuously generates predictions anticipating the relevant future. In this
framework, associations (from the cueing of memory) bias representations of “what is
most likely to occur and be encountered next.” Such associations vary in scale and in the
2

The Hamming distance between two strings (here vectors) measures the minimum number of substitutions
required to change one string into the other.
3
In probability and statistics, a generative model is a model for probabilistically generating observable data
from some distribution, typically given some hidden parameters.
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automaticity of their activation from automatic, simple and unique, similar to a basic
Hebbian association, to more deliberative associations. Associations are formed through
experience, based on similarity and frequent co-occurrence in space and time. The
framework is supported by demonstrations showing a striking overlap between the
cortical network that mediates contextual associative processing (Bar, Aminoff, Mason,
& Fenske, 2007), and the cortical network termed the “default network,” (Raichle et al.,
2001) suggesting that the brain continuously cues its memory “by default” as does the
LIDA model.
What are the advantages of continual predictions and associations? According to
Bar, one advantage is that seemingly random thoughts and aimless mental simulations are
actually helping to create memories. Agents can benefit from such memories without the
external events ever taking place. Another benefit may be that the predicted or expected
aspects of an experience can be used to compute a prediction error, which is deemed
salient and, therefore, comes to consciousness and is learned. The predictable aspect of
the experience is often not salient and not learned. Then, accurate predictions can help
obviate the need to allocate attention (and learning) towards predictable aspects of the
environment. This frees resources to explore the environment for novelties from which
we can learn, and surprises we should avoid. Generating predictability based on our
experience is, therefore, a powerful tool for detecting the unexpected (Bar, 2009).
Predictive coding theory suggests that local transformations can provide the
benefit of reducing the dynamic range (the ratio between the largest and smallest possible
values of a changeable quantity) required to encode potentially highly variable stimuli,
e.g., natural image signals (Huang & Rao, 2011). In addition to these considerations,
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HTM theory (Hawkins et al., 2011) suggests additional advantages of predictions.
Predictions can be used to produce representations with invariance over time. For
instance, suppose that a network learns a temporal pattern “A, B, C, D” and can predict
expected patterns in advance. Later, if the pattern A is first input then the network would
build a single representation not only of A but, due to predictions, expected future inputs
(e.g., B, C) as well. If B appears next then the network will form a single representation
of B, and via predictions, C and D as well. Since these two representations include
aspects of B and C, the representation exhibits some invariance over time. Furthermore,
for distributed representation, temporal predictions can maintain an internal
representation, over time, in the face of incomplete, corrupted, and/or noisy input.
At this point it is important to distinguish two different kinds of prediction.
Within the context of hierarchical Bayesian inference, I distinguish both 1) top-down
predictions (structural priors in probabilistic terminology), which emanate “top-down”
from one hierarchical level into the immediately subordinate level, and 2) temporal
predictions (dynamical priors), encoding the expected temporal dynamics using “lateral”
or recurrent links. In relation to this, it is also important to qualify that, for this work,
“prediction” does not specifically refer to the high-level psychological phenomenon that
is akin to a deliberative judgment. Rather, it is more aptly viewed as a process within a
hierarchical, dynamic (recurrent) network producing 1) dynamic expectations of the
current state based on the previous state(s) at that level, and 2) top-down expectations for
a given hierarchical level stemming from a current belief at the next higher hierarchical
level.
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Finally, hierarchical predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999) involves top-down
predictions whereas in generalized predictive coding (Friston et al., 2010), structural
priors dynamically reshape the trajectory of a low-level attractor, and, additionally, the
low-level attractor itself also contains an abundance of dynamical priors (predictions) that
encode expected higher-order dynamics. Friston and Kiebel (2009; 2011) describe a
simulation demonstrating the necessity of structural and dynamical priors for accurate
perception. They produced artificial “birdsongs” using two time-varying control
parameters governing the frequency and amplitude of vibrations emanating from an
artificial syrinx. The syrinx was driven with two states of a Lorenz attractor, one
controlling the frequency and the other controlling the amplitude or volume. The
parameters of the Lorenz attractor were chosen to generate a short sequence of chirps
every second or so. To endow the songs with a hierarchical structure, they placed a
second Lorenz attractor; whose dynamics were an order of magnitude slower than the
first. That is to say the states of the slower attractor entered as control parameters to
control the dynamics of the first. They decoded the resulting sonogram with a “synthetic
bird,” a data analysis algorithm (dynamic expectation maximization) that infers the
hierarchical and dynamic structure of its input. Then, they tested the effects of selectively
destroying these two types of priors (structural and dynamic) by lesioning the structural
connections to remove structural priors, or by cutting the intrinsic connections that
mediate dynamical priors. In both situations, the synthetic bird cannot recognize the
sequence, and exhibits an inflation of prediction error. Interestingly, the removal of
structural priors has a less marked effect on recognition than removing the dynamical
priors. Without dynamical priors, there is a failure to segment the sensory stream and,
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although there is a preservation of frequency tracking, the dynamics per se have lost their
sequential structure. Although it is interesting to compare and contrast the relative roles
of structural and dynamics priors, the important message here is that both are necessary
for veridical perception, and that destruction of either leads to suboptimal inference. Both
of these empirical priors prescribe dynamics, which enable the synthetic bird to predict
what will be heard next (Friston & Kiebel 2009, 2011).
Approximate Bayesian Inference. Kording and Wolpert (2004) reviewed studies
showing a close correspondence between human decision-making and those judgments
made by Bayesian decision theory, which defines optimal behavior in uncertain
environments where signals in sensory and motor systems are corrupted by variability or
noise. Other work along these lines has suggested that the nervous system combines
visual and haptic information in a fashion that is similar to a maximum-likelihood
integrator (Ernst & Banks, 2002), while Lee and Mumford (2003) have suggested that the
visual cortex performs hierarchical Bayesian inference, and that the “recurrent
feedforward/feedback loops in the cortex serve to integrate top-down contextual priors
and bottom-up observations so as to implement concurrent probabilistic inference along
the visual hierarchy.” Knill and Pouget (2004) popularized the “Bayesian coding
hypothesis,” which states that the brain represents information probabilistically, by
coding and computing with probability density functions or approximations to them.
Most recently, Tenenbaum et al. (2011) presented an approach to understanding
cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over richly structured, hierarchical generative
models. They argued this provides a “unifying mathematical language for framing
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cognition as the solution to inductive problems and building principled quantitative
models of thought with a minimum of free parameters and ad hoc assumptions.”
The Free-Energy Principle. The free-energy principle (Friston, 2005, 2009, 2010) is a
recent theory of brain function that accounts for action, perception and learning. The
principle unifies several existing theories including predictive coding, the Bayesian brain
hypothesis4 (Knill & Pouget, 2004), infomax (Linsker, 1990) and sparse coding
(Olshausen & Field, 1996), associative plasticity, optimal control, and value learning (see
Friston (2010) for a review). A common thread among these all of these theories is
optimization. Some of these theories consider the optimization of value (e.g., expected
reward, expected utility). Others consider the optimization of a complement of value;
namely, self-information5 or “Shannon surprise” (e.g., prediction error). The inverse
relationship between value and surprise can be seen if we consider defining those entities
that are valued to also be ones that are predicted or expected. Then, for example, a
prediction error is a failure to optimize value. In the context of this work on perception, I
discuss the matter as the optimization of prediction error. Also, it is worth noting, that the
free-energy principle accounts for the earlier stated principles “Sparse or Efficient
Coding” and “Approximate Bayesian Inference” (Friston, 2010).
“Free energy” in this context refers to the variational free energy, F, originally
used in statistical physics, which can be defined as follows:
F=

∫ q(ϑ )ln

p(s, ϑ )
dϑ
q(ϑ )

[5]

4
The hypothesis that the brain updates its beliefs with incoming sensory information in an approximately
Bayes-optimal way, using internal probabilistic generative models.
5

The negative log-probability of an outcome, which implies that improbable outcomes are “surprising.”
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where s is some data, ϑ is a set of parameters, p(s, ϑ) is the true joint distribution, and q(ϑ)
is an approximating posterior distribution modeling the data. Variational free energy can
be understood as providing a bound on the natural log of the probability of sampling the
data. Given a probabilistic generative model, m, of the data, free energy can be expressed
in terms of this log-probability and a non-symmetric measure of the difference between
two probability distributions called the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (Equation 6).
The KL-divergence between two probability distributions, a and b, is denoted by
KL[a || b] .
F = ln p(s | m) − KL[q(ϑ ) || p(ϑ | s, m)]

[6]

Since KL is always positive and log-probabilities are always negative or zero, F provides
a lower bound on the model evidence,

ln p(s | m) .

That is, F is less than or equal to the

model evidence. Equivalently, F can be viewed as an upper bound on self-information. If
the approximate posterior q(ϑ) equals the true posterior p(ϑ|s), then KL is zero and F
equals the model evidence (Figure 16).

Figure 16. Decomposition of the log-model evidence. The log-model evidence can be
expressed in terms of two quantities: the always-positive KL divergence and the
variational free energy, F, which lower bounds the model evidence and upper bounds
Shannon surprise.
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Succinctly, the free-energy principle suggests that the brain changes to minimize
its free energy, which bounds (by being greater than) the Shannon surprise on sampling
some data, given a generative model (Friston, 2010). How can an agent minimize free
energy? It cannot know whether its sensations are “surprising” in the Shannon sense,
since this would require it to know the true probability of every outcome. This is where
free energy comes in as an upper bound on surprise, which means that if an agent
minimizes free energy, it implicitly minimizes surprise. Unlike surprise, free energy can
be evaluated because it can be expressed as a function of two things to which the agent
has access: its sensory states and a recognition density encoded by its internal states (e.g.,
neuronal activity and connection strengths) (Friston, 2010). The recognition density is an
approximate conditional probability distribution of the causes of data (here, sensory
input), and is updated by probabilistic inference or “inverting a generative model” in the
statistical parlance. There are several approaches in the literature to approximate
probability distributions, for instance, free-form particle-based approaches, as well as
parametric approaches that assume fixed forms (see Friston 2009 for a discussion).
In the next section, I provide a high-level overview of an application of the freeenergy principle to hierarchical dynamic state-space models showcasing an approach
termed Generalized Filtering (GF). Among the appealing characteristics of GF include
several of the principles identified in this section. For starters, GF was constructed with
neurobiological plausibility in mind (Feldman & Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2010, p.
28), and conforms to the free-energy principle, thus taking what we have identified as a
Converging Evidence Approach. The scheme operates online and unsupervised, in
keeping with the objectives stated in the Autonomy and Agency section. The internal
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models considered in Generalized Filtering have hierarchical form, and are generative
models, which predict their inputs. Finally, the approach involves the estimation of
statistical uncertainty, and can be seen as implementing a form of hierarchical Bayesian
inference (Efron & Morris, 1972; Kass & Steffey, 1989). Incorporating many of the
previously stated perceptual principles, I adopt Generalized Filtering as a theoretical
guide for the proposed PC-CLA network, detailed later in this dissertation.
Applying the Free-Energy Principle
Friston et al. (2010) applied the free-energy principle to derive a Bayesian filtering6
scheme called Generalized Filtering (GF). This method seeks equations for the
approximate Bayesian inversion (recognition) of statistical models, which are quite
sophisticated and general in their form. The approach requires arguably reasonable
assumptions, and produces relatively simple, biologically plausible, update equations for
model parameters7. More specifically, GF considers quite general hierarchical, dynamic,
generative statistical models consisting of hidden state variables, the dynamics of which
can be influenced by an appropriate nonlinear function (equation of motion).
Furthermore, at each level, hidden state variables may be subject to (random) stochastic
fluctuations (uncertainties or inverse precisions) representing these variables’ statistical
uncertainty.

6

Also called recursive Bayesian estimation, this is a general probabilistic approach for estimating an
unknown probability density function, recursively over time, using incoming measurements and a mathematical
process model.
7

In this context, parameters are not assumed to be fixed; rather they are continually estimated and updated.

112

I will discuss uncertainty in terms of precision, the multiplicative inverse of the
variance8. High statistical precision implies a probability distribution that is highly
concentrated about its mean suggesting that the mean is known with a high degree of
precision in the ordinary sense. In terms of statistical model inference, precision is a
hyperparameter to be estimated from the data. I will refer to such hyperparameters that
parameterize estimations of precision as precisions. Precisions in GF’s form of generative
model may themselves undergo state-dependent changes in amplitude, and can have
arbitrary autocorrelation9 functions influencing their time evolution. An important aspect
of this model is its hierarchical form, which induces top-down priors (predictions) into
subordinate levels. Figure 17 illustrates these features at one hierarchical level.

Figure 17. A single hierarchical level in Generalized Filtering. The dashed lines bound
one level with the lower level to the left and the higher level to the right. The model’s
state variables are depicted by the blue boxes. Two nonlinear functions and their
parameters (green) govern both top-down and dynamical priors (or predictions). Two
corresponding sets of precisions (purple) affect the hidden states and vice versa. The
dynamics of precisions are governed by some autocorrelation function.

8

For a multivariate distribution, the precision takes the form of a precision matrix, which is the matrix
inverse of the covariance matrix, if such an inverse exists.
9
Autocorrelation is the correlation between a signal and itself at some offset in time as a function of the
offset.
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The next key feature of Generalized Filtering is the representation of internal
states and hidden parameters in a generalized coordinate system. That is, one where the
coordinates describe the configuration of the system relative to some reference
configuration with the constraint that the set of coordinates must uniquely define the
configuration of the system relative to the reference configuration. For example, the
location of the end of a pendulum can be defined in terms of a coordinate representing the
angle of the pendulum arm from its stationary position, which simplifies calculations
about the dynamics of the pendulum.
For GF, the generalized coordinates include the variable values and the infinite set
of the variables’ higher order derivatives. In such a coordinate system, each point
includes a variable’s current value and the higher-order derivatives of its equations of
motion. Such a point can be viewed as encoding the variable’s current trajectory since
future variable values can be extrapolated using the higher order terms. To illustrate, if x
represents a set of state variables, then this coordinate system considers x = {x, x ', x '', ...} .
With generalized coordinates of motion, instead of simply estimating the conditional
density of hidden states (and parameters), one optimizes the conditional density on their
generalized motion to an arbitrarily high order. In practice, the representation in
generalized coordinates can be truncated at relatively low order (Friston et al., 2008, p.
861).
The third main feature of GF is its use of the Laplace assumption, which entails a
fixed-form, Gaussian, approximation to the agent’s internal probabilistic representations
of the causes of sensory data. While the Gaussian distribution has several advantages (see
Friston, 2009, pp. 297–298 for a discussion), a critical one is that, when free energy is
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minimized, the conditional covariance of hidden states becomes an analytic function of
the conditional mean. This implies that only the mean has to be optimized since the
covariance can be derived from it. This simplifies the mathematics of the model
optimization to a single ordinary differential equation describing the motion of the
conditional mean of states (Friston et al., 2010).
In summary, given the above form of the generative models, treatment of
variables in generalized coordinates of motion, and Gaussian assumptions on the
recognition density (approximate conditional probability distribution of the causes of
data), GF prescribes a set of ordinary differential equations governing recognition
dynamics, which update the conditional density on a model’s states (e.g.,hidden state
variables), parameters (e.g., weighted links), and hyperparameters (e.g., uncertainties or
precisions). For additional details, including the mathematical derivation, please see
Friston et al. (2010) and Feldman and Friston (2010). In the next subsections I discuss
GF’s update equations for perception, learning, and attention in detail, but in a conceptual
manner.
State Optimization via Prediction Error Minimization. The update equation for the
model’s hidden state suggests that instances of two kinds of computational units send and
receive messages at each hierarchical level (Figure 18). State units (blue) encode the
mean vector of the multivariate Gaussian distribution over unknown states generating
sensory data, while error units (red) encode prediction error. The activity of each error
unit is a function of state units (or the input), while state unit activity is a function of error
units. State units provide top-down and temporal predictions to same-level and lowerlevel error units, respectively. Hierarchical inference requires only the prediction error
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from the lower level, which drives the conditional expectations toward a better prediction,
so as to minimize the prediction error in the level below. This recurrent message passing
between hierarchical levels and its processing optimizes free

Figure 18. Hierarchical predictive coding. Each hierarchical level (dashed box) receives
top-down predictions, rTD, of the level’s current representation, r, of the input signal, y.
Feedforward pathways carry errors (e.g., r–rTD) between the predictions and the actual
activity. Errors (rTD–r) are used to correct the current representation, r, and, hopefully,
future top-down predictions, yTD. g represents a set of feedforward connection weights
and g-1 a set of feedback connection weights. Redrawn from Rao and Ballard (1999).
energy by minimizing prediction error, and constitutes perceptual inference (Friston &
Kiebel, 2009). It is also known as (hierarchical) predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999).
Note that prediction errors can be based on top-down predictions (rTD in Figure 18) or on
temporal predictions (not shown). Temporal prediction error would be based on a
temporal prediction and the actual future state.
Parameter Optimization via Associative Plasticity. Associative (or Hebbian) plasticity
is another way in which a model may reduce free energy, in this case by updating the
model’s parameters. For example, such parameters modulate the effects of the processes,
g and g−1 , in Figure 18. GF furnishes parameter update equations quite similar to models
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of associative plasticity based on correlated pre- and post-synaptic activity. In terms of a
computational network, a parameter value corresponds to the weight of a connection
between two computational units. For example, the top-down process, g−1 , might use a
connection between two units to produce the top-down prediction. The connection would
constitute a model parameter, and its current weight would correspond to the parameter’s
current value.
Parameter optimization comes in two forms in hierarchical dynamic models:
structural and dynamic. The structural parameter update is illustrated in Figure 19a, and
considers a currently active hidden variable at a given level (e.g., Level 2) as the
connection’s source, and a currently active bottom-up prediction error variable as the sink.
Such an update changes future top-down predictions, to hopefully better minimize future
bottom-up prediction error. Figure 19b illustrates a dynamical update. Initially, there was
a state variable, p, active at time t from bottom-up prediction error. This update takes a
state variable, q, at the same level whose activity preceded q’s at time t – 1, and updates a
dynamical connection from q to p. At a future time t + n – 1, the re-activation of q
produces a temporal prediction of p (shaded), to hopefully minimize future prediction
error. In either case, the parameter value is updated as a function of 1) the product of the
qth pre-synaptic input and post-synaptic response of the pth error unit, 2) the product of
the parameter value and its function’s associated precision, and 3) a value-dependent
decay, e.g., sigmoidal decay (Friston & Feldman, 2010, p. 8).
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Figure 19. Structural and dynamical parameter updates. Both updates are performed in
response to bottom-up prediction errors (red). a) A structural update modifies (or adds) a
structural connection (parameter), from a higher to a lower level, which changes future
top-down predictions, to (hopefully) minimize future bottom-up prediction error. b) A
dynamical update modifies (or adds) a dynamic connection between two hidden state
variables in the same level changing future temporal predictions to minimize future
bottom-up prediction error.
Hyperparameter Optimization via Gain Control. Uncertainty plays an important role
in GF, where it can be viewed as a hyperparameter, a variable that parameterizes a
distribution of another parameter in a model (Bishop & Nasrabadi, 2006). How does GF
suggest that the optimization of uncertainty occurs in a hierarchical, dynamic, predictive
coding network? At each level in the hierarchy, the uncertainty weights the relative
influence of the prediction error from the level below on the level in question. Recall that
the bottom-up error is calculated based on the previous top-down prediction and the
actual state occurring in the level below. Similarly, for the level in question, top-down
prediction error is calculated based the received top-down prediction and the level’s
current hidden state (see Fig. 3). In GF, the uncertainty is expressed in the terms of a
precision (inverse covariance) that weights prediction error. The larger the variance (i.e.
the lower the precision) in the source of information, the less weight is given to that
source, as is consistent (Rao, 1999) with Kalman filtering (Kalman & Bucy, 1961).
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Figure 20. A single precision hyperparameter in a hierarchical predictive coding network.
It is updated based on the sum of squared bottom-up prediction (red) and a valuedependent decay (purple arrow). It modulates the magnitude of the same prediction error
signal from which it is estimated. Precisions can similarly exist for temporal prediction
errors at each hierarchical level.
More specifically, for the form of models considered Generalized Filtering,
precision parameters are state-dependent, and govern the gain control of error units. Gain
control refers to the control of synaptic gain or post-synaptic responsiveness. As with
parameter optimization, precisions change as a function of 1) the precision-weighted sum
of a squared prediction error term and 2) a decay in proportion to the current precision
value (Figure 20).
Synchrony and neurotransmitters have been suggested as the neurobiological
implementation of gain control. This selective modulation of inputs is equivalent to the
gain-control mechanisms invoked for attention (Martinez-Trujillo & Treue, 2004).
In this section I have discussed the application of the Free-Energy principle to
complicated hierarchical dynamic stochastic models including the update equations
required to perform inference on model states, parameters and hyperparameters. In this
chapter, I next introduce the HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA) and an
implementation with 2D receptive fields. In the next chapter I present a predictive coding
extension to the CLA, termed PC-CLA, which is guided by the ideas in this section from
Generalized Filtering. PC-CLA is proposed for use throughout LIDA providing
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algorithms and data structures for LIDA’s current representations, memory, and attention
and learning processes.
CLA Implementation
Here I describe my implementation of the HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA)
(Hawkins et al., 2011). The HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms is a recent approach to
generic pattern recognition inspired by the organization of the cerebral cortex. While
earlier iterations of the HTM theory have enjoyed publications by its creators (George &
Hawkins, 2009; Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2004; Hawkins, George, & Niemasik, 2009), the
CLA has not; however, some other intrepid researchers have made efforts to study the
algorithm (Thornton, Main, & Srbic, 2012; Thornton & Srbic, 2013; Thornton, Srbic,
Main, & Chitsaz, 2011). Here I present an implementation of the HTM Cortical Learning
Algorithms, called 2D-CLA, which modifies the receptive fields of the algorithm to have
limited overlapping 2D receptive fields. Existing neural network models employ similar
receptive fields (see e.g., LeCun & Bengio, 1995). Such an extension allows 2D-CLA to
deal with real-world input (i.e., visual or auditory stimuli). The tests in this chapter
explored some of the basic properties of the spatial pooling portion of 2D-CLA on
artificial 2D patterns.
The CLA takes Boolean vectors as input. It is worth mentioning that, for best
performance, input patterns should, on average, be as uniformly distributed throughout
the input’s dimensions as possible. This constraint arises because the CLA is limited in
its ability to produce representations that are more distributed than those it receives, and
insufficiently distributed representations do not enjoy the advantages of high-dimensional
spaces. “Natural” auditory and visual stimuli fit this distribution requirement quite easily
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since they are composed of many pieces, which are apprehended by a distributed array of
sensors. In contrast, for human-generated data, e.g., a time series of computer mouse
pointer coordinates, a preprocessing step may be required to produce distributed inputs.
From here I first describe the original CLA algorithm in terms of data structures
and algorithms. Next I describe the 2D receptive field modification. Then I describe
several experiments exploring some of the basic properties of the implementation,
including the effects of varying its parameters, which are, to my knowledge, undescribed
elsewhere in this way.
Cortical Region. The main data structure of the Cortical Learning Algorithms is called
the cortical region (Figure 21). A cortical region consists of a set of columns, which are
based on the functionality of cortical minicolumns (Buxhoeveden & Casanova, 2002). In
this implementation, I focus on a square 2D column arrangement, although other
arrangements are possible.

Figure 21. A depiction of a single cortical region. The region shown has 900 (30x30)
columns, arranged in a 2D fashion, with each column having 4 cells. It is typical for
implementations to have 1024–2048 columns.
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Each column is comprised of several cells (explained below), and has one
proximal dendrite segment, a functional approximation to a neuronal dendrite segment.
The proximal dendrite segments integrate the activity of artificial proximal synapses
(described later), implementing connections in close proximity to the column. Proximal
synapses respond to active inputs received by the region. Figure 22 depicts a single
column, its proximal dendrite segment and the segment’s proximal synapses. The activity
of the proximal synapses on a proximal dendrite segment determine its column’s overlap
score10, a scalar measure of column activity from the bottom-up input. Each column also
has a boost attribute, which weights the overlap score, and is based on the column’s
recent history of activity. Boost is used to make under-utilized columns more salient.
Finally, each column has a column activity state which may be inactive, not sufficiently
active to compete with other columns, competitive, sufficiently active to compete with
other columns, or active, competitive and having won the competition with its
neighboring columns to determine the most salient columns. A column’s activity state is
based on its boosted overlap score and predicted column overlap, an additional amount
of overlap given to columns temporally predicted in the previous time step.
Next, a cell (gray circles in Figure 23) is a representational unit belonging to
exactly one column. Cell activity provides a current representation of the temporal
context in which their column is currently active, if it is. Long-term information about
context is encoded in CLA using a combination of distal synapses and distal dendrite
segments. Each distal synapse is a synapse that has a cell as its source, and has, as its sink,

10
The original CLA white paper refers to both “overlap score” and “boosted overlap score” as “overlap.”
Here I distinguish between the two.
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a distal dendrite segment, which is connected to another cell, with the constraint that
these two cells must be from different columns (Figure 23).

Figure 22. A single column having four cells. Each column has a single proximal
dendrite segment (blue), which integrates the activity of several proximal synapses
(green).

Figure 23. Distal synapse connection in a cortical region. Each distal synapse has a distal
dendrite segment source that is associated with a particular cell. A distal synapse’s sink is
some cell in the neighborhood of the associated cell of its source.
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Distal dendrite segments maintain a set of distal synapses, and integrate the
synapses’ activity. Distal dendrite segments also have an activation threshold, measured
in the number of active synapses (explained shortly). If the number of active synapses is
above this threshold the segment is considered active. Finally, each cell has several distal
dendrite segments (Figure 24) whose activity, in part, determines the cell’s state.
Specifically, dendrite segments determine whether cell state is predicted to become active
in the future. Additionally the cell state may be active or inactive.
Each synapse, proximal or distal, has a source, a sink, a binary weight, and a
permanence (defined below). A potential synapse is one with a weight of 0, while a
connected synapse is one with a weight of 1. A synapse is active if, and only if, its source
is active and it is connected. Synapse weight is determined by permanence, a scalar
attribute of each synapse modified by learning. If the permanence is above the synapse
connection threshold, then the synapse is connected with a weight of 1. If the permanence

Figure 24. A single cell with five distal dendrite segments. Distal dendrite segments,
depicted by the circles containing a step function, have several distal synapses, depicted
as open and filled blue circles. Each of these circles represents a possible connection with
a neighboring cell in the region. A cell becomes predictive whenever one or more of
these segments become active, while a segment becomes active depending on sufficient
synaptic activity (filled-in blue circles).
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is below this threshold, but above 0, then the synapse is potential with weight 0. Finally,
if a synapse’s permanence drops to 0 or less, then it is removed. In review, the source of a
distal synapse is some cell in the cortical region, and the sink is a nearby (relative to the
source) distal dendrite segment. In contrast, the source of a proximal synapse is a bit in
the cortical region’s input, and the sink is the proximal dendrite segment of a column.
Cortical regions are designed such that they may be repeated hierarchically,
without an intermediary between one region’s output and the next higher region’s input.
It is also possible to have a tree-shaped hierarchy of regions, with multiple regions at
same hierarchical level, each processing a portion of the network’s input. In such a
situation the next hierarchical level would pool together the output of these multiple
regions. Here, I initially focus on a single 2D cortical region and a sensory input. In the
PC-CLA chapter, I consider multiple hierarchical levels with each level consisting of a
single region.
Cortical Region Process. In this implementation, each cortical region is driven by its
own cortical region process, which runs a serial cycle updating the region’s state, and
performing learning. This cycle is depicted in Figure 25, and I first describe it at a high
level just below.
The cortical region process can be roughly subdivided into two sub-processes,
spatial pooling and temporal pooling, to reuse terminology from the original CLA
description. Spatial pooling refers to the process of grouping similar inputs into the same
(or nearly the same) sparse distributed set of active columns that represent the input.
Spatial pooling approximately corresponds to Step 1 below in the detailed description.
Temporal pooling (corresponding to Step 2) occurs sequentially after the spatial pooling
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step. It takes the active columns representation produced by spatial pooling, and the
current temporal context encoded by the cells predicted in the last cycle to become active
this cycle, and produces the current active cell state. From the current active cell state the
temporal pooler also produces a current predicted cell state, the context for the next cycle.
Both the current active cell state and the current predicted cell state comprise the
temporal pooler’s output. The union of these two states represents at least two time steps,
and should exhibit some temporal invariance, hence the name temporal pooler. With this
high-level description in mind, I now summarize the main loop of the cortical region
process (Figure 25) at an arbitrary cycle t as follows:
Step 1. Based on the current bottom-up Boolean input, y, compute the active columns of
the cortical region, L1, for cycle t.
a) Perform process g taking in the bottom-up input, y, and the columns’ proximal
dendrites and associated proximal synapses, and outputting the columns’ overlap scores.
b) For columns with a boosted overlap score greater than a threshold, perform a local kwinners-take-all procedure to determine the active columns, L1. The constraint, k, limits
the number of possible active columns within a given area ensuring that the active
columns are distributed.
Step 2. Compute the active cells at cycle t, L2, the current cells predicted to be active at
some future cycle, PL2t, and their union, U.
a) Based on the active columns, L1 and the currently predicted cells, PL2t-1 (computed in
Step 2b of cycle t – 1), compute the current active cells, L2.
b) Based on the active cells, L2, and the region’s distal dendrites and synapses, perform
process, f, producing the region’s current predicted (for some future cycle) cells, PL2t.
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c) Compute the union, U, of the active cells, L2, and the current predicted cells, PL2t.
Step 3. Perform the learning processes.
a) Perform spatial learning, updating the permanence of proximal synapses based on
bottom-up prediction error. Also update each column’s boost attribute based on its
activity history.

Figure 25. The cortical region process for a single hierarchical level with an input. All
the components of single cortical region appear within the gray dashed box.
b) Perform temporal learning, which updates distal synapse permanence, and possibly
adds new distal synapses. This learning is driven by both unpredicted columns and
predicted columns that did not actually become active. I describe the details of these
processes in the next section.
Learning. In this section, I give the additional details for the learning Step 3 of the
cortical region process. In the original CLA, the spatial learning process iterates over
each current active column, and updates the permanence values of the column’s synapses
based on the synapse’s input. Synapses with active inputs have their permanence
incremented, while those with inactive inputs have their permanence decremented. This
has the effect of tuning columns to be more responsive to their current bottom-up inputs.
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For boosting, there are two separate mechanisms to bias underrepresented
columns. If a column’s active history, the recent history of being an active column, is not
a sufficient percentage of its neighbors’ active history, its boost attribute is increased
based on the difference. Increased boost makes it more likely for a column to win in the
inhibition step, and become an active column. Define a column’s competition history to
be the recent history of whether its overall column activity was sufficient to enter the
inhibition competition. If competition history is not a sufficient percentage of its
neighbor’s competition history, then the permanence of each of its proximal synapses is
also increased or “boosted.”
For the temporal pooler, learning updates distal dendrite segments. For
computational reasons, here I introduce an attribute that is unique to distal dendrite
segments called prediction order. The prediction order of a distal dendrite segment
represents the number of cycles in the future for which the segment predicts when it is
active. Initially, the prediction order of all distal dendrite segments is 1. Whenever the
temporal learning process uses a segment in an attempt to add a temporal prediction with
an order greater than 1, the segment’s prediction order is changed to the new order.
Given this, the temporal learning can be summarized in three types of update: 1) For each
active column without any cells predicted to be active for the current time step, we wish
to have, at least, a first-order temporal prediction. Based on the previously active cells,
the distal dendrite segment that best predicted the column’s activity is selected for an
update later in that cycle. In this kind of segment update, the segment’s synapses are
positively updated, and new synapses, also predictive of the column’s activity, are added
to the segment. 2) For each active (predicting) distal dendrite segment (determined in step
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3b of the cortical region process), a segment update data structure, recording information
pertinent to a possible update, is stored for potential implementation until the cycle in
which the prediction’s validity can be verified, which is termed the segment’s verification
time. If this type of update is processed, new synapses are not added. 3) As with updates
of the previous type (2), for each cell that is currently predicted by a distal dendrite
segment, another distal dendrite segment update that predicts the cell’s activity one cycle
earlier is stored for a potential implementation. If performed, this type of update adds
new synapses to bolster the new higher-order prediction.
Not all stored segment updates are actually performed, as we also wish to keep
the distal synaptic connections, and the amount of predicted cells they produce, sparse. If
a column is already well predicted by an existing first-order dendrite segment, it is not
necessary, and likely detrimental, to update synapses so as to increase similar prediction.
In order to enforce sparsity in the temporal pooler, one learning cell is always designated
during each cycle for each active column. A cell is marked learning if it was just
previously, and sufficiently, predicted by other learning cells or, otherwise, because it
was the most strongly predicted by distal dendrite segments.
With all this in mind, I now discuss how segment updates are performed. Updates
of type 1 are always performed in the cycle in which they are generated, and always
positively update the segment’s synapses. Stored updates of types 2 and 3 are processed
at their verification time based on the observed state of the cell. If the cell is indeed active
at the verification time, and the cell has been chosen to be the learning cell for its column
during that cycle, then the update is performed positively. We want to positively
reinforce correct predictions when they concern a learning cell. In this case, if the cell is
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not learning, the stored segment update is not performed and is discarded (we want to
keep learning minimal for each column). Finally, if the update involves a segment whose
cell is inactive at the verification time, then the update negatively modifies the segment’s
synapses. This weakens a prediction that did not come true.
2D-CLA
The main difference between my 2D implementation of CLA and the original CLA
model concerns the receptive fields of columns. The original CLA randomly chose the
inputs from which to base its receptive field, from input bits near to the column, with
closer bits being more likely to be chosen. 2D-CLA generates a deterministic receptive
field based on a bivariate Gaussian distribution; however a smaller number of proximal
synapses are randomly added to each column to prevent ties in column activity. I focus
on 2D receptive fields and a 2D arrangement of the internal representational elements so
that the algorithm is more applicable to “natural” data streams. There is evidence for
retinotopic maps in the visual cortex involving the orderly mapping of receptive field
position to coordinates in the brain (Swindale, 2008). More generally, neuroscience
identifies topographic maps as neuronal connections arranged such that neighboring
points in the periphery are represented by adjacent locations in the central nervous system.
Such maps are found in the somatic sensory, visual, and motor systems. In other systems
(e.g., the auditory and olfactory systems), there are also orderly representations of various
stimulus attributes like frequency or receptor identity (Purves et al., 2001).
The next difference concerns the
getKthOverlappingColumn(Collection<Column>) function. This function
takes a collection of competing columns and a k value and returns the column with the kth
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highest activity score among the competitors or null if this is not possible. This function
is used to implement part of the column inhibition step (Step 2c) of the cortical region
process. This function was changed since I found that it was biased towards those
columns out the outer edges of the cortical region’s 2D array of columns. Without this
correction, such outer columns are more likely than inner columns to be selected because
their neighborhood is smaller. The modification offsets this bias by scaling k based on the
number of columns that are passed to the method, and makes it harder for columns with
small neighborhoods (those on the edge of the region) to win. This scaling factor is
produced by dividing the number of columns by an estimate of the maximum number of
competing neighbors a column could possibly have.
Initialization. The initialization of the 2D Cortical Learning Algorithms is as follows:
based on user-specified parameters, the region’s columns are generated having a 2D
organization. The columns’ proximal dendrite segments are initialized with a receptive
field of proximal synapses modeled using a bivariate Gaussian distribution. Moreover,
proximal synapses with randomly generated inputs are added to each column as well. The
permanence of the proximal synapses is randomly initialized using a different univariate
Gaussian distribution centered at the synapse connection threshold. Cells are given a
fixed number of distal dendrite segments, which themselves, in turn, are initialized with
some number of distal synapses chosen among local, neighboring cells. Distal synapse
permanence is deliberately initialized to a value below the synapse connection threshold
so that a few positive updates are required before a synapse can become connected. See
Appendix B for the pseudocode details of the receptive field initialization for columns.
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Parameters. The 2D Cortical Learning Algorithms has a significant number of
parameters, some of which are introduced by this particular implementation. Their roles
and values are discussed in detail in this section. To start, I designate the dimensionality
of the input by n. Next, I define the projection factor parameter as the ratio of the number
of columns in a cortical region to the number of bottom-up inputs to the region. As such
the product of n and projection factor determines the total number of columns in the
region.
For this implementation, the columns of a region have a 2D arrangement, and,
accordingly, their receptive fields are modeled using a bivariate Gaussian distribution.
That is to say, the input sources of the proximal synapses of each column are selected
based on this distribution. More formally, I define the distribution over a 2D input space
where a point in the space is denoted by (x, y). The distribution has equal variances in the
x and y dimension, which I denote by, σ rf , and I assume zero correlation between x and y.
We want a function that outputs the number of proximal synapses that will be generated
for a given input with position (x, y) as a function of the position’s distance from the
column at (xc, yc). Intuitively, this will produce a circular receptive field, with potentially
more synapses near the center than on the periphery (depends on exact parameter values).
To do this I take the bivariate Gaussian function just described, and add a multiplicative
constant to obtain a function, f, which outputs the number of proximal synapses assigned
to a given column, c, with position (xc, yc), as a function of the input position (x, y):

srf
(x − xc )2 + (y − yc )2
2
f (x, y) = πσ rf exp(−
)
2
2σ rf2

[7]

There are two parameters governing the size of this receptive field. The first,
termed receptive field sigma, σrf, refers to the standard deviation for both dimensions (x
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and y) of the bivariate Gaussian probability distribution. The second parameter, called
receptive field scaling, srf, scales the possible output range of the bivariate Gaussian from
[0,1) to [0, srf). The purpose of the scaling is so that we can assign a positive integer
number of synapses to a position (x, y). For a given input location, f (x, y) defines the
number of proximal synapses that will be created, taking their source from that input
location (Figure 26). In order to prevent ties in column activity, I assign a small number
of proximal synapses with random input positions to each column. The parameter,
receptive field randomness, specifies the number of random synapses as a ratio of the

Figure 26. Rendering of the bivariate Gaussian receptive field model for a single column.
Here the column is centered at (0, 0) in this example. The x- and y-axis represent the
input space. For a given coordinate (x, y), this function outputs (vertical z-axis) the
number of synapses (0 or more) to be generated for the column that will take their
presynaptic input from coordinate (x, y) in the input space.
deterministic ones. A similar Gaussian function is used to generate the random input
position for these synapses.
Given the receptive field sigma and receptive field scaling, it is possible to
determine the maximum possible distance that a proximal synapse may be from its
associated column. This maximum distance is defined to be the size of the column’s
receptive field radius, rrf. I obtain an expression for this radius by taking Equation 7 and
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setting the left hand side equal to ½, the lowest output value that still rounds to at least 1
synapse. Then, making the substitution rrf 2 = x2 + y2 the receptive field radius is given by
rrf = 2σ rf2 ln[

[8]

srf
]
πσ rf2

Intuitively, twice the receptive field radius gives us an idea of the maximum possible
distance between two inputs that feed into the same column. For this work, it will be
assumed that rrf is a parameter determined by the specific needs of the user. Then, given a
user-specified radius, r ' , values for proximal synapse source sigma and proximal
synapse scaling can be calculated. For instance, in this work they are calculated as
follows:
σrf = r '

[9]

srf = π e(r ')2

[10]

At runtime, several additional parameters come into play. The column competition
threshold parameter specifies a threshold on the overall column activity (Step 2b), which
combines the bottom-up boosted overlap score and the predicted column overlap.
Columns below this threshold are given an activity score of 0 for that cycle, and do not
participate in the inter-column inhibition step. Next, the local column activity parameter
determines how many columns can possibly win the inter-column inhibition within a
given area (Step 2c). In detail, I define the inhibition neighborhood of the column by a
circle with a radius, inhibition radius, the average of the distance from connected
proximal synapses to their columns across all columns. Then, for each competing column,
the column must have the local-column-activityth highest column activity score of all the
columns in this neighborhood to become an active column.
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The following parameters affect column boosting. History size defines the history
length, in cycles, of each column’s active history and competition history. The former
records whether a column was an active column each cycle, while the latter records
whether a column had a sufficient column activity score to compete in the inter-column
inhibition step. Given these histories, the minimum column activity parameter refers to the
minimum average activity (averaged over its active history) a column may have among
its inhibition neighborhood before its boost value is increased. Recall that boost helps
historically weaker columns become more likely to win. Thus, this parameter specifies
the minimum average activity a column can have, as percentage of the neighbors with
maximum average activity. Columns below this minimum are boosted. The minimum
column activity parameter also determines the threshold at which insufficiently
competitive columns have their proximal synapses positively updated or “boosted.”
Finally, the boost function slope controls the slope of a linear curve governing the amount
of boost given to those columns that, recently, have been insufficiently active.
Several parameters are related to the cells of the cortical region. The cells per
column parameter governs how many cells are generated for each column, dendrites per
cell, how may distal dendrites segments feed into each cell, and initial synapses per distal
segment, the initial number of synapses initially generated for each distal dendrite
segment. Due to learning, distal dendrites may gain additional synapses (connected or
potential) up to a maximum specified by maximum new distal synapses per update. Distal
dendrite segments are judged active whenever they have at least distal dendrite activation
threshold synapses active, and can be chosen to undergo learning if they have at least
segment learning threshold synapses active. Finally, when a source of a new distal
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synapse is chosen among neighboring cells, the source can be from a distance of at most
distal learning radius away from the synapse’s dendrite segment sink. Table 5
summarizes the parameters discussed in this section.
2D-CLA Testing
In this section, I describe several tests of the 2D-CLA implementation. Several earlier
tests are focused on exploring several properties of the spatial pooling and temporal
pooler sub-processes, as well as the effects of particular parameters on these processes.
Many tests build upon the results of earlier ones. To my knowledge, these CLA
properties have seen little or no formal testing.
Most tests use randomly generated binary vector patterns as input. A motivation
for this choice of input is that the algorithm should be able to handle arbitrary input
patterns; consequently one advantage of random patterns is that they introduce no bias to
input patterns. However, a disadvantage is that random patterns may not introduce many
patterns that are challenging to discriminate since random patterns are likely to be quite
different from one another and easy to discriminate.
For some tests that compare two Boolean vector patterns, I will use the taxicab
distance, d1, (Krause, 1986), also known as Manhattan distance. This distance metric is
defined for two vectors p, q, in an n-dimensional real vector space with a fixed Cartesian
coordinate system, and can be defined by:
n

d1 ( p, q) = ∑ pi − qi

[11]

i=1

For tests where I would like to evaluate the accuracy of retrieval (in this work’s
context accuracy of prediction), I use the F-score measure (van Rijsbergen, 1979). I
consider the accuracy of both top-down and temporal predictions of cell activity with this
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Table 5. The main parameters of the algorithm, their descriptions, and the default values
used in this implementation.
Parameter
Input size
Projection factor
Receptive field sigma
Receptive field scaling
Receptive field
randomness
Column competition
threshold
Local column activity

History size
Minimum column
activity

Boost function slope
Cells per column
Dendrite segments per
cell
Initial synapses per
distal segment
Maximum distal
synapses added per
segment update

Associated Description
variable
n
The dimensionality of the input
p
Ratio of number of columns to
the input size
σrf
Sigma value for bivariate
Gaussian modeling the receptive
field of columns
srf
Scaling factor for bivariate
Gaussian modeling the receptive
field of columns
—
The number of randomly
generated proximal synapses per
column as a proportion of the
deterministically generated ones.
—
Threshold on the bottom-up
column activity determining the
columns entering the inhibition
step
lca
The maximum number of active
columns allowed within a
neighborhood around a
competing column.
—
The length of the history record
of each column’s activity.
—
Minimum average activity a
column may have, as a
percentage of its neighbors’
activity, before its overlap is
boosted
—
Slope of the linear function
controlling boost updates.
cells
Number of unique cells in each
column.
ds
Number of unique distal dendrite
segments associated with each
cell.
—
Number of synapses initially
generated per distal dendrite
segment.
—
Limitation on the number of new
synapses added in a single
segment update.
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Default
value
256
4.0
4.0
83.0
0.05

0.02

3.0

1000
0.01

0.05
7
5
20
20

Table 5. (Continued).
Parameter
Maximum
synapses per
distal segment
Distal dendrite
activation
threshold

Associated
variable
sd
—

Segment learning
threshold

—

Distal learning
radius

—

Description

Default
value
32

Absolute limit on number of
synapses per distal dendrite
segment.
Number of active distal synapses
1
for a distal dendrite segment to be
active, and associated cell
predictive.
Number of active distal synapses
1
required for a distal dendrite
segment to be eligible for learning.
Radius of a circle about the
7.0
column where new distal synapses
are being adding. Only cells within
this circle selected as such a
synapse’s source.

measure, as well as the accuracy in reproducing the active columns representation of a
previously encountered input. Next, I introduce two prerequisite definitions in defining
the F-score. Given an observation, representing the actuality, and a prediction from a
classifier, denote the number of true positives (correct predictions) by tp, the number of
false positives (incorrect predictions) by fp, and the number of false negatives (missing
predictions) by fn. Given these, the precision can be defined as: precision = tp / (tp + fp) and
the recall: recall = tp / (tp + fn) . For either measure, if the denominator evaluates to zero,
then the measure is defined to have value one, and, consequently, both measures can take
on values in the closed interval [0, 1].
Precision and recall are particularly useful in evaluating the performance of
classification algorithms involving skewed classes, a situation in which the likelihood of
a particular class occurring greatly outstrips the others (Ng, 2013). In the context of
predicting sparse Boolean vector patterns, I identify two such classes for pattern bits: 1)
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true is the positive class and 2) a false is the negative class. With sparse patterns, the
classes are then skewed with only 2% of the bits typically being of the positive class. In
such situations, using the raw percentage of correct predictions to measure accuracy has a
drawback, e.g., a naive classifier never predicting any positive results would typically
obtain a high percentage of correct predictions, in this case, 98% correct. However,
assuming that the patterns had a nonzero number of true bits, the same classifier would
obtain the worst possible score in terms of recall: zero.
Typically, in statistics and machine learning, the precision and recall scores are
combined into a single scalar measure of accuracy, the F-score, denoted Fβ, and defined,
for a positive real, β, as:
Fβ =

(1+ β 2 )⋅ precision ⋅ recall
β 2 ⋅ precision + recall

[12]

Fβ measures the effectiveness of a classification (here, of true or false), given that we
attach β times as much importance to recall as precision (van Rijsbergen, 1979). For
example, F1 weights the importance of precision and recall equally, and is a common
single-valued accuracy metric. In the context of PC-CLA, we require a good recall score
first and foremost; however, if we are evaluating temporal predictions, there is a
tolerance for a less-than-perfect precision score, which I discuss next.
Precision measures the accuracy of predictions — low precision means positive
predictions are incorrect overall, while high precision means positive predictions are
mainly correct. For temporal predictions in PC-CLA, I suggest tolerating some
inaccuracy in positive predictions. Such a tolerance for false positives can be explained
by appealing to overlapping sequences, those sequences sharing common co-occurrence
patterns for one or more instants that later diverge. Having learned overlapping sequences
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in a cortical region can lead to situations where a particular prediction may be a false
positive in some contexts, but a true positive in others. In general, the CLA can handle
multiple predictions at the same time because each temporal prediction is sparse
(typically less than 1%), thus combining predictions of multiple possible future patterns
in a single set of predicted cells is unlikely to cause interference or break the sparsity of
the representation. Furthermore, if those synapses producing false positive predictions
were removed or considerably weakened, learned patterns could be lost without any good
reason to believe that such patterns cease to exist.
Can we quantify a tolerance for false positives in terms of precision? The original
CLA theory (Hawkins et al., 2011, p. 29) suggests that completing even 10% of the
active columns representation of a pattern is sufficient to have high certainty that the full
pattern is occurring. One main reason predictions are desirable is to maintain
representations in the face of noisy or missing inputs. For instance, suppose there is a
well-learned pattern A-B-C, and that A is input to a cortical region and, at the next
moment, B is missing or severely corrupted. We’d like to predict B from A sufficiently
well so that a representation corresponding to A-B-C is maintained; specifically we
would like to correctly predict at least 10% of the active columns of B. Given that the
active columns representations of input patterns is typically near to 2% of the total
columns, it then follows that the number of active cells would be at most 2%, and is
typically less (since temporal predictions are kept to a minimum). Since the active cells
are so sparse, the predicted cells are typically sparse as well (< 2%). So we have an upper
bound on the total number of predicted cells (2%), and a lower bound on true positive
predictions (10%), which implies an upper bound on false positives of 90%. These

140

percentages correspond to a lower bound on precision: 0.1 (0.1+ 0.9) = 0.1 . Given this,
and the motivation for good recall, I suggest using a beta value of 10 for the F-score
(F10), which weights recall 10 times as important as precision, to evaluate temporal
predictions in CLA. In contrast, later tests of multiple hierarchical levels suggest false
positives are undesirable for top-down predictions, and, consequently, I will use the F1
score to evaluate these.
Spatial Pooler. The central objective for the spatial pooling operation (see Step 1 of
Cortical Region Process section) is the production of a sparse, distributed set of active
columns. As mentioned previously, it has been suggested (Kanerva, 1988; Snaider, 2012)
that sparse high-dimensional vectors have desirable uniqueness and robustness properties,
e.g., binary vectors with 2% active bits in 1,000–10,000 dimensional spaces. Thus, a
sparsity criterion of 2% column activity was adopted as the target activity for the spatial
pooler’s output.
The importance of sparse column activity compels the question: Which factors
determine the amount of column activity produced by the spatial pooling operation?
Figure 27 summarizes the causal relationships between the algorithm’s various
parameters and the amount of column activity. Starting at the bottom of the figure, we
have the inhibition radius quantity, the average of the distance from connected proximal
synapses to their columns across all columns. In this implementation, inhibition radius is
a function of the parameters: receptive field radius and projection factor. Intuitively, a
large receptive field radius generates columns having synapses farther from the column’s
center. This creates columns whose activity represents the presence of active inputs
across a larger, more disparate range of inputs. Recall that the projection factor is defined
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as the ratio of the number of columns in a cortical region to the number of bottom-up
inputs to the region. The projection factor should be chosen to project the input into a
sufficiently high-dimensional column representation space, e.g., 1024–2048. The values
of these two quantities are assumed to be chosen based on the needs of a specific
application of the algorithm.

Figure 27. The factors affecting the number of active columns produced by the spatial
pooler and the causal relationships between these quantities.
Moving upwards in the figure, we have both the local column activity (LCA) free
parameter and the inhibition radius determining an upper bound on the density of active
columns in a given neighborhood of columns. Choosing a good value for the LCA
parameter is the subject of the second test below. Switching over to the right side of the
diagrammed hierarchy, we have the number of competing columns being a function of
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the amount of input activity and the free parameter, column competition threshold. I
define input activity as the ratio of true bits to total bits in a Boolean input. Finding a
good value for column competition threshold is the subject of the first test below. To
wrap up the diagram, the inter-column inhibition step takes the active column density
bound from the left side and a set of competing columns from the right, and outputs a set
of active columns.
The Cortical Learning Algorithms are replete with parameters. To reduce
redundancy, Table 6 gives the default parameter values used in each of the tests below
unless specifically mentioned otherwise.

Table 6. The default cortical region parameters used in the following tests unless
specifically noted otherwise.
Quantity name
Input signal dimensionality
Projection factor
Receptive field sigma
Receptive field scaling
Receptive field randomness
Column competition threshold
Local column activity
Minimum column activity
Developmental period (cortical
region process cycles)

Value(s) used
256
4.0
4.0
83.0
0.05
0.01
3.5
0.01 (1%)
350 (or 100 consecutive
stable cycles)

Sparsity Robustness Test. In the original CLA whitepaper, the authors suggested that
HTM cortical regions are able to convert distributed representations into sparse
distributed representations of active columns (Hawkins et al., 2011, pp. 11–12), and that
the percentage of active bits in the input might vary significantly, yet the spatial pooler
might produce a sparse set of active columns. Motivated by these ideas, this test was
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developed to explore the robustness of the spatial pooling operation to varying degrees of
true bits in Boolean inputs, which I refer to as input activities. For a range of input
activities, a series of trials were performed to ascertain the average amount of column
activity produced by the spatial pooler. In each trial, the following steps were performed:
1) a single cortical region was created performing the standard random initialization of its
columns’ proximal synapse weights, 2) an input with a particular percentage of true bits
was randomly generated, 3) the spatial pooler was repeatedly run on this input for a
developmental period of 350 cycles, during which the proximal synapses adjust to the
pattern, and a stable active columns representation of the input forms, and lastly 4) the
percentage of columns that were active at the end of the developmental period was
recorded.
Recall that the parameter column competition threshold specifies the amount of
overall activity that columns must have before they can enter the inter-column inhibition
step. As such, this parameter affects sparsity robustness. Additional tests were run
varying the value of column competition threshold. Table 7 gives the main parameters
and their specific values for this test.
A plot of the results of the Sparsity Robustness Test is shown in Figure 28. The
sparseness of the active columns representation, in terms of the percentage of total
columns active, remains reasonably close to 2%, gradually increasing, until about 80%
input activity. This demonstrates that the spatial pooling algorithm is robust in the
production of sparse representation even to more “dense” input having higher input
activity. The data also suggest that the effect of the column competition threshold is to
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considerably decrease column activity, but only for lower amounts of input activity. For
example, a threshold of 0.2 showed significant difference from the other two threshold

Table 7. The chief parameters and their values in the Sparsity Robustness Test.
Parameter name
Input activity (%)
Column competition threshold
Trials per test
Local column activity

Value(s) used
1–100, steps of 5
0.00–0.30, steps of 0.1
200
5.0

Figure 28. The results of the Sparsity Robustness Test. A plot of the average percentage
of columns found active, after a developmental period, as a function of input activity
percentage. The legend codes for difference values of the column competition threshold
parameter.
conditions up to about 16% activity. This suggests keeping the threshold low (<= 0.1) so
as to maintain sparsity for inputs with lower input activity (1–20%). A threshold of 0.0 is
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discouraged in situations where noise in the input could excite at least one synapse in
every column leading to a situation where every column must compete in the inhibition
step (Ahmad, Personal Communication).
LCA Parameter Optimization Test. As discussed above, the local column activity
(LCA) parameter affects column activity by determining the maximum number of
columns that can possibly win the inter-column inhibition step within a given circular
area with radius, inhibition radius. What value should this critical parameter take, so that
spatial pooling produces approximately 2% column activity? This test seeks the answer.
Based on the previous test, we know that the spatial pooler exhibits good sparsity
robustness when the column competition threshold is low. So, for this test, I fixed this
free parameter to 0.01. I also continued to fix the projection factor to 4.0 to have at least
1000 columns representing the data, since I am focusing on inputs of 256 dimensions.
Given these assumptions, I seek a method of obtaining an LCA value producing about
2% column activity for a range of receptive field radii and a range of input activity. Thus,
I varied the input activity, i, and the receptive field radius, rrf. For each pair of these
values (i, rrf), I performed a series of trials, each using a randomly generated input. In
each trial an input with activity i was randomly generated, and input to a cortical region
with columns having a receptive field radius of rrf. Then, the spatial pooling operation
was performed on the input for a developmental period, at the end of which the
percentage of active columns was recorded. After all of these trials were performed, the
average activity percentage was compared with the 2% target: If it was sufficiently close
to the 2% target, the current LCA value was recorded for condition (i, rrf), and the
process advanced to the next condition pair. Otherwise, LCA was adjusted, and the
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process was repeated until a sufficiently close result was found. Table 8 summarizes the
various experimental parameters of the test.

Table 8. Parameters used in the LCA Parameter Optimization Test.
Parameter name
Input activity (%)
Receptive field radius
Random inputs per trial
Sufficient average column activity (%)

Value(s) used
0.02–0.22, steps of 0.1
3–7, steps of 1
60
2 ± 0.3

The results of this effort are shown in Figure 29. The data suggest a linear
relationship between receptive field radius and optimal LCA value, regardless of input
activity. The input activity also has an effect, though it is apparently nonlinear, which
makes choosing the LCA parameter difficult if the input activity varies considerably. If
input activity can be stably constrained, then linear regression can be used to determine a
function that outputs a good LCA value given a receptive field radius. For this reason, in
the subsequent tests, I typically fix input activity at 2%, or employ a range of input
activities close to 2%. Then, for a fixed input activity, I perform a linear fit on the data
points shown in Figure 29 to obtain a function outputting a LCA parameter value as a
function of the receptive field radius. If input activity is not stable, then one must
dynamically update LCA based on the changing input activity as the algorithm runs. This
could perhaps be achieved by using multiple regression to produce an LCA-outputting
function with two inputs, input activity and receptive field.
Note in Figure 29 that I have not shown results for receptive field radii less than
3.0. For fixed input activity these curves are still roughly linear in this range of radii,
although less so. The issue for small radii is that rounding effects occur since the
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continuous, Gaussian-based receptive field model must be actualized using a set of
discrete input locations. If a receptive field radius of less than 3.0 is desired, it may be
necessary to optimize the LCA for the particular radius and/or input activity.
Noise Robustness Test. Recall that the spatial pooling operation attempts to produce a
sparse distributed set of active columns representing the current bottom-up input. One
purported benefit of sparse distributed representation is noise robustness. To determine
how robust 2D-CLA’s active columns representations are to noise, I tested the effect of
varying amounts of noise (0% to 50%), added to input patterns, on the inputs’ resulting
sets of active columns, that is, its sparse distributed representation. I also varied the input
activity, the percentage of bits in the input patterns that were true, from 1% to 5%. I used
this range since the Sparsity Robustness Test had already suggested low input activity to
be desirable.
Concretely, for each input activity condition, i, a single Boolean input, with 256
dimensions, was generated with i percent of its bits randomly set to true. Next, in a
developmental period, the input was shown to a cortical region performing only the
spatial pooling operation for 250 cycles. At the end of this period, the final set of active
columns was recorded as the sparse distributed representation of that single input.
Next, for a range of noise conditions, the original input pattern was corrupted by
an amount of noise. Noise was added uniformly to true bits and false bits alike, turning
the former false and the latter true. For a particular input activity condition and noise
condition, 500 trials were performed. In each, a noisy version of the single original input
was generated, and was then exposed to the same cortical region for a developmental
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Figure 29. The results of the LCA Parameter Optimization Test. The LCA values
producing near 2% column activity on average as a function of the column’s receptive
field radius. The legend additionally shows the range of input activity conditions
explored.
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period. At the end of this period the “noisy” set of active columns was compared with the
single original set for that input activity condition.
To perform this comparison, I computed the normalized taxicab distance between
the original set and a noisy set. Here, this distance is the total number of errors in the
active columns representation, both false positives and false negatives, divided by total
number of columns in the region. For a given input activity and noise amount, I averaged
the scores across the 500 trials.
Figure 30 summarizes the results of this test. Increased amounts of noise
(depicted in the legend) significantly increased the distance between an original active
columns representation and noisy active columns representations. The data also suggest a
benefit in keeping the input activity low; namely, that lower input activities have better
noise robustness than higher input activities (e.g., the 50% noise curve changes
signifcantly over the range of input activities).

Figure 30. The results of the Noise Robustness Test.
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Representation Distribution Test. So far we have looked at the sparsity of the sparse
distributed representations produced by the spatial pooler, and their noise robustness.
What about the degree of distribution of column usage in these representations? To this
end, the spatial pooling operation includes a “boosting” component designed to
encourage equal usage of columns in active columns representations over time. If active
columns representations are inadequately distributed across all columns, then the
algorithm is not taking advantage of the high dimensional column space and the benefits
it confers. This test, then, explores the evenness of column usage in the active columns
representations produced by the spatial pooler.
In each condition of this test, 10,000 inputs having 256 dimensions and a
particular input activity were randomly generated. Each such input was shown to a
cortical region running the spatial pooler for a developmental period of 200 cycles. After
this period, I recorded the columns used in the active columns representation of the input.
After all trials were performed, the average, and then the standard deviation, of each
column’s usage, across all trials, was computed. To summarize these usage standard
deviations, they themselves were averaged to produce a singular measure.
Ideally, if the active columns representations are well distributed, then the
variance in column usage should be high, approaching the variance of randomly chosen
sets of columns; otherwise, the variance should be low. The aforementioned process was
repeated for a range of input activity levels, and for a range of values of the parameter,
minimum column activity. This parameter controls a threshold determining whether
individual columns will be boosted based on their activity history. Another boosting
parameter, boost function slope, governs the magnitude of the change to a column’s boost
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attribute when boosting is performed. Recall, the boost attribute weights competing
columns in the inter-column inhibition step (Step 1b). For this test, I chose a fixed boost
function slope that I found gave high variance scores.
To give the results of the test better context, I have also added a baseline data
series. This baseline estimates the average variance of column usage if the distribution of
column usage is (nearly) completely random. The baseline was obtained by first
randomly generating, for each input activity condition, 10,000 Boolean patterns having
the same dimensionality as the number of columns (1024) in the test’s cortical region and
having the particular input activity. Then, for each input activity condition, the average
variance in the usage of each bit (representing a column) was computed across the 10,000
patterns.
The results of this test are shown in Figure 31. The data indicate that variance in
column usage increases with input activity, which suggests keeping input activity low.
While, this cannot be controlled by a parameter, it is possible to preprocess inputs to
reduce input activity, e.g., performing subsampling or a predictive coding filter (Huang &
Rao, 2011). All data series showed less variance on average than the baseline, implying
that the column usage distribution was less than optimal. Moreover, it appears that this
difference increased for higher input activity conditions. For the input activities depicted
in Figure 31, the variance in column usage was not significantly affected by different
values of the boosting parameter, minimum column activity. I did find greater differences
between the boosting parameter conditions for high input activity (> 40%). If dealing
with high input activities, this could be taken as suggestiing that this parameter be set
very high. However, there is a drawback in doing so, which is the topic of the next test.
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Figure 31. The results of the Representation Distribution Test. The graph depicts the
average variance in column usage versus input activity. The legend illustrates different
values of the boosting parameter, minimum column activity.
Representation Stability Test. The boosting component of the spatial pooler was
motivated by the need for adequate distribution in column usage in the active columns
representation of input. Recall that with boosting, columns recently having less activity
(either in their competition score or winning the inter-column inhibition) are “boosted” or
biased. In effect, little-used columns become more likely to be part of an active columns
representation. A drawback of this boosting adjustment is that if it is implemented too
strongly, then the active columns representation loses stability. For example, the
representation of the exact same input might change with each presentation to the cortical
region.
In this test, I explored this “representation stability” phenomenon. A series of
trials were run using inputs with 2% of the bits set true. Such sparse inputs were chosen
for earlier conceptual reasons and, additionally, some tests (discussed later) suggest
benefits in using low input activity patterns. Another reason to try sparse inputs is that
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cortical regions produce output representations with 2% sparsity (due to the sparsity of
the active columns representation), and send their output to higher regions; thus most
higher regions can expect to receive input with about 2% active bits. In each of 15,000
trials, a single input was generated and shown to a cortical region running the spatial
pooler for 50 processing cycles. After each cycle, the difference between the current
active columns set and the previous active columns set was calculated and recorded. Such
trials were also run for different values of the boosting parameter, minimum column

Figure 32. The results of the Representation Stability Test. This plot of the results of the
Representation Stability Test shows the average distance in the current active columns
representation from the previous representation versus the run cycle. The distance is the
normalized taxicab distance from the previous cycle. Higher values of the minimum
column activity parameter require more cycles for representational stability.
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activity, which can take on a value from 0 to 1. The average results are shown in Figure
32 with their standard deviations for two of the parameter conditions.
Regardless of the minimum column activity parameter value, the active columns
representation stabilized (< 1% change) after about 45 cycles of presentation. However,
stability occurs much more quickly for a low minimum column activity, e.g., a value of
0.01 stabilizes in less than 20 cycles. This suggests that there is a drawback to setting
minimum column activity high, and that it should not be set too high. Recall that the
previous test suggests that minimum column activity should not be set too low since it
increases the variance in column usage. In order to deal with this, I suggest keeping input
activity low, e.g.,2%, which also has the effect of decreasing column usage variance.
Then, minimum column activity can be kept at a low value, which will also maintain
representation stability. An example of preprocessing that would reduce input activity is
predictive coding filtering techniques (not to be confused with hierarchical predictive
coding) (Huang & Rao, 2011). Such filters compute local prediction error, e.g.,
determining if a pixel’s value is predictable based on its neighbors, which can have the
effect of reducing the input activity, especially for signals with repetitive, redundant,
portions.
Co-Occurrence Memory Degradation Test. The spatial pooler’s learning process
adjusts the permanence of the proximal synapses of a region’s columns. These
adjustments leave an imprint corresponding to a given input pattern, and can be viewed
as memory for co-occurrence patterns. What happens when a cortical region receives a
large number of different co-occurrence patterns? For instance, does the active columns
representation of an input change because of all of the adjustments to the region’s
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proximal synapses? Surely, the more patterns that are “stored” the more learned patterns
will be corrupted or degraded.
This experiment quantifies answers to these questions by storing an increasing
number of co-occurrence patterns with 529 bits, 2% of which were true, into a single
cortical region. After each set of patterns has been stored, the test then determines the
degree to which each pattern’s original active columns representation changes.
Concretely, for a given number of patterns, p, a single cortical region is generated. Next,
p patterns are randomly generated after which each is exposed to the cortical region for a
developmental period of 200 cycles. At the end of this period, the active columns
representation of the pattern is recorded. After all p patterns have seen development, and
their active columns representation recorded, then each pattern is shown to the region for
a single cycle, and the resulting “degraded” active columns representation is recorded and
compared with the pattern’s original active columns representation. The accuracy in
pattern retrieval is computed in terms of the normalized taxicab distance and F1 score.
Figure 33 shows a plot of the average normalized taxicab distance, as a function of the
number of patterns stored in a cortical region. The data indicate that there is not an
increase in the taxicab distance with an increasing number of stored patterns. There is
actually a slight decrease in the distance as more patterns are stored.
A similar pattern across the number-of-patterns condition was found using the F1
score (Figure 34). That is to say the accuracy of retrieval seemed to improve slightly with
larger numbers of stored patterns. In order to verify that there was good uniformity in
column usage across the large number of active columns representations, I also computed
the average variance in column usage (as defined in the previous Representation
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Distribution Test) across both the original representations and the degraded ones as well
(Figure 35). It appears that the average variance in column usage does not decrease due to
a large number of stored patterns; in fact there seemed to be a general increase (an
improvement) in column usage uniformity among the “degraded” patterns. For some
context, randomly generated patterns of 2% true bits had an average variance of 0.139.
This increase in usage variance alleviates concerns about uniformity in column usage.
Conclusions
The HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms is a recent approach to general pattern
recognition inspired by the organization of the cerebral cortex. While the HTM theory
has enjoyed previous published work by its creators, the CLA has not. Here I presented
an implementation of the HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms, called 2D-CLA, which
modifies the receptive fields of the algorithm to have limited 2D receptive fields. The

Figure 33. The average normalized taxicab distance of retrieved patterns as a function of
the total number of patterns exposed to a cortical region. A higher distance implies that,
after all patterns were exposed, the retrieved active columns representation was greatly
different from its original representation.
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Figure 34. The average F1 score for active column pattern retrieval as a function of the
total number of patterns exposed to a cortical region. A higher score implies better
retrieval.

Figure 35. A comparison of the average variance in column usage among the original
active columns representations (blue) and the degraded active columns representations.
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tests in this chapter explore some of the basic properties of the spatial pooling portion of
2D-CLA on artificial 2D patterns. In several tests, I evaluated the sparse distributed
output of spatial pooling; namely, the active columns representation.
The Sparsity Robustness Test demonstrated the robustness of the active column
representation’s sparsity for various input activities. The spatial pooler does well in
producing sparse representations for inputs with about 80% or less true bits. The results
also suggest keeping the column competition threshold low to maintain good sparsity for
inputs with lower input activity (1–20%).
In the LCA Parameter Optimization Test I analyzed the problem of choosing the
local column activity parameter when using the proposed 2D receptive fields. The data
suggest linear relationships between receptive field radius and “optimal” LCA value, for
a range of input activities. The input activity has a nonlinear effect on “optimal” LCA. If
input activity can be stably maintained, then linear regression can produce a function to
obtain a “good” LCA value given a particular receptive field radius.
The Noise Robustness Test demonstrated noise robustness for the sparse
distributed representations of “learned” coincidence patterns. The data suggest better
noise robustness for inputs with lower input activities, and this is especially true for
higher amounts of added noise.
In the Representation Distribution Test I explored how well the spatial pooling
algorithm makes evenly distributed use of a cortical region’s columns. The results
indicate that variance in column usage (high being desirable) decreases from baseline
with increased input activity, suggesting keeping input activity low. In turn, this suggests
preprocessing inputs to reduce input activity if possible. For sparse inputs (near 2%), the
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effect of the boosting parameter, minimum column activity, on the variance in column
usage was insignificant; however, for inputs with high activity rates this parameter has a
greater effect.
In the Representation Stability Test I explore the stability of the active columns
representation when “boosting” occurs. Boosting attempts to increase the evenness of
column usage. On average, the active columns representation stabilized after about 45
cycles of input presentation with quicker stability for low values of the boosting
parameter, minimum column activity. This suggests that there is a drawback to setting
minimum column activity high, i.e., it will take a long time to obtain a stable
representation of an input pattern. I suggest keeping input activity low, e.g.,2%, which
also has the effect of increasing the evenness of column usage. Then the boosting
parameter, minimum column activity can be kept at a low value, which will also maintain
representation stability.
Finally, in the Co-Occurrence Memory Degradation Test I looked at the effect of
“storing” increasing numbers of coincidence patterns on their active columns
representations. I measured the difference between original representations of
coincidence patterns and the representations after many such patterns had been stored in
the memory. The data indicate a slight decrease in the taxicab distance with an increasing
number of stored patterns. The accuracy of representation retrieval, measure by the F1
score, appeared to improve slightly with larger numbers of stored patterns. Finally the
average variance in column usage does not decrease due to a large number of stored
patterns; in fact, there seemed to be a general improvement in column usage variance
among the “degraded” patterns.
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In this section, I have studied a 2D receptive field extension to the HTM Cortical
Learning Algorithms (2D-CLA). Here, I explored the effects of the algorithm’s various
parameters, a little-studied topic. These test results provide new information about the
performance of algorithm with respect to several parameters of the CLA’s spatial pooler
as well as parameters introduced with the 2D-CLA extension. A recurring lesson from
these tests is that the algorithm performs best not only when it produces sparse distributed
representations of inputs, but when it receives sparse distributed representations in the
first place. While it takes some effort to configure, the spatial pooling algorithm showed
the ability to sparsify general Boolean inputs, produce noise robust representations, and
have an adequate storage capacity for co-occurrence memories.

161

5

Cortical Learning Algorithms with Predictive Coding for a Systems-Level

Cognitive Architecture
Introduction
In this chapter I continue describing a detailed perception network intended for tight
integration with a broad systems-level cognitive architecture, LIDA. Having introduced
the HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA) in the previous chapter, here I present a
predictive coding extension to them termed PC-CLA. I first outline the theoretical
motivation for PC-CLA. Next, I describe PC-CLA and its implementation. Then, I report
the results of tests of PC-CLA. Finally, I discuss the theoretical considerations of
integrating PC-CLA with the systems-level LIDA model and its commitments.
Motivation. In the previous chapter I reviewed Generalized Filtering (Friston et al.,
2010), a general, biologically plausible, Bayes-approximate mathematical prescription
for an advanced filtering network. I am interested in a computational model of pattern
recognition like several of those reviewed earlier (Chapter 2). In particular, the
computational HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA) incorporates sparse distributed
representation (a consequence of the free-energy principle), hierarchical decomposition,
and representation of higher-order temporal dynamics, with online learning in a single
algorithm. However, not all the aspects of Generalized filtering appear in CLA including
1) the use of uncertainty and its estimation, and 2) the optimization of network states,
parameters, and, hyperparameters, based on prediction error minimization (free-energy
minimization). The cross-pollination of the ideas in these two theories forms the
theoretical guide of this work. The ambitious goal is to develop a perception network
with the capacity to process a general range of sensory signals in accordance with the
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free-energy principle, which, statistically speaking, performs the triple-estimation
problem of inferring model states, parameters, and hyperparameters (Friston et al., 2008).
From another view, such a research program aims to capture the suggested functionality
of the neocortex as a general pattern learner, using only time as a guide in capturing cooccurrence patterns (based on simultaneity) and sequences (temporally ordered) of cooccurrence patterns.
In order to keep to scope of this problem manageable, I will not approach all
aspects of the problem at once. While I have discussed the representation of uncertainty
(via hyperparameters) theoretically, I will not approach it computationally in this work.
Rather, I aim to develop a predictive coding extension to the HTM Cortical Learning
Algorithms1, which I term the Predictive Coding Cortical Learning Algorithms (PCCLA), as a first step towards the vision of a computational network of the form outlined
by Generalized Filtering. While GF does not restrict the types of state variables used, PCCLA uses binary variables. Table 9 summarizes some of the pertinent features addressed
by the CLA, PC-CLA, and GF models.
Again, while PC-CLA may have more narrow applications as a data analysis or
pattern recognition algorithm, I mainly propose it here as a detailed, fundamental
building block for cognitive systems. In particular, in a hierarchy, it can be seen as
implementing the current representations, memory, and learning and attentional processes
for a systems-level cognitive architecture. As with the CLA, the core algorithm as I will
describe it is recursive, so that it can conceivably be repeated in a large tree-structured

1

Numenta’s CLA has been implemented in C++ and deployed for commercial purposes.
Their whitepaper on CLA gives its pseudocode, from which I have developed my own
implementation in Java with the changes mentioned in this dissertation.
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Table 9. Comparison of CLA, PC-CLA and GF by the features they address.
Feature

PC-CLA

CLA (2011) GF (2010)

Online learning

X

X

X

Unsupervised learning

X

X

X

Distributed representation

X

X

Sparse representation
State optimization /
Predictive coding
Temporal prediction within same
level
Top-down prediction into lower
level
Top-down prediction error passed
feedforward
Parameter optimization /
Learning

X

X

X

X

Spatial (Coincidence) learning
Temporal learning of various
orders
Hyperparameter optimization /
Gain modulation

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Precision estimation
Precision weighting of prediction
errors

X
X
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hierarchy, possibly following Fuster’s (2006) outline of two intertwined perceptual and
executive memory hierarchies. I conjecture that, out of such a network, I will be able
implement cognitive features traditionally studied by LIDA and similar cognitive systems.
Additionally, an agent built from a PC-CLA network would have the capacity to deal
with high dimensional “real-world” sensory data streams in a grounded manner (Barsalou,
1999). Currently, the LIDA model does not have any faculties, in the form of a detailed
algorithm, to deal with such high-dimensional inputs. Previously, LIDA research has
simplified or “stubbed” the perceptual aspects of the agent.
PC-CLA: A Predictive Coding Extension to the HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms
PC-CLA is constructed as an extension to the CLA; as such the cortical region data
structure and others defined in the previous chapter on the 2D-CLA remain the same.
Thus, the extension pertains mainly to the cortical region process. In particular, I add
predictive coding message passing (Rao & Ballard, 1999) between hierarchical levels,
which allows cortical regions to be replicated hierarchically.
The predictive coding extension to the Cortical Learning Algorithms introduces
the following changes to the cortical region process: 1) For the spatial pooling operation
(Step 1, previous chapter), the column overlap score is now computed using prediction
error. Specifically, input is the unpredicted (false negative) portions of the current
bottom-up input, with respect to the current top-down prediction of the region. This
contrasts with CLA that simply processes the original bottom-up input. 2) For the spatial
pooling operation, when a column is predicted in the immediately previous cycle to
become active in the current cycle, its bottom-up overlap score is assigned a value based
on the predicted column overlap parameter. This is done because predicted columns, due
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to the previous change, effectively inhibit their bottom-up input; however, the column
should still compete with other columns to be part of the active columns representation.
The rationale here is that we must maintain the temporal context encoded by this
column’s cells, and since it will not receive any bottom-up input (since its being
predicted effectively inhibits any bottom-up input), we must give it a typical overlap
score for the column to remain competitive. 3) The spatial learning operation now
updates the proximal synapses on each column in the region, not just the active columns.
Additionally, this procedure now strengthens all synapses connected to an active input (to
minimize future errors from that input) and weakens all synapses whose input was
predicted, but did not become active. 4) A new function is added that processes top-down
predictions received from the immediately higher level. It runs serially after the
calculation of the currently predicted cells, but before the temporal pooler learning
operation. It computes the prediction error between the current top-down prediction and
the union of the current active cell state and the current predicted cell state. It also adds in
the current top-down prediction into the current cell activity state (4a and 4b in Figure 36
below). 5) A new function is added that generates top-down prediction to be sent to the
immediately lower level. Specifically, it converts the current predicted columns (columns
with current predicted cells) into an expected input pattern, using the columns’ proximal
dendrites and proximal synapses (5b in Figure 36).
Predictive Coding Cortical Region Process. In this PC-CLA implementation, each
cortical region is driven by its own predictive coding cortical region process, which runs
a serial cycle that updates the region’s state and performs learning. This cycle is depicted
in Figure 36, and I first describe it at a high level below.
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The predictive coding cortical region process can be roughly subdivided into three
sub-processes, spatial pooling, temporal pooling, and message passing. Spatial pooling
refers to the process of grouping similar inputs into the same (or nearly the same) sparse
distributed set of active columns that represent the input. Spatial pooling approximately
corresponds to Step 2 below in the detailed description. Temporal pooling, corresponding
with Step 3, occurs sequentially after the spatial pooling step, and takes the active
columns representation produced by spatial pooling, and the current temporal context
encoded by the cells predicted in the last cycle to become active this cycle, and produces
the current active cell state. From the current active cell state the temporal pooler also
produces a current predicted cell state, the context for the next cycle. Both the current
active cell state and the current predicted cell state comprise the temporal pooler’s output.
Covering at least two time steps, the union of these two states should exhibit some
temporal invariance, hence the name temporal pooler. The message passing sub-process
(Steps 4 & 5) implements hierarchical predictive coding, which involves computing the
prediction error between 1) the top-down prediction from a higher cortical region and 2)
the union of the active and predictive cell states of the region. This error is then passed
forward to the next higher level. With this high-level description in mind, I now
summarize the main loop of the predictive coding cortical region process (Figure 36) at
an arbitrary cycle t as follows:
Step 1. Compute the current bottom-up prediction error, εv, between the current bottomup Boolean input, y, and the previous cycle’s top-down prediction, yTD .
Step 2. Compute the active columns of the cortical region for cycle t, L1.
a) Perform process g taking the bottom-up prediction error, εv, and the columns’ proximal
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dendrites and associated proximal synapses, and outputting the columns’ overlap score.
b) For each column predicted to become active this cycle (computed in Step 5a of cycle
t – 1), set its overlap score to the predicted column overlap parameter.
c) For columns with an overlap score greater than the column overlap threshold, perform
a local k-winners-take-all procedure to determine the active columns, L1. The constraint,
k, limits the number of possible active columns within a given area ensuring that the
active columns are distributed.
Step 3. Compute the active cells at cycle t, L2, the current cells predicted to be active at
some future cycle, PL2t, and their union, U.
a) Based on the active columns, L1 and the currently predicted cells, PL2t-1 (computed in
Step 3b of cycle t – 1), compute the current active cells, L2.
b) Based on the active cells, L2, and the region’s distal dendrites and synapses, perform
process, f, producing the region’s current predicted (for some future cycle) cells, PL2t.
Based on only the cells predicted for the next cycle t + 1, determine the columns,
predicted this cycle, to be active next cycle, PL1t (used later in Step 5).
c) Compute the union, U, of the active cells, L2, and the current predicted cells, PL2t.
Step 4. Process the current received top-down prediction, UTD.
a) Compute the error between U and the current received top-down prediction, UTD, and
send the error to the next hierarchical level.
b) Update PL2t, the current cells predicted to be active at some future cycle, by adding in
those cells predicted in UTD.
Step 5. Based on the columns predicted to be active next cycle, PL1t, (found in Step 3b):
a) Compute each column’s predicted column overlap (used in 2b of next cycle).
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Figure 36. The predictive coding cortical region process for a single hierarchical level
with an input. All the components of the single cortical region appear within the gray
dashed box. Current representations are shown in blue with the exception of current
errors, which are shown in red. Green boxes represent the processes using long-term
synaptic connections.
b) Perform process g-1 to generate the region’s current top-down prediction, yTD .
Step 6. Perform the learning processes.
a) Perform spatial learning, updating the permanence of proximal synapses based on
bottom-up prediction error. Also update each column’s boost attribute based on its
activity history.
b) Perform temporal learning, which updates distal synapse permanence, and possibly
adds new distal synapses. This learning is driven by both unpredicted columns and
predicted columns that did not actually become active. I describe the details of these
processes in the next section.
This concludes a high-level description of the PC-CLA algorithm. For more
detailed pseudocode of key portions of the algorithm, see Appendix B.
Learning in PC-CLA. Here I give the additional details for the learning Step 6 of the
predictive coding cortical region process. In the original CLA, the spatial learning
process iterates over each current active column, and updates the permanence values of
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the column’s synapses based on the synapse’s input. Synapses with active inputs have
their permanence incremented, while those with inactive inputs have their permanence
decremented. This has the effect of tuning columns to be more selective to their current
bottom-up inputs. In PC-CLA, this part of the algorithm is changed, and the process
iterates over all columns in the cortical region and updates the permanence values of each
column’s synapses according to any bottom-up prediction error occurring for the
synapse’s input. In detail, synapses with active inputs due to false negative prediction
error have their permanence increased, while those responsible for a false positive
prediction error have their permanence decreased. In PC-CLA, the boosting update
algorithm remains unchanged, as well as, in the temporal pooler, the learning updates to
distal dendrites segments.
In this section I have described the basic details of the PC-CLA algorithm. In
Chapter 6 I, provide more details of my specific computational implementation. In
Appendix C, I give a detailed time complexity analysis of the algorithm.
Temporal Pooler Tests
Here I first present some tests exploring the temporal pooling aspect of the CLA (Step 3),
which has seen little in the way of published reports. These tests study a single cortical
region performing both the spatial pooling process and, additionally, the temporal
pooling process. Temporal pooling attempts to learn temporal patterns in the temporal
progression of the sparse distributed representations produced by the spatial pooler. Once
learned, the temporal pooler predicts the next expected pattern. Assessing the accuracy of
such predictions is the subject of the first test below. Additionally, the temporal pooler
tries to predict more than one time step in the future, which serves to build temporal
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invariance in the cortical region’s output. Assessing this type of prediction accuracy is the
subject of the second test below. Common parameters between these tests, and their
values, are summarized in Table 10.
First-Order Temporal Prediction Accuracy Test. The cells of the columns of the
cortical region encode the various temporal contexts required for variable-order temporal
prediction, the ability to predict the next state (active cells) based on a variable number of
previous states (Hawkins et al., 2011, pp. 16–17). In addition, the distal dendrite
segments and their synapses implement the long-term temporal memory used to predict
cell states from the different activity contexts encoded by active cells. In this test, I
explore the first-order prediction capabilities of the temporal pooler, i.e., predictions of
the expected set of active cells for the very next processing cycle. For the test I generate
sequences of randomly generated 2D Boolean patterns having the form prefix-cue-target (Figure
37). The prefix is a subsequence, and each pattern in it is randomly generated for each sequence.
The prefix’s length is an independent variable of the test. The cue portion of sequences consists
of a single pattern occurring immediately after the last pattern of the prefix. The cue pattern is
fixed across all sequences, and has its true bits uniformly distributed throughout the input space to
minimize potential bias. Finally, the target portion consists of a single pattern randomly generated
for each sequence.

A single trial in this test consists of the generation of a sequence having the
described form, which is then repeatedly input to a cortical region performing spatial and
temporal pooling with learning. The number of repetitions is a test parameter termed
developmental exposures. After the final pattern, the target pattern, is presented at the end
of each developmental exposure, the current and predicted states of cells and columns are
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Table 10. The temporal pooler parameters shared across the two temporal pooler tests.
Parameter name

Explanation

Input dimensionality
Input activity

Dimensionality of input signal
Ratio of the number of true bits in the
input to the total number of input bits
Initial potential synapses assigned to
each distal dendrite segment at setup
time
Limit on the number of new synapses
added by a single segment update
Limit on the number of possible
synapses on any distal dendrite
segment
Radius of the circle defining the
neighborhood of cells about a distal
dendrite from which synaptic
connection can potentially be made
The number of distal synapses that
must be active before a distal dendrite
segment is considered active
The number of distal synapses required
to be active on a distal segment for
learning
The initial permanence of distal
synapses at setup time. This value
should be below the connection
threshold
Change in permanence for those distal
synapses deemed worthy of
strengthening
Change in permanence for those distal
synapses in need of weakening

Initial synapses per
distal dendrite segment
Maximum synapses per
segment update
Maximum possible
synapses per distal
segment
Distal learning radius

Distal dendrite segment
activation threshold
Segment learning
threshold
Initial distal synapse
permanence
Distal permanence
increment
Distal permanence
decrement
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Value(s)
used
529
0.02
20
20
32
7

1
1
0.4

0.1
–0.1

Figure 37. Illustration of the type of sequences used for the First-Order Temporal
Prediction Accuracy Test. The letters represent randomly generated 2D Boolean patterns.
The prefix length was an independent variable. The cue was fixed across all sequences
and the target was randomly generated for each sequence.
cleared to clear the current context. The motivation for this is to control for the learning
of a temporal transition from the last pattern to the first.
After the final developmental exposure of a sequence, the final set of active
columns, which represents the active columns representation of the target pattern, are
recorded. After the developmental period, I present the initial part of the sequence one
final time with learning turned off. Specifically, I only present the patterns of the
sequence up to, and including, the cue pattern, that is, the final target pattern is not
shown. Then, I retrieve those columns predicted for the next time step, i.e., the prediction
of the target pattern’s active column representation. Based on these predicted columns
and the original active columns representation of the target, the F10 score (the F-score
with recall valued 10 times as much as precision) is computed and recorded for the trial.
To test the cortical region’s performance in representing the context of the sequence, I
vary the size of the sequences’ prefix. I also vary the number of distal dendrite segments,
which gives a cortical region increased temporal memory. The results are summarized in
Figure 38.
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There were 7,500 trials in each condition. Each sequence had 4 developmental
exposures to the region. The cortical region had 7 cells per column and 20 distal dendrites
per cell.
Higher-Order Temporal Predictions Test. The CLA is capable of making greater than
first-order predictions, that is, predictions of cell activity at two or more cycles in the
future. These serve to produce temporal stability or invariance in the cortical region’s
output when viewed over time (Hawkins et al., 2011, p. 17). This can be seen by noting
that 1) higher-order temporal predictions can put cells into a predicted activity state
several cycles in advance, and 2) both the predicted and active cell states are combined in

Figure 38. Accuracy of first-order temporal predictions versus the prefix size of inputs.
The prefix size appears to have some, though not a great, effect on prediction accuracy
for the range of sizes tested. The number of cells per column did have a significant effect
on first-order temporal prediction accuracy as expected. Note adding cells increases the
cost of the algorithm in terms of time and space.
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producing a region’s output. In this test, I aim to study how well CLA performs this
function. Germane to this, I define a parameter of the cortical region called prediction
order limit controlling the highest order of segment updates (and consequently the
highest-order prediction of segments) that can be stored (and possibly performed) by the
temporal pooler. If performed, such segment updates modify distal synapses to better
predict patterns two or more cycles in advance.
In each trial of this test, I first generate a sequence of 2D Boolean patterns having
a fixed size determined by the test parameter, sequence size, which was set to 4. With
each generated sequence, I perform the following procedure for a range of prediction
order limits. The procedure generates a cortical region using the specified prediction
order limit, and then performs a developmental phase, repeatedly running the sequence
on the cortical region, which performs spatial and temporal pooling with learning. At the
end of each sequence presentation, the current and predicted states of cells and columns
are cleared to control for learning that the last pattern predicts the first. After the final
developmental sequence presentation, the final set of active columns, representing the
final pattern of the sequence in its temporal context, are recorded. For the crucial test
phase, I check the accuracy of predictions for this final set of active columns. For the test
phase, I run the sequence a final time, pattern by pattern, at each step comparing the
current temporally predicted columns, including all higher-order predictions, with the
recorded final active columns representation of the sequence. For each comparison, the
F10 score between the currently predicted columns and the actual active columns
representation of the final pattern is recorded. The idea here is to determine the degree to
which the final set of active columns is predicted in advance at each step in the sequence.
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To summarize the results, I compute the average F10 scores, across each randomly
generated sequence, for the sequence steps 1 to sequence size – 1, specifically, 1 to 3
(Figure 39).

Figure 39. Accuracy of higher-order (> 1) temporal predictions versus number of cycles
in advance of the final sequence pattern. For one cycle in advance there was no
significant difference between learning higher-order predictions (e.g., two and threeorder) and not. For two cycles in advance there was a significant improvement in
accuracy for both two and three-order limits over only a one-order limit. Finally, while
not significant, a three-order limit bested both one and two-order limits in predicting
three cycles in advance.
There were 300 trials in each condition. The size of each sequence was 4. Each
sequence had 1,000 developmental exposures to the region. The cortical region had 8
cells per column and 25 distal dendrites per cell. The results of the test suggest that while
the cortical region can learn to predict in advance, there are significant limitations such
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higher-order predictions, at least for sequences of randomly generated patterns. Future
work should study this capability of the algorithm on more natural data streams.
PC-CLA Tests
In this section I present an initial test of the PC-CLA algorithm that implements the
predictive coding cortical region process (Figure 36).
Reconstruction Accuracy Test. The motivation for this test comes from the desire to
arrange multiple cortical regions in a hierarchy with adjacent levels passing messages
according to hierarchical predictive coding. If top-down predictions are sent top-down
from a cortical region at one level to a lower region, then information must be lost in the
translation from the initial columnar representation of predictive columns in column
space to an expected input in input space. This is because the journey in the feedforward
direction involves a nonlinear, many-to-one generalization (many proximal synapses to
one column). Also the input space and column space typically differ in dimensionality.
To what degree is information lost (patterns become corrupted) with this inter-region
translation? And what is the effect of columns’ receptive field size?
To answer these questions, I developed the Reconstruction Accuracy Test. For a
range of receptive field radii, I generated a cortical region with columns having the
specified receptive field radius. In each such condition, a series of 5,000 random inputs,
having an input activity of 2%, were then generated, and each input was presented to the
cortical region. An input activity of 2% was used, since I found an increase in
reconstruction accuracy for inputs with lower percentages of active bits. Furthermore, we
can expect a potential lower cortical region to produce outputs of near 2% activity, in
short because a well-tuned spatial pooler will tend to produce sparse sets of active
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columns.
The cortical region performed the spatial pooling operation for a short
developmental period of 200 cycles. After this period, the resultant (stable) active
columns representation was recorded for the particular input. Next, a top-down prediction
or “reconstruction,” based on this same active columns representation, was generated,
which had the same dimensionality as the original input. This prediction was created by
iterating over the active columns, and, for each connected synapse on each column,
marking the bits corresponding to the connected synapse’s input index true. I
experimented with other methods of producing this prediction, in particular, using scalar

Figure 40. The reconstruction accuracy versus the receptive field size. Reconstruction
accuracy was operationalized as the F1 score between a Boolean input and the top-down
reconstruction of its stable active columns representation. The data suggest a slight drop
in accuracy with larger receptive field size.
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measures of “sufficient” predictions; however, I found that a policy of counting one or
more synapse(s) as a prediction for its source input bit produced the best reconstruction
accuracy.
To evaluate the accuracy of the reconstruction I used the F1 score between the
original input and its reconstruction. The results of the test are shown in Figure 40. The
data suggest a slight decrease in reconstruction accuracy as receptive field size is
increased; however the result was not statistically significant. So, at least for the range
tested, the effects of the receptive field size on prediction accuracy can be ignored.
Predictive Coding Spatial Learning Test. The purpose of this test is to compare a
cortical region that processes and learns from the original input pattern (regular) with a
cortical region that processes and learns from the top-down prediction error in its input
(predictive coding). The difference between the original CLA’s spatial learning and that
of PC-CLA’s is summarized in Tables 11 and 12 below. Comparing the last rows of each
table, it can be surmised that PC-CLA learning saves on the number of operations
performed since two of its four possibilities require no change.
For the predictive coding condition, the predicted column overlap (see bottom of
p. 172 for definition) parameter was used and set to 0.5, which corresponds to half of the
potential synapses on each column’s proximal dendrite segment. As such, predicted
columns should very strongly compete with bottom-up active columns in the intercolumn inhibition.
For each of 10,000 trials, I performed the following steps: 1) Generate a sequence
of length 3 of random patterns having 2% true bits, 2) Generate a single standard cortical
region and a single predictive coding cortical region, 3) Develop each region on the
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sequence by repeatedly exposing the sequence to the cortical region 50 times with
learning, 4) Expose the sequence to each of the two cortical regions again, this time
without learning, recording how well each of the region’s current top-down prediction
matches the next input pattern.

Table 11. Spatial learning in the original CLA for binary input. The synapses of active
columns are updated to better match the input. During learning, synapses are changed
solely in reponse to their inputs. Whether the synapse is connected does not influence the
learning update.
Case

Synapse connected

1
2
3
4

Yes
Yes
No
No

Synapse’s source
active
Yes
No
Yes
No

Change to
synapse
Strengthen
Weaken
Strengthen
Weaken

Table 12. Spatial learning in PC-CLA for binary input. The synapses of all columns are
updated to minimize the current top-down prediction error. That is, learning only updates
synapses whose connectivity is inappropriate given the current input. In contrast with
Table 11, for cases 1 and 4, no change is made.
Case

Synapse connected

1
2
3
4

Yes
Yes
No
No

Synapse’s source
active
Yes
No
Yes
No

Change to
synapse
No change
Weaken
Strengthen
No change

I first evaluated the spatial learning in both conditions by assessing the accuracy
of the cortical regions’ top-down predictions in terms of the F1 score. Surprisingly, I
found that the regular condition had a significantly better score than the predictive coding
condition (Figure 41).
I wanted to get a better sense of why the standard learning approach outperformed
the predictive coding one. I additionally measured the connection rate of the proximal
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Figure 41. Top-down prediction F-score.

Figure 42. Proximal synapse connection rate.
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synapses of each cortical region’s columns since the connected synapses of predicted
columns are counted in computing top-down predictions (see Appendix B for the
pseudocode details). I found that the regular condition connected nearly all of its
proximal synapses while the predictive coding condition connected significantly less
(Figure 42).
Given that the regular condition outperformed predictive coding in top-down
prediction accuracy, but used significantly more synapses in doing so, I desired to further
explore what was happening. I suspected that with all the connected synapses, perhaps
the regular condition was simply predicting more to get a better prediction score. To
explore this, I additionally recorded the true bit rate of the top-down prediction generated
by both conditions on this test. I found (Figure 43) that the predictive coding condition
produced significantly sparser predictions (average of 1%) than the regular condition
(average of 9.4%). I have not yet mentioned the necessity of sparse top-down predictions.
Conceptually, this need arises in multi-region networks where top-down predictions are
sent to influence lower cortical region. When this occurs the active bits in the prediction
are added into the predicted cell state of the lower region (Step 4b). In short, if this
addend is not sparse it can break the sparsity of the lower region’s representation. The
need for sparse top-down predictions also arises empirically, specifically, in the next test
with multiple cortical regions.
In Tables 11 and 12 I hypothesized that the predictive coding would involve
fewer synaptic changes than the regular condition. To verify this, I recorded a count of
each change made to proximal synapses during the test. The results (Figure 44) indicate

182

Figure 43. Top-down prediction activity rate.

Figure 44. Proximal synapse changes.
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that the regular condition indeed involves more synaptic changes than the predictive
coding condition, although this difference was not quite significant.
In summary, the regular spatial learning condition showed improved top-down
prediction accuracy at the cost of requiring more synaptic connections and changes to do
so. In contrast, the predictive coding condition desirably produces sparse top-down
predictions at the cost of prediction accuracy. While I suggest more exploration of this
tradeoff, it appears that for single-level cortical region networks it may be better to use
the regular spatial learning approach. However, for multi-level networks, the sparse topdown predictions of the predictive coding condition appear to make it the better choice.
Two Hierarchical Levels Test. This test studies the effects of having top-down
predictions, from a higher cortical region to a lower one, in a two-level cortical region
network. In particular, I compared a two-level two-region network where the higher
region does not send top-down predictions into the lower level with a similar network in
which the higher region did send top-down predictions. In both conditions, I presented
the network with a battery of temporal sequences of randomly generated patterns. In
order to measure the effects of the top-down prediction manipulation, I recorded both the
top-down prediction accuracy and temporal prediction accuracy, using the F1 score, in
both regions for each condition. I expect the top-down predictions to improve prediction
accuracies in the lower region. A separate consideration in this setting is the degree of
invariance in each level’s output. It has been suggested that hierarchically superior
regions will exhibit greater output invariance than lower regions. In order to test this, I
also recorded the variation in the outputs of both regions in this network while processing
temporal patterns.
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The test was performed as follows: a two-level network was created by generating
two cortical regions with the same parameters except that their projection factor
parameters, which govern the number of columns per input for the region, differed. The
first (lower) cortical region had a projection factor of 4.0, as is typical among the tests
described thus far; however, in order to maintain the same output size for both regions,
the second cortical region used a projection factor of 1 / cellsPerColumn , since the cell
representation of the first cortical region increases the size the original input by a factor
of cells per column.
In each of the 1,500 trials, a sequence of randomly generated patterns having
length 3 was generated. During a developmental period, the sequence was then repeatedly
shown 25 times to the network in the following manner: the first region processed the
false negative prediction error of the original input and its current top-down prediction
for that input. After this, the first region’s output was obtained and the second region
processed the false negative prediction error of the first region’s output and region two’s
current top-down prediction. Both regions performed the full predictive coding cortical
region process (Figure 36). After the higher region ran each step, its current top-down
prediction was sent, and incorporated into, to the first region. In the test phase of each
trial, both regions’ current states were reset, and the same sequence was again shown to
the network as before except without any learning.
During this test presentation, for each pattern in the sequence (except the first),
the first-order temporal prediction accuracy of the active columns was recorded for both
regions in terms of the F1 score. Similarly, the top-down prediction accuracy of each
region’s prediction of its input was also recorded. Additionally, each region’s output to
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the next hierarchical level (Step 4a) was recorded for each pattern as well. Once the entire
sequence had been presented during the test presentation, the average top-down
prediction accuracy and average temporal prediction accuracy for the sequence was
computed as well as a single invariance measure across the sequence, for each region.
The invariance measure was determined by first computing the standard deviation
of the usage of each of the output dimensions across the sequence. Then, the standard
deviations were averaged for an overall invariance measure. Across all sequence trials
these measures were again averaged for the final results. This measure of invariance is
low (near 0.0) for little varying patterns and higher for patterns of high variance. For
instance, I found that 500,000 random Boolean vectors of 256 dimensions had an
invariance of about 0.138.
The top-down prediction accuracy results are summarized in Figure 45. At the
first hierarchical level the top-down predictions were moderately accurate and top-down
predictions had no significant effect on accuracy. However, at the second hierarchical
level having top-down predictions signicantly improved top-down prediction accuracy.
While not statistically significant, it appears that top-down predictions give a better
prediction accuracy at the second level than either condition at the first level.
Figure 46 depicts the temporal prediction accuracy results of the test. Again at the
first hierarchical level there was not a significant difference in prediction accuracy
between the two top-down prediction conditions. However, at the second level having
top-down predictions significantly improved the temporal prediction accuracy. Also
worth noting is that the temporal prediction accuracy at the second level in the top-down
influence condition is significantly better than at the first level. It appears likely that, even
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Figure 45. Top-down prediction accuracy versus hierarchical level.

without top-down influence, the second level might be outperforming the first in this
respect although statistical significance cannot be claimed.
The output variation results of the test are plotted in Figure 47. There was no
significant difference in output variation across the experimental conditions at the first
hierarchical level. At the second hierarchical level there was a significant decrease in
output variation compared to the first level for both conditions. A lower score signifies
more temporally invariant outputs. To give these results context, I computed the variation
of 500,000 random Boolean patterns having 256 dimensions (the test’s input size) and a
2% true bit bits and obtained an invariance score of 0.138 (standard deviation of 0.00066).
This suggests that the algorithm is indeed producing more invariant outputs than it
receives.
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Figure 46. Temporal prediction accuracy versus hierarchical level.

Figure 47. Output variation versus hierarchical level.

188

In this section I have presented the results of tests of the temporal pooling portion
of the CLA algorithm along with tests pertaining to the addition of hierarchy to the CLA
algorithm including the effects of predictive coding, multiple hierarchical levels, and topdown predictions.
The First-Order Temporal Prediction Accuracy Test explored the effects of the
cells per column parameter and the amount of context on the accuracy of first-order
temporal predictions in the CLA. It showed a signifcant improvement in accuracy for a
larger value of the cells per column parameter. It also showed a less pronounced, but still
discernable, effect for the context length manipulation.
The Higher Order Temporal Predictions Test showed that the CLA could learn to
make higher-order predictions on sequences of random patterns. Nonetheless, the higherorder predictions were significantly worse than first-order predictions.
In preparation for testing multiple hierarchical levels, the Reconstruction
Accuracy Test studied the effect of receptive field size on top-down prediction accuracy.
It found that increasing the receptive field size had a slightly negative effect on accuracy
for the ranges of receptive field size tested.
The Predictive Coding Spatial Learning Test compared a predictive coding style
learning algorithm for spatial learning with the standard CLA-prescribed algorithm.
Interestingly, the predictive coding condition gave worse top-down prediction accuracy
than the standard. However, in its favor, predictive coding connected considerably fewer
synapses, performed less synaptic updates, and produced sparser top-down predictions
than the standard learning algorithm. Additional studies of these tradeoffs are in order.
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Finally, the Two Hierarchical Levels Test studied the effects of top-down
predictions in a two-level two cortical region network. I found top-down predictions to be
a boon improving both the top-down and temporal prediction accuracy at the second
hierarchical level with no significant difference at the first level. Top-down predictions
did not have a significant effect on the invariance of either level’s output. Notably, the
second level exhibited greater output invariance than the first as is suggested by HTM
theory.
Theoretical Considerations for PC-CLA and LIDA
I propose PC-CLA as a detailed, low-level, uniform algorithm, which, replicated
recursively in a large-scale hierarchical network, might implement the more abstract,
global, cognitive features comprised by the LIDA model, such as its Current Situational
Model, various types of memory, and attention and learning processes. The various
aspects of PC-CLA correspond to several entities in LIDA: the notion of hidden state
variables and their values corresponds to the current representations in the Current
Situational Model of LIDA’s Workspace. The long-term synapse-like connections of PCCLA could potentially implement one or several of LIDA’s short-term Sensory Memory,
Perceptual Associative (recognition) Memory, Procedural Memory, Declarative Memory,
etc. PC-CLA creates segment updates corresponding to proposed synapse-like
connections. Under certain conditions the segment update is performed and the
connections are modified. Similarly, LIDA’s structure building codelets can propose new
temporal links in the Workspace, and, if such links are part of a structure winning the
competition for conscious, then they are learned into any appropriate memory. While
LIDA’s attention mechanism employs attention codelets that create competing coalitions
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for a winner-take-all competition for consciousness, Generalized Filtering’s attentional
mechanism is based on precision-weighted prediction errors, at each hierarchical level
(Feldman & Friston, 2010). Though the connectionist PC-CLA theoretically overlaps
with a wide range of cognitive entities in the systems-level LIDA model, reconciling the
two requires several theoretical considerations.
Sparse Distributed Representation. Conceptually, PC-CLA adheres to sparse, efficient
coding (Friston, 2010, p. 5), while, computationally, it makes strict use of sparse
distributed representation (Hawkins et al., 2011). For instance, bottom-up inputs are
(typically) represented by a sparse set of active columns (typically) distributed
throughout a cortical region. If LIDA adopts such distributed representation for its
underlying internal representations, it would be a departure from its previous use of
localist, graphical, “node-and-link” representation. With PC-CLA, an instantiated node
would be theoretically implemented as a sparse distributed representation involving one
or more hierarchical levels, depending on the degree to which the node was hierarchically
decomposed. Uninstantiated nodes would be encoded by the permanences of proximal
and distal synapses likely across multiple cortical regions.
PC-CLA can be viewed as implementing two possible types of links: “structural
links” encoding hierarchical decomposition and “dynamic links” encoding level
dynamics. Structural links correspond to “feature-of” and “is-a” links in current LIDA
terms (McCall et al., 2010). Furthermore, a particular collection of structural (proximal)
links would constitute the memory for a node in the sense that they define the nodes
component features in the immediate lower level. Structural links are implemented by a
collection of PC-CLA’s artificial dendrite segments and their synapses (described below),
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with each synapse having its source in one hierarchical level and its sink in the lower
level. Dynamic links correspond to LIDA’s temporal and/or causal links. Dynamic links
are implemented similar to structural links except that links’ source and sink would be
some computational unit within the same level. Related to this, Snaider (2012) has given
a proposal for the use of high dimensional, distributed, “modular composite vectors” as
the main data structure for the LIDA architecture.
PC-CLA and Global Workspace Theory. Hebb (1949) proposed the cell assembly
theory, which first described Hebbian (or associative) plasticity. Under this theory groups
of interconnected neurons are formed through a strengthening of synaptic connections
based on correlated pre- and post-synaptic activity — simply, “cells that fire together
wire together.” Over repeated exposures associative plasticity allows the brain to glean
statistical regularities in its sensory input. PC-CLA’s (and some of the brain’s) learning
processes can be seen as a kind of Hebbian learning involving the plasticity of synaptic
connections. On the other hand, Global Workspace Theory (GWT) (Baars, 1988) and its
LIDA model, flesh out a distinct concept, conscious learning. LIDA’s multiple modes of
learning (Perceptual, Procedural, Transient Episodic, etc.) all occur continually,
simultaneously, and online using each global broadcast of the contents of consciousness.
I hypothesize that Hebbian learning must be the basis of LIDA’s conscious learning, that
is, numerous Hebbian connections, across multiple hierarchical levels, must be modified
with each broadcast. Such a view also allows for synaptic plasticity with preconscious
and never conscious processes. In support of this, synaptic plasticity has been suggested
to account for unconscious priming (e.g., Chaumon, Schwartz, & Tallon-Baudry, 2009;
Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene et al., 1998).

192

In GWT, coalitions, incorporating the results of the processing of sensory data,
compete for attention in the “global workspace.” Does the same hold true for PC-CLA?
Throughout a hierarchy of PC-CLA regions, messages are passed feedforward and topdown. Each such message can be viewed as a different interpretation of the current
situation. Each message competes for representation in the region it is sent to with 1) the
region’s current expectations and 2) other received messages (each region receives one
feedforward and one top-down message). It is possible for such a network to settle on a
coherent consensus on the current situation across multiple regions via such message
passing. The filter of GWT can be seen in a PC-CLA network as this process of the
network settling on a particular set of current representations, which are typically widely
distributed through the levels of a cognit-like network (Fuster, 2006). Such widespread
settling on coherent representations in PC-CLA is proposed to correspond with the global
broadcast of GWT. The “global workspace” in PC-CLA would be highly distributed
across a hierarchical network with its locus dynamically changing from moment to
moment, a view compatible with a recent account of a dynamic GWT (Baars, Franklin, &
Ramsøy, 2013).
GWT supports the Conscious Learning Hypothesis: significant learning takes
place via the interaction of consciousness with the various memory systems. PC-CLA is
compatible with this view because the contents of consciousness in PC-CLA would
typically concern a large representation distributed across thousands of representational
units, which would likely require updating a significant number of long-term connections
implementing PC-CLA’s memory. One potential difference between PC-CLA and GWT
is that PC-CLA’s synaptic updating is primarily driven by top-down and temporal
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prediction errors, in whichever areas they occur, while for GWT, learning is proposed to
occur with each conscious broadcast. However, if prediction errors are taken to be highly
salient then it becomes clear that the related representations will be highly likely to win
the competition for consciousness, and become the target of learning. One last item to
note is that learning based on a prediction error in this manner can be either
instructionalist (adding a new representation) or selectionist (reinforcing an existing
representation).
Precision and Salience. Previously in the section “Hyperparameter Optimization via
Gain Control,” I discussed the optimization of precision, considered as a hyperparameter
from a statistical modeling viewpoint. Recall that precision in this context is a statistical
term referring to the multiplicative inverse of the covariance of a model’s hidden states.
High statistical precision corresponds to a probability distribution highly concentrated
about its mean, suggesting that the mean is known to a high degree of precision in the
ordinary sense. Precision is then just another way to talk about a model’s uncertainty. In
the context of probabilistic inference on the states of hierarchical dynamic models, we are
required to reconcile a given level’s temporal predictions for the next time step with the
actual bottom-up input (or observation) that is actually received. How do we determine
which of these two quantities to “trust?” The answer is that we must perform a weighted
average between the two quantities, with the precision being used as the weight. In
Generalized filtering, this weighting is implemented by using precision quantities to
weight prediction errors. The idea of the weighting is that sources having higher precision
are “trusted” more. As a consequence, the prediction error from a model with low
precision would carry less weight in updating another model’s state, while a highly
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certain model’s prediction errors would carry the most. According to the equations
derived in Generalized Filtering, the precision is updated principally using the sum of
squared prediction errors, the same prediction errors that the precision weights. This has
several implications for the LIDA model. Firstly, it suggests that precision (inverse
covariance) modulates the salience of current representations via the multiplicative
weighting of prediction errors. Also, it suggests that state-dependent (i.e., based on
prediction errors) processes should be deployed at each hierarchical level of the
Workspace to maintain and update precision quantities. Such processes are not concerned
with what is being represented, rather with ongoing prediction error.
Interestingly, the neurobiological implementation of precision is thought to use
those neurotransmitters that modulate synaptic gain (Feldman & Friston, 2010). Synaptic
gain and its biasing effects have previously been associated with attention (e.g.,
Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Feldman and Friston (2010) have suggested that attentional
processing can be simulated with a Bayes-optimal recognition scheme on models
including uncertainty. They suggest attention can be seen as the “selective sampling of
sensory data that have high precision in relation to the model’s predictions.” Put another
way, this suggests that precision quantities contribute to the current salience of current
representations. It also suggests that top-down predictions are another feature of salience
as they can create an attentional “bottleneck” by biasing particular representations,
preventing others from being expressed.
Following GTW (Baars, 1988) LIDA has defined attention as the process of
bringing content to consciousness based on salience. Salience in this context includes
importance, urgency, insistence, novelty, unexpectedness, motion, loudness, brightness,

195

goal or task relevance, etc. (Faghihi et al., 2012) Following the free-energy principle,
salience in potential future versions of PC-CLA would appear as precision-weighted
prediction errors. These errors drive the update of the representations of the causes of
sensory input while the precision governs the magnitude of such changes. Happily,
LIDA’s psychological notions of salience don’t contradict the idea of salience based on
precision-weighted prediction error: novelty, unexpectedness, motion, loudness, and
brightness all involve prediction error on sensory data. Importance, urgency and goal or
task relevancy suggest salience involves value. In the free-energy framework, value is
precision (Friston, 2009), implying that valued predictions are high-precision predictions,
which exert more influence over the representations that get expressed, and consequently,
over actions.
Structure Building Codelets and Attention Codelets. In the LIDA model, structure
building codelets build new nodes, links, and other representations in the preconscious
Workspace. If such new representations win the competition for consciousness and are
broadcast, then they are learned into any appropriate memory. Here, intimately integrated
within the mechanism of PC-CLA, I am essentially proposing several general structure
building codelets that propose and reinforce links. Structural links connecting hidden
units in neighboring hierarchical levels serve to implement the part of the memory storing
co-occurrence patterns, and are used when computing top-down predictions. Dynamic
links connecting hidden units in the same hierarchical level are the foundations for
temporal predictions. Finally, if PC-CLA incorporates hyperparameter (synaptic gain)
optimization, then the optimization could be performed by attention codelets, concerned
solely with the activity of prediction error computing units, and performing the update
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operation previously discussed (Ch. 4, “Hyperparameter Optimization via Gain Control”)
to estimate precision. Previously in LIDA, attention codelets did not have such general
concerns.
Conclusions
This chapter has suggested a common, general-purpose algorithm for current
representations, memory, and learning on high-dimensional data streams for the systemslevel LIDA cognitive architectures. In particular, I proposed a predictive coding
extension to the HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms, termed PC-CLA, which is proposed
as a foundational building block for the systems-level LIDA cognitive architecture. PCCLA fleshes out LIDA’s internal representations, memory, learning and attentional
processes, and takes an initial step towards the comprehensive use of distributed and
probabilistic (uncertain) representation throughout the architecture. PC-CLA further
extends the Cortical Learning Algorithms to support hierarchy.
Several tests of PC-CLA were presented to bolster the claims of the algorithm’s
abilities. Two tests further explored the performance of temporal pooling portion of the
CLA, which has not seen much in the way of published reports. In particular I studied
how well the temporal pooler predicts the next pattern of active columns in time.
Subsequent tests of multiple hierarchical levels showed 1) the cost of translating
messages between regions, given my particular choice of receptive fields, 2) the
difference between processing and learning from prediction error versus the original
pattern, and 3) the effects of a cortical region receiving top-down predictions from a
higher region in a two-level network. The work here additionally extends the LIDA
software framework to support high dimensional pattern recognition (see Chapter 6).
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Finally, I discussed the implications of PC-CLA as a principled algorithm underlying the
LIDA architecture.
Future Work. While I discussed the representation of statistical uncertainty in the
theoretical introduction in Chapter 4, I have tabled any implementation of it in this
dissertation. Adding uncertainty to the algorithm would require precision units to be
added to the algorithm, which would estimate the uncertainty in information sources
based on accumulated prediction error and then, based on this estimate, weight these
prediction error signals.
A second avenue of future work involves replacing binary representations with
scalar ones. For instance Snaider (2012) has found that integer vectors of limited range
(e.g., 0–15) constitute a useful tradeoff between the expressiveness of scalar
representation and the computational efficiency of discrete (e.g., Boolean) representations.
This added expressiveness may be particular helpful since PC-CLA intrinsically requires
multiple representations to be integrated into a single one, since a single cortical region’s
state is a concomitant of both a bottom-up signal, a top-down prediction, and an internal
temporal prediction.
Since PC-CLA makes few assumptions about the type of sensory data it receives
there is the promise of it having applicability to a range of data streams including
auditory, visual, haptic, etc. Much further research into such applications is required to
validate the algorithm’s generality. With regards to the implementation of PC-CLA, some
future work might take aim at rewriting the code so that cortical region processes can run
in parallel on separate threads as opposed to running synchronously as they currently do.
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There are several open issues regarding PC-CLA’s use as a building block for the
LIDA model, including how PC-CLA would incorporate Sensory-Motor Memory, the
memory for motor plans that specifies actuator execution routines. However, there are
reasons to believe such research would be fruitful (Friston, 2011). Additionally if PCCLA is used to implement a systems-level LIDA agent, a methodology for building in
motivations to bias particular patterns might be required (Friston et al., 2009).

199

6

Implementations

In this chapter, I describe the key algorithms and data structures of the computational
implementations of the conceptual constructs presented so far in this dissertation.
Motivational Extension to LIDA Software Framework
In this section I describe my implementation of the motivational extension to the LIDA
software framework. For the basics of the LIDA framework, see Chapter 2 “The LIDA
Software Framework.”
Adding Incentive Salience. A primary component of the motivational extension to the
LIDA framework is the addition of base-level incentive salience and current incentive
salience to both node and link data structures. Since incentive salience functions similarly
to activation, the implementation of incentive salience mirrors that of activation; however
incentive salience make take on a value in the range [–1, 1] whereas, previously in the
framework, activation values were limited to [0, 1]. Previously in the LIDA framework,
current activation and base-level activation were specified by several methods of the
Activatible and Learnable interfaces, respectively. To obtain activation, various
other framework elements, such as nodes, links, and codelets, extend these interfaces.
Here, I update these two interfaces by adding new methods similar to the activationrelated ones for incentive salience (Figure 48 upper boxes). With these updates, it is also
possible for activation and incentive salience to take on values in the [–1, 1].
A technicality of adding this new value to the LIDA framework arises because
Node and Link objects are copied as they move from module to module. This
necessitates that incentive salience also be copied. This, in turn, requires that NodeImpl
and PamNodeImpl override their updateNodeValues(Node) method and
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LinkImpl and PamLinkImpl override their updateLinkValues(Link) method
to ensure incentive salience is copied when nodes or links are copied.
The Valenceable, FeelingNode, and FeelingLink Interfaces. The second main
component of the motivational extension concerns feeling nodes and feeling links. To
implement these I first define the Valenceable interface so that framework elements
may have a valence sign. Two new interfaces, FeelingNode and FeelingLink,
extend Valenceable as well as the existing Node and Link interfaces. Figure 48
depicts this for FeelingNode only, but FeelingLink is implemented analogously.
Note that while, conceptually, the motivation extension does not suggest incentive
salience for feeling nodes, the computational implementation inherits the incentivesalience-related methods since FeelingNode extends Node (and thus
Activatible). Nonetheless, this is not an issue since the computational
implementation never references the incentive salience values for feeling nodes so they
are ignored.
Motivation Perceptual Associative Memory (PAM) Module. The MotivationPam
class extends from the LIDA framework’s default PAM implementation,
PerceptualAssociativeMemoryImpl. It adds the module parameters given in
Table 13. Also, a specific initializer, MotivationPamInitializer, extending the
LIDA framework’s existing BasicPamInitializer, is required to initialize the
nodes. This initializer parses the “nodes” parameter as specified in Table 13.
Figure 49 summarizes the MotivationPam module in a UML class diagram.
Particularly notable is the isOverPerceptThreshold() method, which takes into
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Figure 48. The UML diagram of part of the motivational extension to the LIDA software
framework. Filled arrows denote an inheritance relationship. Open arrows imply an
implementation-of relationship. While not shown, a similar implementation pattern is
used for the FeelingLink, FeelingLinkImpl, and FeelingPamLinkImpl
types.
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Table 13. The module parameters introduced by the MotivationPam module.
Parameter Name
Explanation
pam.perceptmapping.* The * signifies wildcard. Each unique
parameter beginning with this name
specifies a mapping for PAM content
that enters the percept: 1) type of
object being mapped (node or link),
2) data type of element in PAM, 3)
data type object is changed to when it
enters the percept. This feature allows
multiple node types to occur in PAM.
pam.learningRate
A parameter controlling the rate of all
types of learning in PAM including
of base-level activation and incentive
salience.
pam.discountRate
A parameter controlling the rate of
temporal difference learning.
nodes
The value of this parameter is
sequence of node definitions, each
separated by ‘,’. Each definition
specifies a node’s label, initial baselevel activation, name in the
framework’s factory, optionally a
valence sign, and, optionally, the type
of feeling, drive or not.
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Example Value
node,
FeelingPamNodeImpl,
FeelingNodeImpl

0.2

0.1
thirst-feeling:0.1:
FeelingPamNodeImpl:
negative:drive
or
ball:0.5:PamNodeImpl

account both activation and incentive salience, and the
propagateActivation(PamLinkable, PamLink, double) method, which
adds support for current incentive salience passing.

Figure 49. The UML class diagram for the MotivationPam class.
Workspace. The Workspace class was modified to support the usage of nonstandard
Node and Link types; namely, the FeelingNode and FeelingLink types.
Secondly, an temporal-link-building algorithm was built into the Workspace as a method.
This method triggers whenever a new event node is added to the Workspace’s Current
Situational Model. This method attempts to build new temporal links from the previous
conscious event in the Conscious Contents Queue (CCQ) to an event in the Current
Situational Model (CSM). The pseudocode of this algorithm can be found in Appendix B.
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Additionally, a FeelingStructureBuildingCodelet was added to the
Workspace, which continually attempts to build new links from feeling nodes in the CSM
to the strongest co-occurring event node in the CSM. Finally, for an attention codelet, the
LIDA framework’s DefaultAttentionCodelet was used, which generically forms
coalitions from sufficiently active Workspace content. Note that no coalitions are created
in the absence of CSM content. This is important because if no broadcast occurs then the
Conscious Contents Queue does not advance. To remedy this, a periodic decay (every
1,000 ticks) was added to the CCQ that removes the oldest queue position.
Global Workspace. The standard LIDA framework GlobalWorkspaceImpl class is
used, but the way the coalition class, CoalitionImpl, computes its activation is
changed. Coalition activation, acoalition , is still based on the base-level activation of the
attention codelet creating the coalition and the average of the salience of each node and
link in the coalition1. However, Node and Link salience is now the sum of the node or
link’s total activation and the absolute value of its total incentive salience.
n

acoaltion = battention−codelet ⋅ ∑ itotal−activation + itotal−incentive−salience n
i=1

In this section I have described the main changes to the LIDA framework required
to implement the proposed motivation model. Chiefly, this extension allows nonstandard
node and link objects to be used as a part of the common representational currency and
adds base-level and current incentive salience to the Learnable and Activatible
interfaces respectively.
1

The conceptual LIDA model includes two additional factors in the calculation of
coalition activation: 1) degree of intersection of the attention codelet’s concern with the
coalition’s content, and 2) a general modulatory activation of the attention codelet module (Madl
& Franklin, 2012). These factors were not used for this simple experimental replication and will
not be further explained here.

205

2D-CLA and PC-CLA with the LIDA Software Framework
In this section I describe my implementation of 2D-CLA and PC-CLA as a software
framework built on top of the existent LIDA software framework. For a time complexity
analysis of the algorithm, see Appendix C.
Cortical Region Setup. The PC-CLA framework uses a factory class called
CorticalRegionFactory to help create CorticalRegionImpl instances. This
factory implements the factory design pattern and stores specifications of the parameters
that define a CorticalRegion. Each of these specifications is implemented as a
CorticalRegionDef (definition) object. To properly initialize an instance of
CorticalRegionImpl with the LIDA software framework, one must declare a
framework module using this class in the agent XML file. This module declaration must
specify the CorticalRegionInitializer class as its initializer class. This
initializer checks for the particular following module parameters: 1)
“corticalRegionDefName,” which specifies the name of the CorticalRegionDef
used by the CorticalRegionFactory. If the name is new, a new definition is
created and added to the factory; otherwise the factory uses the existing definition. In
either case, the CorticalRegionFactory uses the CorticalRegionDef with
this name to help build the CorticalRegionImpl. Note that this allows definitions to
be reused across multiple CorticalRegionImpl instances (and XML declarations).
2) “backgroundTaskType” specifies the factory name (as defined in the factory data
XML file) of the FrameworkTask implementing the processes of the cortical region.
(This task specification is intentionally different from the standard way of initializing
tasks in the LIDA framework. Typically tasks can be declared in the “initialtasks” tag of
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module declaration.) 3) Finally, the “sourceModuleName” parameter specifies the
module name providing the input to the cortical region being defined.
Object-Oriented Design. First I will describe the design of the implementation from a
high level (Figure 50). I define a CorticalRegion interface specifying the basic
operations for cortical regions and conforming to the LIDA framework by extending the
framework’s FrameworkModule interface. The central CorticalRegionImpl
class implements CorticalRegion and CorticalRegionBottomUpSource.
The latter is implemented because we want a cortical region to possibly be the source of
input to a higher cortical region, and the separation of this interface allows other classes
to implement CorticalRegionBottomUpSource. This implementation of intermodule communication is shaped by the decision to implement each cortical region’s
processes as a serial cycle. In an asynchronous implementation of CorticalRegion a
listener design pattern might instead be used to define the communication. Next, I
provide the details of the CorticalRegionImpl class.
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Figure 50. High-level view of the CLA implementation using the LIDA framework.
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Figure 51. A detailed view of the CLA implementation using the LIDA framework. For
clarity, some of the more extraneous class members were omitted.

209

The CorticalRegionImpl class is the central part of the CLA
implementation. The details of this class are diagrammed in Figure 51. BitVector, an
implementation of a Boolean vector is used for the input and output of the class. Each
CorticalRegionImpl has a 2D array of Column instances and a 3D array of Cell
instances as well as a queue of stored SegmentUpdate instances. Column
neighborhoods, specifically, the inhibitionNeighbors and distalLearningNeighbors class
members are implemented using maps where the key is a column and the value is the
column’s neighbors. The FullCorticalRegionTask runs the main loop of the
algorithm. While each column has one proximal dendrite segment, in implementation, I
simply extend DendriteSegmentImpl to help implement ColumnImpl. Predictive
coding is implementing by a relatively simple extension of CorticalRegionImpl
called PredictiveCodingCorticalRegionImpl.
TaskManager. The TaskManager was extended to be able to run a new main class after
the framework is shutdown. In particular, I used this to run a program to parse the log file
after each run of the framework. A new parameter, “postExecutionClass” was added to
the TaskManager, which loads the class with specific canonical name (package name
plus class name).
Another feature that was added is the “shutdown tick” functionality. This allows
the user to specify a tick at which the TaskManager will automatically shutdown the
entire framework application. The shutdown tick is set by specifying a parameter named
“shutdownTick,” having an integer value, in the TaskManager XML declaration.
Logging Analysis. One way I assessed the performance of the CLA implementation was
using the standard Java logger. I added logging statements to record variable values after
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each processing cycle of the algorithm. To aid this effort I used an enumeration called
ClaMeasures to tag the log. Then, using the post execution class functionality describe
in the last section, I used a simple class, ProcessLogFile, to load the log file by a run
of the CLA framework application. Then, using some methods in the DataUtils class,
I separated the logs of each measure into its own file. From here the stand-alone GUI
class DataVisualizer can be used to view individual ClaMeasures as a time
series and along with the series’ average.
CLA GUI. To help visualize the application’s runtime state, I created two GUI “panels,”
which are custom “windows” that can be added to the LIDA framework GUI. These GUI
classes extend the LIDA framework’s GuiPanelImpl. The first such panel,
CorticalRegionVisualizer, displays various aspects of the
CorticalRegionImpl with which it is associated. The possible aspects are defined
by the CorticalRegionAspect enumeration, and include the active columns,
currently predicted columns, columns’ boost values, and current and previous cell states.
The second GUI panel was a simple rendering of the Boolean input sent to the cortical
region.
Conclusions
This chapter presents the software implementations of the motivational extensions to
LIDA as well as the 2D-CLA and PC-CLA algorithms presented in this dissertation. Both
implementations employ several software design patterns, and were designed for
compatibility with the existing LIDA software framework.
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7

Conclusions

Summary of Work
In Chapter 3, I explored how to implement the agenda of an autonomous agent in the
systems-level LIDA cognitive architecture. To this end, I presented a motivation
extension to LIDA covering a range of motivation-related concepts, including feelings,
affective valence, incentive salience, emotion, appraisal, reinforcement learning, and
model-free and model-based learning. This extension adds new faculties to the LIDA
model including drive feelings, affective valence, incentive salience, and temporal
difference learning. I discussed the role of motivations in a single LIDA cognitive cycle,
as well as over multiple cycles. As an initial step in validating this motivational
extension, I presented a computational implementation of a LIDA-based agent that
replicates the results of an existing “reinforcer devaluation” experiment, which tested the
agent’s ability to learn, and later update, the reward predicting attributes of stimuli that
drive its behavior.
In Chapter 4, I identified several guiding principles on the nature of perceptual
representation, perceptual inference, and the associated learning processes. Guided by
these principles, in particular, the free-energy principle, I suggested combining ideas from
the computational HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA) and the mathematical
Generalized Filtering. As an initial step in this direction, I presented my implementation
of CLA, termed 2D-CLA, which modifies the receptive fields of the algorithm to have
limited 2D receptive fields. Over several tests I explored some of the basic properties of
the spatial pooling portion of 2D-CLA on artificial 2D patterns. I evaluated the sparse
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distributed output of spatial pooling; namely, the active columns representation. Such
testing provides new insights into this little-studied algorithm.
In Chapter 5, I proposed a general-purpose predictive coding extension to the
HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms, termed PC-CLA, which is proposed as a
foundational building block for the systems-level LIDA cognitive architecture. PC-CLA
fleshes out LIDA’s internal representations, memory, learning and attentional processes,
and takes an initial step towards the comprehensive use of distributed and probabilistic
(uncertain) representation throughout the architecture.
Summary of Contributions
In the Artificial Motivations Chapter (Chapter 3) I discuss how to extend the broad
systems-level LIDA cognitive architecture to incorporate these various motivational
concepts and mechanisms. The aspects implemented include feelings as motivators,
valence, incentive salience, reinforcement learning, temporal difference learning, modelfree control, and model-based control. These additions include changes to aspects of the
LIDA model’s memory, current representations, and notion of salience. To complement
these additions to the LIDA conceptual model, this work additionally extends the
software framework implementation of the LIDA model to include support for
motivation. Specifically, this work 1) adds an implementation of feelings nodes having
affective valence, 2) extends regular nodes allowing for current and base-level incentive
salience, 3) extends links to pass incentive salience, and 4) adds learning algorithms
related to incentive salience including temporal difference learning to LIDA’s PAM. To
begin validating the proposed motivational extension, a computational LIDA agent
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replicates a psychological experiment testing motivational phenomena in biological
agents.
Perception and pattern recognition are oft-ignored subjects in cognitive models,
which are typically high-level. On the other hand, connectionist approaches to intelligent
algorithms are not always concerned with algorithms suitable for systems-level cognitive
architectures, which require online learning and unsupervised learning, and cannot have a
human in the loop. In Chapters 4 and 5 I explore an algorithm capable of processing high
dimensional inputs, which has relevance to cognitive architectures. In Chapter 4 I present
a modification to the HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA), termed 2D-CLA. 2DCLA adds limited 2D receptive fields to CLA to more closely model the way biological
intelligence deals with high-dimensional “natural” data, e.g., audio and visual. I then
describe several tests of the algorithm with relevance to both 2D-CLA and CLA. While
the HTM theory has enjoyed some interest, to date there have been relatively few
published works on the CLA. In Chapter 5 I present a novel predictive coding extension
to the CLA algorithm, PC-CLA, which allows the algorithm to be repeated recursively in
a hierarchy (McCall & Franklin, 2013). I then present additional tests of the CLA
providing new insights into its properties and the effects of varying its parameters. I also
report on initial tests of hierarchy with PC-CLA, which has not seen previous study.
In Chapter 6 I described the software implementations of the motivational
extension to LIDA as well as the 2D-CLA and PC-CLA algorithms presented in this
dissertation. Both implementations employ several software design patterns and have
good compatibility with the existing LIDA software framework.
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In summary, while my research has several goals, it has produced these particular
contributions to Computer Science and Cognitive Science:
•

Development of the generic parts of the LIDA software framework allowing for
rapid and highly-customizable implementations of LIDA software agents (Ch. 2)

•

Conceptual modeling of motivation in much of cognition using the LIDA model.
Motivation is a fundamental, often-overlooked aspect of cognitive architectures.
(Ch. 3)

•

Extends the computational LIDA software framework to support the conceptual
motivation model (Ch. 6)

•

Part of the proposed work will validate the motivational extension of LIDA via
the replication of an existing experimental result (Ch. 3)

•

Conceptual modeling of high-dimensional perception in cognition necessary for
intelligent agents with rich senses to succeed in complex environments (Ch. 4–5)

•

Suggests a theoretical view (the free-energy principle) and accompanying
algorithm (PC-CLA) that sees the processes of a systems-level cognitive
architecture as performing general data assimilation based on patterns in time.
This principled approach may help unify existing approaches by providing a core
conceptual framework for mental processes (Ch. 4–5)

•

Fleshes out a method for biologically plausible, limited, overlapping, 2D
receptive fields for the Cortical Learning Algorithms (CLA) making the algorithm
more suitable for processing visual stimuli (Ch. 4)

•

Tests and evaluates some of the basic aspects of the CLA, previously undescribed
by published work, including its sparse distributed representations, noise
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robustness, parameters and their effects, “boosting” mechanism, and memory
quality (Ch. 4–5)
•

Extends the Cortical Learning Algorithms, by adding predictive coding, to
support hierarchical versions of the algorithm. This allows for hierarchical
decomposition, which is crucial in managing complexity in data analysis and
pattern recognition (Ch. 5)

•

Extends the LIDA software framework to support high-dimensional pattern
recognition, which was previously unsupported. This allows LIDA agents to cope
with sensory data streams of much greater complexity (Ch. 6)

Limitations
Concerning the work described in Chapter 3 on Artificial Motivations there are some
limitations. This work did not attempt to model human-level emotions such as jealousy or
shame, rather it provides lower-level mechanisms, which I hope will aid in explaining
such phenomena. While I have described multi-cyclic deliberative decision-making
conceptually and began approaching it computationally, deliberation, as a complex
phenomenon, requires a more extensive study in a variety of settings, and not just simple
experimental ones. While I theoretically proposed drive feeling nodes and describe their
role in learning and their relation to current incentive salience, this proposal must be
validated in more experimental replications and complex real-world tasks. Finally the
motivational extension to LIDA should be evaluated in more complex unstructured
domains.
For Chapters 4 and 5 on 2D-CLA and PC-CLA, I only conceptually described the
representation of uncertainty in terms of precisions parameters as well as the estimation
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of these parameters from prediction errors. Serious work is needed to best implement and
validate such an extension. Additionally, the underlying representations of columns and
cells in these algorithms are Boolean, as opposed to scalar, which might afford greater
expressiveness. My computational implementation of these algorithms employs serial
processes, but there is tremendous promise of runtime speedup if such processes were
implemented in parallel and/or for GPUs. Lastly, the testing of these algorithms on a
varied battery of real-world data, e.g., audio, visual, haptic, would help begin to support
claims of the generality of the algorithm in the assimilation of data based on cooccurrence and sequence in time.
Future Directions
(In this section I summarize possible avenues for future work beyond the scope of this
dissertation. I am not proposing to address the items below for the final version of this
dissertation.)
In Chapter 3 in the section on the temporal difference learning of base-level
incentive salience it was assumed that that the discount factor, γ, was fixed. However,
changes in physiological state (e.g., stress) may serve to dynamically modulate this
factor. Future work could, in general, explore the situations where emotions modulate the
agent in a physiological way.
Another avenue of future research may involve the so-called, eligibility traces,
which “trace” the credit assignment of temporal difference learning back further in time
than the immediately previous event. Eligibility traces can be viewed as providing a
short-term memory of multiple previous events so that several of these previous events
may all be updated as each new observation arrives. Eligibility traces are usually
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implemented by an exponentially decaying memory trace, with decay parameter λ (Barto,
2007).
In Chapters 4 and 5, I discussed the representation of statistical uncertainty
theoretically; I have tabled the implementation of it in this dissertation. Adding
uncertainty to the algorithm would require precision units to be added to the algorithm,
which would estimate the uncertainty in information sources based on accumulated
prediction error, and then, based on this estimate, weight these prediction error signals.
A second avenue of future work with the CLA involves replacing binary
representations with scalar ones. For instance, Snaider (2012) has found that integer
vectors of limited range (e.g., 0–15) constitute a useful tradeoff between the
expressiveness of scalar representation and the computational efficiency of Boolean
representations. This added expressiveness may be particular helpful since PC-CLA
intrinsically requires multiple representations to be integrated into a single one, since a
single cortical region’s state is a concomitant of 1) a bottom-up signal, 2) a top-down
prediction, and 3) an internal temporal prediction.
Since PC-CLA makes few assumptions about the type of sensory data it receives
there is the promise of it having applicability to a range of data streams including
auditory, visual, haptic, etc. Much further research and testing of the general efficacy of
the algorithm are required. While I developed tests of the degradation of spatial memory
and the noise robustness of the spatial pooling process, analogous tests are still needed
for temporal memory and the temporal pooler. Finally, with some “deep” learning
networks employing up to ten hierarchical levels (Ye, 2013), more than two levels should
be tested with PC-CLA.
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With regards to the implementation of PC-CLA, some future work might take aim
at rewriting the code so that cortical region processes can run in parallel on separate
threads as opposed to running synchronously as they currently do.
There are several open issues regarding PC-CLA’s use as a building block for the
LIDA model, including how PC-CLA would incorporate LIDA’s Sensory-Motor
Memory, the memory for motor plans that specifies actuator execution routines.
However, there are reasons to believe such research would be fruitful (Friston, 2011).
Additionally if PC-CLA is used to implement a systems-level LIDA agent, a
methodology for building in motivations to bias particular patterns would be required
(Friston et al., 2009). This would require implementing such constructs as feeling nodes
and incentive salience using distributed connectionist representation, and not atomic ones
as was done in Chapter 3.
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Appendix B – Selected Pseudocode
In this Appendix I present the pseudocode for a selection of the algorithms described in
this Dissertation. The pseudocode is present as one or more functions, each taking a set of
inputs and returning an output.
Motivational Agent. A critical aspect of the motivational agent is the ability to build
novel temporal links between events having a temporal order. Here I present the
pseudocode of the algorithm employed in the Workspace to build such links.
Function BuildTemporalLink(n, csmStructure, temporal)
Adds potential links to the current situational model based on temporal order of
conscious events
inputs:
n, A node that is a part of the current percept
csmStructure, A node-and-link graph representing
the current situation
temporal, Flag signifying a temporal link
local variables:
broadcastQueue, A queue of recent conscious broadcasts
latestBroadcast, Most recent conscious broadcast, a graph
source, Potential source of temporal link
sink, Potential sink of temporal link
latestBroadcast ! broadcastQueue.Pop()
sink ! n
// If latest broadcast already contains n then n assume n
// has been ongoing and that no temporal link should be created
if latestBroadcast.Contains(sink) = false then
source ! GetFirstEvent(latestBroadcast, temporal)
if source is not null then
// Add source if not already present in CSM
if csmStructure.Contains(source) = false then
csmStructure.AddNode(source)
// Add link if it does not create a two-link cycle
if csmStructure.Contains(sink, source, temporal) = false then
csmStructure.AddLink(source, sink, temporal)
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2D-CLA. 2D-CLA adds limited 2D receptive fields to the CLA. The shape of the
receptive fields is modeled using a bivariate Normal distribution. Here I present the
pseudocode that generates these 2D receptive fields.
function AddProximalSynapses(column, heightBound, widthBound, synapseFactor,
rfSigma, connectionThreshold)
Adds synapses to specified column connecting it to the input space. The receptive field’s
shaped is determined by a bivariate Normal distribution.
inputs:

column, Proximal synapses will be added to this column
heightBound, Height of the square-shaped input space
widthBound, Width of the square-shaped input space
synapseFactor, Multiplicative constant used to calculate the number of
synapses connected to a given input bit
rfSigma, Controls the dispersion of the receptive field
connectionThreshold, Threshold at which synapses are “connected”
local variables: boundingRadius, Radius of a circle that overestimates the extent of
the area where Bivariate Normal distribution
gives a positive output
boundingRadiusSquared, Square of boundingRadius
sigmaSquared, Square of rfSigma
twoSigmaSquared, Twice sigmaSquared
normalization, Normalization term of Normal distribution function
heightMin, Lower y bound of a square bounding the receptive field
heightMax, Upper y bound of a square bounding the receptive field
widthMin, Lower x bound of a square bounding the receptive field
widthMax, Upper x bound of a square bounding the receptive field
distanceSquared, Square of distance between an input dimension
column’s position
synapses, Number of synapses to be connected to a given input
position
newSynapse, A single newly generated synapse
boundingRadius ! 2 * rfSigma + 1
boundingRadiusSquared ! Power(boundingRadius, 2)
sigmaSquared ! Power(rfSigma, 2)
twoSigmaSquared ! 2 * sigmaSquared
normalization ! synapseFactor / (twoSigmaSquared * PI)
// Calculate height and width bounds of a square bounding the circular receptive field
heightMin ! Floor(column.InputHeightPosition – boundingRadius)
if heightMin < 0
heightMin ! 0
heightMax ! Floor(column.InputHeightPosition + boundingRadius)
if heightMax > heightBound – 1
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heightMax ! heightBound – 1
widthMin ! Floor(column.InputWidthPosition – boundingRadius)
if widthMin < 0
widthMin ! 0
widthMax ! Floor(column.InputWidthPosition + boundingRadius)
if widthMax > widthBound – 1
widthMax ! widthBound – 1
for i = heightMin to heightMax do
for j = widthMin to widthMax do
distanceSquared ! Power(i – heightPosition, 2) + Power(j – widthPosition, 2)
if distanceSquared <= boundingRadiusSquared then
synapses ! Round(normalization * Exponential(–distanceSquared /
twoSigmaSquared))
for s = 0 to synapses do
newSynapse ! AddPotentialSynapse(column, i, j)
if newSynapse.Permanence >= connectionThreshold then
AddConnectedSynapse(column, newSynapse)
PC-CLA. In this section I present some pseudocode for the PC-CLA algorithm. I focus on the
parts of algorithm unique to PC-CLA, or those parts that are modified from the original CLA. I
start with those functions, a part of the spatial pooling portion of the algorithm, which were
modified. The function ComputeOverlappingColumns is invoked first, followed immediately by
ComputeActiveColumns, which uses GetKthColumn as a subroutine. Finally
PerformSpatialLearning would be called by the main loop of the algorithm.
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function ComputeOverlappingColumns(falseNegativeError, columns, predictedColumns,
predictedColumnOverlap,
columnOverlapThreshold)
returns a set of columns whose receptive fields significantly overlap with active inputs
inputs:

falseNegativeError, Current unpredicted input activity
columns, The cortical region’s columns
predictedColumnOverlap, Overlap score given to predicted columns
columnOverlapThreshold, Threshold defining sufficient column overlap
local variables: newBoost, New boost value for a column
activityScore, Synaptic activity of a particular column
overlappingColumns, Columns whose synaptic connections
sufficiently overlap with active inputs
for each column in columns do
newBoost ! 0
if column.PotentialSynapseCount > 0 then
activityScore ! 0
if predictedColumns.Contains(column) then
activityScore ! predictedColumnOverlap
else
for each synapse in column.ConnectedSynapses do
if inputError[synapse.SourceInputIndex] = true then
activityScore++
activityScore ! activityScore / column.PotentialSynapseCount
if activityScore > columnOverlapThreshold then
newBoost ! activityScore * column.Boost
overlappingColumns.Add(column)
column.BoostedOverlap ! newBoost
return overlappingColumns
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function ComputeActiveColumns(overlappingColumns, inhibitionRadius,
columnCount, k)
returns a set of active columns representing the current bottom-up input
inputs:

PI, Ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter
overlappingColumns, Columns whose synaptic connections sufficiently
overlap with active inputs
inhibitionRadius, Average distance of a connected synapse from its
column across all proximal synapses in the cortical region
columnCount, Number of columns in the cortical region
k, Sparsity parameter governing density of active columns per unit area
local variables:
inhibitionArea, An estimate of the size of a column’s receptive
field
maxPossibleNeighbors, Largest possible inhibition neighborhood
for a column
kthColumn, K-th most active column in a neighborhood
activeColumns, list of active columns
inhibitionArea ! PI * Power(inhibitionRadius, 2)
//Inhibition area could be larger than area of all columns for some parameters
maxPossibleNeighbors ! Min(inhibitionArea, columnCount)
for each column in overlappingColumns do
kthColumn ! GetKthColumn(GetNeighbors(column), maxPossibleNeighbors, k)
if kthColumn is not null then
if column.BoostedOverlap >= kthColumn.BoostedOverlap then
activeColumns.Add(column)
return activeColumns
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function GetKthColumn(neighbors, maxNeighbors, k)
returns the column with k-th highest overlap among a specified collection
inputs:

neighbors, List of columns neighboring each other
maxNeighbors, most possible neighbors a column could possibly have
k, Place of the returned column in terms of its boosted overlap
local variables: kthColumn, Column with k-th highest overlap
scaling, Measure of how large neighborhood is as compared to the
maximumally sized neighborhood
scaledIndex, Index of k-th most active column, scaled for
neighborhood size
kthColumn ! null
if maxNumNeighbors > 0 then
scaling ! neighbors.Size / maxNumNeighbors
// As neighborhood size decreases, less columns can be k-th highest or better
scaledIndex ! Round(scaling * k) – 1
if scaledIndex >= 0 and scaledIndex < neighbors.Size
Sort(neighbors) //Sort by boosted overlap score
kthColumn ! neighbors.Get(scaledIndex)
return kthColumn
function PerformSpatialLearning(columns, falseNegativeError, falsePositiveError,
proximalLearningIncrement, proximalLearningDecrement)
Updates the proximal synapses of columns in response to bottom-up prediction error.
inputs:

columns, Cortical region’s columns
falseNegativeError, Current unpredicted input activity
falsePositiveError, Current falsely predicted input activity
proximalLearningIncrement, Positive change amount for proximal synapses
proximalLearningDecrement, Negative change amount for proximal synapses

for each column in columns do
UpdateBoost(column)
for each synapse in column.PotentialSynapses do
if falseNegativeError[synapse.InputIndex] = true then
UpdatePermanence(synapse, proximalLearningIncrement)
if falsePositiveError[synapse.InputIndex] = true then
UpdatePermanence(synapse, proximalLearningDecrement)
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The subsequent functions are related to the inter-cortical-region message passing.
The first describes how a cortical region generates a top-down prediction of its input. The
second describes how a cortical region incorporates a top-down prediction into its state,
and the third illustrates how a cortical region’s output signal, for a higher cortical region,
is produced.
function GetTopDownPrediction(oneOrderPredictedColumns, inputCoverage,
predictionThreshold)
returns The cortical region’s current top-down prediction of its bottom-up input
inputs:

oneOrderPredictedColumns, Columns predicted for the next time step
inputCoverage, Array, over the input dimensions, containing the number of
synaptic connections to each input dimension
predictionThreshold, Threshold determing whether top-down synaptic activity
counts toward the top-down prediction
local variables: predictionCounts, Number of predictions for each input dimension
prediction, Boolean prediction of cortical region’s next bottom-up
input
for each column in oneOrderPredictedColumns do
for each synapse in column.ConnectedSynapses do
predictionCounts[synapse.SourceInputIndex]++
for i = 0 to predictionCounts.Length – 1 do
if inputPredictions[i] / inputCoverage[i] > predictionThreshold then
prediction[i] ! true
return prediction
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function ProcessTopDownPrediction() incorporates a received top-down prediction with
the cortical region’s cell state
inputs:

tdPrediction, Current top-down prediction received from higher region
cells, Cells of the cortical region as a 1D array
regionHeight, Height of the cortical region’s column and cell space
regionWidth, Width of the cortical region’s column and cell space
cellsPerColumn, Number of cells in each column
local variables: heightOffset, Offset for 3D to 1D array conversion
heightOffset = regionWidth * cellsPerColumn
for i = 0 to regionHeight – 1 do
for j = 0 to regionWidth – 1 do
for k = 0 to cellsPerColumn – 1 do
index ! i * heightOffset + j * cellsPerColumn + k
if tdPrediction[index] = true then
cells[i][j][k].IsPredictedCurrently ! true
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function ComputeOutput(cells, regionHeight, regionWidth, cellsPerColumn) returns the
current output of a cortical region to its immediately hierarchically superior cortical
region.
inputs:

cells, Cells of the cortical region as a 1D array
regionHeight, Height of the cortical region’s column and cell space
regionWidth, Width of the cortical region’s column and cell space
cellsPerColumn, Number of cells in each column
local variables: output, The cortical region’s boolean output
heightOffset, Offset for 3D to 1D array conversion
heightOffset ! regionWidth * cellsPerColumn
for i = 0 to regionHeight – 1 do
for j = 0 to regionWidth – 1 do
for k = 0 to cellsPerColumn – 1 do
if cells[i][j][k].IsActiveCurrently or
cells[i][j][k].IsPredictedCurrently then
output[i * heightOffset + j * cellsPerColumn + k] ! true
return output
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Appendix C – PC-CLA Complexity Analysis
Below, I provide an analysis of the time requirements of the PC-CLA algorithm. The
definitions of the variables used are given in Table 14. I perform this analysis with some
parameters involved. While the asymptotic runtime complexity does not change for these
various parameter values, I present the work in terms of these parameters to get a better
sense of the cost of the algorithm as a function of these parameters.
Initialization Phase
Function: SetupForCycle
Time Complexity: O(cpn)
Comment: Requires updating state of each cell.
Function: ComputeInhibitionRadius
Time Complexity: O(s p pn)
Comment: Requires computing the average distance of each connected proximal synapse
from its column’s center.
Function: UpdateInhibitionRadius
Time Complexity: O(r i2pn)
Comment: For each column ( pn) , requires computing the column’s neighboring columns
having size at most.
Phase Total: Sum of these functions’ runtimes is and, under the condition s p > ri 2 , this
simplifies to O(s p pn) .
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Table 14. The parameters used in the complexity analysis of the PC-CLA algorithm.
Parameter
Input size
Projection factor
Connected synapses
per column
Inhibition radius

Inhibition neighbors
Active column ratio
Cells per column
Dendrite segments
per cell
Maximum synapses
per distal segment
Distal learning radius

Highest segment
prediction order

Associated Description
variable
n
The dimensionality of the input
p
Ratio of number of columns to
the input size
sp
An upper bound on the number
of connected synapses per
column
Radius of the circle about a
ri
column that defines that
column’s inhibition
neighborhood
nbrs
Number of columns within a
circle of radius inhibition
radius
Ratio of active columns to total
k
columns in a cortical region
Number of cells in each
c
column
ds
Number of unique distal
dendrite segments associated
with each cell
sd
Absolute limit on number of
synapses per distal dendrite
segment
rd
Radius of a circle about the
column where new distal
synapses are being adding.
Only cells within this circle
can be selected as a new
synapse’s source.
o
Largest number of cycles in
advance a distal dendrite
segment will predict for future
activity
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Example
value
529
4
50
5.2

85
0.02
7
5
32
7

4

Spatial Pooling Phase
Function: ComputeOverlappingColumns
Time Complexity: O(s p pn)
Comment: Computes each column’s boosted overlap score.
Function: ComputeActiveColumns
Time Complexity: O(nbrs ⋅log 2 (nbrs) ⋅kpn)
Comment: For each overlapping column, this function performs a merge sort, which has

O(n log 2 (n)) time complexity.
Function: PerformSpatialLearning
Time Complexity: O((2s p + nbrs) pn)
Comment: In the worst case, all synapses on all columns must be updated twice.
Phase Total: O(dpn), d = max{s p , k(nbrs log 2 (nbrs)), 2s p + nbrs}
Assuming the active columns ratio is near 0.02, i.e., k = 0.02, then the third argument
wins the max operation over the second argument and d = 2s p + nbrs . This gives us a
total time complexity of O((2s p + nbrs) pn) .
Temporal Pooling
Function: UpdateActiveCells
Time Complexity: O((ds ⋅ ck)(sd pn))
Comment: For each cell of each active column of which there are ckpn , we must check
its distal dendrites segments and their synapses for various conditions. In the worst case
this amounts to sd (2ds +1)ckpn operations. Dropping constants in the parenthesis and
refactoring for comparison with other functions gives O((ds ⋅ ck)(sd pn)) .
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Function: UpdatePredictiveCells
Time Complexity: O((ds⋅c)(sd pn))
Comment: In the worst case, for every cell, cpn , we have to check all of its distal
dendrite segments and their synapses for sd ⋅ds ⋅ cpn operations. Factoring this term for
easy comparison with the other functions gives O((ds ⋅ c)(sd pn)) .
Function: PerformTemporalLearning
Time Complexity: O(ock(sd pn))
Comment: The time complexity can be easily stated as O(u ⋅ sd ) , where u is the number
of segment updates processed on average during each cycle. Segment updates are queued
in the functions UpdateActiveCells and UpdatePredictiveCells. The former will queue at
most kpn updates to be performed in the same cycle. The latter will store as many
updates as there are predicted cells, which I estimate to be about kcpn . Additionally, at a
given cycle updates queued a variable number of cycles previously may require
processing. Let o represent the highest order of segment update queued in the function
UpdatePredictiveCells. We then have:

u = kpn + okcpn
u = (oc +1)kpn
⇒ O(sd (oc +1)kpn) = O(ock(sd pn))

Phase Total: The first function loses out to the second because of the added k term, which
is always less than 1.0. The third function also loses out to the second since ok will
almost certainly be less than 1.0 as well. So, due to the function UpdatePredictiveCells,
this phase has an overall time complexity of O(sd ds ⋅ cpn)
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Message Passing Phase
Function: ComputeTopDownPrediction
Time Complexity: O(s p pn + n) = O((s p p +1)n)
Comment: In the worst case we must check each proximal synapse on each column in the
region counting up the number of times an input is predicted. Then a final pass over each
input bit checks if its prediction activity meets a threshold.
Function: ProcessTopDownPrediction
Time Complexity: O(cpn)
Comment: In the worst case this involves updating the state of all cells in the region.
Function: ComputeOutput
Time Complexity: O(cpn)
Comment: Possibly involves all cells in the region.
Phase Total: Technically, it could be O((s p p +1)n) or O(cpn) . However, since the cost
of cells per column, c, grows much faster than s p , it is unlikely that c > s p . Furthermore,
since s p > c in this implementation, I will assume that O((s p p +1)n) dominates.
Algorithm Total
The temporal pooling phase dominates the others phases with a time complexity of
O(sd ds(cpn)) . This casts the spotlight on the parameters, c, ds, and sd. With high values

for these parameters the cortical region has great capacity to learn temporal patterns with
the drawback of greatly increasing the time complexity of the algorithm. To illustrate this
total cost using the somewhat modest example values given in Table 14 we have a
theoretical time complexity of O(4480n) .
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